Glass, 
Book. 



January, 1833. 

NEW AND INTERESTING WORKS 

PUBLISHED BY 

J. HATCHARD & SON, 187, PICCADILLY. 



SCRIPTURAL RESEARCHES; 

By the Right Hon. SIR GEORGE HENRY ROSE, Bart. 
12mo. 7s. 6d. bds. 

THE SCRIPTURE GARDEN WALK ; 

Comprising the Botanical Exposition and Natural History of every Plant in 
the Sacred Scriptures ; with appropriate Reflections and Original Poetry. Post 
8vo. 10s. 6d. bds. Illustrated with an elegant Vignette Title. 

HQN. MISS C. GRIMSTON'S PRAYER BOOK. 
THE FORMS OF MORNING and EVENING PRAYER, 

according to the use of the United Church of England and Ireland, together 
with the Psalms of David. To which are added, the First Lessons, to be 
read on Sundays, and the Second Lessons, as they are appointed to be said 
every Morning and Evening in the year. 

The whole arranged in the order in which they are used ; the first volume 
containing the Morning, and the second the Evening Service. Third Edition. 
2 vols. 12mo. 18s. boards, or 11. 10s. bound in morocco. 

CHRIST OUR EXAMPLE ; 

'By the Author of the " Listener," '' Scripture Reader's Guide," &c. &c. 
12mo. 6s. bds. 

THE ANNALS OF MY VILLAGE : 

Being a Calendar of Nature for every month in the year. With Illustrations. 
By the Author of " Select Female Biography," " Conchologist's Companion," 
&c. 8vo. 12s. bound in canvas. 

COMPARATIVE COINCIDENCE OF REASON 
AND SCRIPTURE 

3 vols. 8vo. £l. 7s. bds. 

A MANUAL of RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION 

to assist Parents for preparing their children for the RITE of CONFIRMATION, 
and the more Solemn Duty of receiving the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper. 
By a Lay Member of the Church of England. 12mo. 6s. bds. 

JOHANNICE; a Poem, in two Cantos, 
MONODY ON LORD BYRON, AND OTHER POEMS. 
By the Rev. JOHN DRYDEN PIGOT, Jun., B. A. of Christ Church, Oxford, 
and Chaplain to the most Hon. the Marquis of Tweeddale. 8vo. 6s. 



WORKS PUBLISHED BY J. HATCHARD AND SON. 



BISHOP OF CHESTER'S WORKS. 

1. A PRACTICAL EXPOSITION of the GOSPELS of 

ST. MATTHEW and ST. MARK, in the form of Lectures, intended to assist 
the Practice of Domestic Instruction and Devotion. Third Edition. 8vo. 
or 2 vols. 12mo. 9s bds. 

2. A PRACTICAL EXPOSITION of the GOSPEL of ST. LUKE, in 
1 vol. 8vo. or 2 vols. 12mo. 9*. bds. 

3. SERMONS on the PRINCIPAL FESTIVALS of the CHRISTIAN 
CHURCH; to which are added, Three Sermons on Good Friday. Third Edi- 
tion. 8vo. 10s. 6d. bds. or 12mo. 6s. bds. 

4. THE EVIDENCE of CHRISTIANITY, derived from its NATURE and 
RECEPTION. Fifth Edition, 8vo. 10*. 6d. or 12mo. 6s. bds. 

5. A SERIES of SERMONS on the CHRISTIAN FAITH and CHA- 
RACTER. Eighth Edition. 8vo. 10s. 6d. bds. or 12mo. 6s. bds. 

6. APOSTOLICAL PREACHING CONSIDERED, in an Examination of 
St. Paul's Epistles. Also, FOUR SERMONS on Subjects relating to the 
Christian Ministry, and preached on different Occasions. Seventh Edition, 
enlarged, 8vo. 10s. 6d. bds. 

7. A TREATISE on the RECORDS of the CREATION, and on the Moral 
Attributes of the Creator. Sixth Edition. 2 vols. 8vo. \l. Is. bds. 

LETTERS to the YOUNG. By MARIA JANE 

JEWSBURY. Third Edition, enlarged. 12mo. 6s. boards. 

By the same Author, 
LAYS of LEISURE HOURS. 12mo. 5s. boards. 

SCENES IN OUR PARISH. By a "Country 

Parson's " Daughter. Second Edition, corrected. 12mo. 5s. bds. 

By the same Author, 
A SECOND SERIES. 12rao. 5s. bds. 

SHORT MEMORIALS of the LORD'S GOODNESS ; 

illustrated in the following Narratives : — Old Gabriel, *' Catherine Radden," 
" Hamlet of St. Budeaux," " The Aged Shepherd," " The Aged Widow," " The 
Aged Gypsey," "Visits to a Cottage," "Serious Thoughts for the Aged," 
" On the Power and Grace of the Holy Spirit. 12mo. 4s. 6d. bds. 

BY THE REV. HENRY BLUNT. 
1. TWELVE LECTURES upon the HISTORY of ST. 

PAUL, delivered during Lent, 1831, at the Church of the Holy Trinity, 
Upper Chelsea. Part I. Third Edition, 12mo. 5s. 6rf. canvas. 

2. TWELVE LECTURES upon the HISTORY of ABRAHAM. Fifth 
Edition. 12mo. 5s. 6d. canvas. 

3. NINE LECTURES upon the HISTORY of ST. PETER; Eighth Edition. 
12ino. 4s. 6d. canvas. 

4. EIGHT LECTURES upon the HISTORY of JACOB ; Ninth Edition. 
12mo. 4s. 6(2. canvas. 

The LIFE of PETER HOUGHTON, B. A. late assistant 

Curate of Walton-le-Dale. By ROGER CARUS WILSON, M. A. Vicar of 
Preston, Lancashire. 1 2mo. 3s. bds. 



WORKS PUBLISHED BY J. HATCHARD AND SON. 



BRIEF MEMORIALS of the LIFE and CHARACTER of 

the late Rev. JOHN EDMUND JONES, M. A. of St. Edmund Hall, Oxford. 
By THOMAS PAGE, M. A. of Magdelene Hall, Oxford, and Curate of Rugby. 
l2mo. 3s. bds. 

VILLAGE LECTURES, illustrating in simple lan- 

guage the Creation and Fall of Man, and arranged in the form of Addresses for 
Family and Parochial Reading. By the Rev. J. D. PARMETER, late ot 
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. 12mo. 3s. 6d. boards. 

SERMONS on the FIFTY THIRD CHAPTER of 

ISAIAH, the Beatitudes and other Subjects, By JOHN HAMBLETON, M, A. 
Minister of the Chapel of Ease, Islington. Second Edition. 8vo. 10s. 6d. l>ds. 

RESEARCHES in GREECE and the LEVANT. By 

the Rev. JOHN HARTLEY, M. A. late Missionary in the Mediterranean, 
cr. 8vo. 6s. cloth bds. 

BRIEF MEMOIRS of the late Right Reverend JOHN 

THOMAS JAMES, D. D., Lord Bishop of Calcutta particularly during his 
Residence in India; gathered from his Letters and Papers, by the Rev. ED- 
WARD JAMES, M. A. Prebendary of Winchester, and Examining Chaplain 
to the Lord Bishop of the Diocese. 8vo. 7s. 6a. bds. 

OCCASIONAL THOUGHTS on Select Texts of Scrip- 
ture. By the late JOHN MASON GOOD, M. D. with a Portrait of the Au- 
thor. 12mo. 3s. 6d. bds. 

EXTRACTS from the Religious Works of LA MOTHE 

FENELON, Archbishop of Cambray. Translated from the original French, by 
MISS MARSHALL. Eighth Edition. 12mo. 6s. bds. 

ENGLISH PRISONERS in FRANCE, containing Ob- 

servations on their Manners and Habits, principally with reference to their 
Religious State, during Nine YeaTs' Residence in the Depots of Fontainebleau, 
Verdun, Givet, and Valenciennes. By the Rev. R. B. WOLFE, Chaplain. 8vo. 
7s. 6d. bds. 

LETTERS on the CLIMATE, INHABITANTS, PRO- 
DUCTIONS, &c. of the Neilgherries, or Blue Mountains of Coimbatoor, South 
India. By JAMES HOUGH, of Madras. 8vo. 6s. bds. 

By the same Author, 

The MISSIONARY VADE MECUM, containing Information and Suggestions 
for the use of Missionaries, Missionary Candidates, and Committees. ]2mo. 2s. 
canvas. 

JUVENILE SUNDAY LIBRARY, Vol. L, containing 

Lives of the Apostles and Early Martyrs of the Church. 18mo. 4s. neatly 
half-bound. 

A SHORT TREATISE on the MILLENNIUM, in which 

the Reign of Christ during that period is shown from Scripture to be Spiritual ; 
and the Signs and Miracles, urged as proofs of his near personal Advent, to 
be fallacious. By a Clergyman of the Established Church. 12mo. 3s. hds. 

A NEW METRICAL PSALTER. By a Clergyman of 

the Established Church. 32mo. 3s. 6d. bound in canvas. 



WORKS PUBLISHED BY J. HATCHARD AND SON. 



SIX LECTURES, on the PARABLE of the PRODIGAL 

SON, delivered in the Parish Church of Bradford- Abbas, Dorset, during Lent, 
1830. By the Rev. ROBERT GRANT, B. C. L., Vicar. 12mo. 3*. bds. 

AN EXTRAORDINARY, but AUTHENTIC NARRA- 
TIVE of the PENITENCE and DEATH of the Notorious Mrs. D***. By the 
late Rev. HENRY REVELL, M.A. Author of " Sermons," " Essays," &c. 12mo. 
5s. bds. 

The FAMILY MONITOR. 8vo. 10s. 6d. canvas. 

N. B. A work calculated, from the information which it contains on do- 
mestic subjects, and its varied useful matter, to interest every member of a 
family; and peculiarly designed for the religious instruction and general im- 
provement of Servants. 

The ANNALS of the POOR ; containing the Dairyman's 

Daughter, the Negro Servant, and Young Cottager. To which are added, The 
Cottage Conversation, and a Visit to the Infirmary. By the Rev. LEGH RICH- 
MOND, A.M., late Rector of Turvey, Bedfordshire. With an Introductory 
Sketch of the Author, by the Rev. John Ayre, A.M. 

A new Edition, 18mo., 3s. 6d. boards, with Ten highly-finished Wood-cuts, 
illustrative of the scenes described in the different Tales. 

The same work in a neat foolscap volume, illustrated with a Portrait of the 
Author, and other Engravings, by Edward Finden. 75. bds. 

REMARKS on CLERICAL EDUCATION. By the 

Rev. H. RAIKES, A.M., Chancellor of the Diocese of Chester. 12mo. 5s. bds. 

A MEMOIR of the REV. ROBERT P BEACHCROFT, 

A.M. Rector of Blunbam, Bedfordshire, and Chaplain to the Right Hon. Viscount 
Goderich, &c. kc By THOMAS ANTHONY METHUEN, A.M. Rector of 
All Cannings and Garsdon, Wilts, and Chaplain to his Grace the Duke of 
Beaufort. 12mo. 5*. bds. 

A MEMOIR of the late Mrs. NEWNHAM of FARN- 

HAM ; with a Selection from her Papers and Correspondence. By W. NEWN- 
HAM, Esq. 12mo. 5i. 6d. bds. 

By the same Author, 

1 A TRIBUTE OF SYMPATHY, addressed to Mourners. 6th Edition, 
12mo. 5s. bds. 

2. ESSAY on SUPERSTITION ; being an Inquiry into the Effects of Phy- 
sical Influence on the Mind, in the Production of Dreams, Visions, Ghosts, and 
other Supernatural Appearances. 8vo. 10s. 6d. bds. 

3. The PRINCIPLES of PHYSICAL, INTELLECTUAL, MORAL, and 
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. 2 vols. 8vo. £1. 8s. bds. 

The PORTRAITURE of a CHRISTIAN GENTLEMAN. 

By W. ROBERTS, Esq. Lincoln's Inn. Second Edition, enlarged. 12mo. 6s. 
bds. 

REASONS for ATTACHMENT and CONFORMITY to 

the CHURCH of ENGLAND. By the Rev. ROBERT MEEK, Curate of 
Yatton-Keynell and Castle-Combe, Wilts. 12mo. 4s. 6d. bds. 

By the same Author, 

MUTUAL RECOGNITION and EXALTED FELICITY of GLORIITED 
SAINTS. Second Edition. l2mo. 3s. bds. 



WORKS PUBLISHED BY J. HATCHARD AND SON. 



The SOLACE of an INVALID. Third Edition. ]2mo. 

5s, 6d. bds. 

MIRIAM ; or, the Power of Truth ; a Jewish Tale. 

Third Edition. 12mo. 7s. 6d. bds. 

SERMONS preached at St. George's Church, Everton, 

By the Rev. Matson Vincent, M. A. 12mo. 6s. bds. 

CHRISTIAN ESSAYS. By the Rev. Samuel 

CHARLES WILKS, A. M. Second Edition. '8vo. 12s. b6s. 

By the same Author. 

1. The ESSAY on "The Signs of Conversion and Unconverson in Ministers 
of the Church." Third Edition, 12mo. 3s. bds. 

2. CORRELATIVE CLAIMS ond DUTIES ; or the Necessity of a Church 
Established, and the means of promoting a Spirit of Devotion among its Mem- 
bers. 8vo. 12s. bds. 

3. FORTY FAMILY SERMONS. 8vo. 12s. cloth. 

MEMOIRS of the LIFE of the late Rev. JOHN 

MERRY, A. B.. 12mo. 4s. 6d. canvas. 

CHRISTIAN SYMPATHY; a collection of Letters, Ad- 

dressed to Mourners. Fourth Edition, 32mo. 2s. bds. 

ANCIENT HISTORY, English and French, exemplified 

in a regular dissection of the Saxon Chronicle ; preceded by a Review of Whar- 
ton's Utrum Elfricus Grammaticus; Malmesbury's Life of St. Wulstan ; and 
Hugo Candidus' Peterborough History: wherein the principal Saxon Annalists 
are now (for the first time) identified. 12mo. 10s. 6d. bds. 

The LAWS RESPECTING PEWS or SEATS in 

CHURCHES. Compiled by H. S. ENGLISH, Attorney. 8vo. 5s. 6d. bds. 

STATISTICS of FRANCE.— The Government.— Public 

Revenue from 1788 till 1832. — Royal Mints. — Bank — Agriculture. — Manufac- 
tures. — Shipping. — Commerce. — Royal Navy. — Colonies. — Courts of Law.— 
Arrest for Debt. — Jury. — Crimes and Punishments. — Prisons. — Galleys. — Public 
Press. — The Argus. — Napoleon and Talleyrand. — Newspapers and Writers of the 
Day. — History and recent reorganization of the National Guard. — Dramatic Au- 
thorship. — Receipts of theatres. — Gaming-Houses. — Weights and Measures com- 
pared with those of England. By LEWIS GOLDSMITH, Author of the "Crimes 
of Cabinets," " The Secret History of the Cabinet of Buonaparte," &c. &c. 8vo. 
12s. bds. 

The RECITER : a Work particularly adapted to the Use 

of Schools ; consisting of Pieces Moral, Religious, and Sacred, in Verse and 
Prose ; selected and classed on a new Plan, with reference to the different ages 
of Students. By the Rev. EDWARD WARD, A M. Fourth Edition. 12mo. 
4s. 6d. bds. ; or 5s. bound. 

BIBLE STORIES, selected from the Old and New Tes- 

taments, familiarized for the Use of Children. By the Author of " Ellen Web- 
ster," &c. &c. Third Edition. 2 vols. 18mo. 5s. half-bound. 

SUNDAY ENJOYMENTS ; or Religion made Pleasant 

to Children. With a Frontispiece. 18mo. 2s. 6d. bds. 



WORKS PUBLISHED BY J. HATCHARD AND SON. 



CONSISTENCY, by Charlotte Elizabeth. Third 

Edition. 18rno. 2s. 6d. bds. 

STEPPING STONES for TOTTERING FEET; or 

Reading Lessons adapted to Mrs. Williams' Syllabic Method, with plates. 16mo. 
3s. 6d. canvas. 

EXTRACTS from the RULE and EXERCISES of HOLY 

LIVING and DYING of JEREMY TAYLOR, D.D. By a Mother, for the use 
of her Children. 12mo. 6s. canvas. 

HINTS on the CONSTITUTION of DISPENSARIES, 

with the view of their beiug rendered of more extensive benefit to the Labour- 
ing Population, and equally applicable and advantageous to Towns of Consider- 
rable Population. By JOHN STORER, M. D. F.R.S. 12mo. 2s. &d. bds. 

BUDS and BLOSSOMS ; or Stories of Real Children. 

By a Lady. 18mo. 2s. neatly half-bound. 

A PRACTICAL VIEW of Christian Education in its Early 

Stages. Seventh Edition. To which is now added, a Letter to a Son soon 
after the close of his education, on the subject of not conforming to the world. 
By THOMAS BABINGTON, Esq. Seventh Edition, 12mo. 5s. bds. 

HINTS for the IMPROVEMENT of EARLY EDU- 
CATION and NURSERY DISCIPLINE. Eleventh Edition. 12mo. 3s. 6d. 
boards. 

BY THE. REV. HARVEY MARRIOTT. 
1. SERMONS on the CHARACTER and DUTIES of 

WOMEN. 12mo. 3s. 6d. boards. 

2. FOUR COURSES of PRACTICAL SERMONS, in four vols. 10s. 6d. each 
Course. 

3. A COURSE of SERMONS, preached at Margaret's Chapel, Bath, in the 
years 1826 — 1289 ; being a Practical and Spiritual Commentary on the Book of 
Common Prayer. 8vo. 10s. 6d. bds. 

4. EIGHT SERMONS on " The Signs of the Times." 8vo. 6s. bds 

SERMONS, preached in the Parish Church of Bassing- 

ham, near Newark-on-Trent. By the Rev. D. S. WAYLAND, M. A. Vicar 
of Kirton in Lindsey, and Curate of Bassingham, Lincolnshire. 8vo. 10s. 6d. 

SERMONS Illustrating Christ's dealings with his Church. 
By the Rev. F. G. GROSSMAN, late Morning Preacher of the Penitentiary 
Chapel, Bath; Minister of Carlisle Episcopal Chapel, Lambeth; and Chaplain 
to the Right Hon. Lord Ribblesdale. Dedicated, by permission, to the Right 
Rev. Lord Bishop of Winchester. 8vo. 9s. bds. 

" We cordially recommend this volume to onr readers." — Pulpil. 

FRIENDLY SOCIETY SERMONS, to which are added 

some few for Charitable Societies, all written with the same object of setting 
forth the causes of distress among the Poor. By the MINISTER of a COUNTRY 
PARISH. Second Edition. 12mo. 6s. bds. 

AUTHENTIC DETAILS of the VALDENSES, in Pied- 
mont and other Countries. Illustrated with twelve Etchings. 8vo. 12s. bds. 



WORKS PUBLISHED BY J. HATCHARD AND SON. 



BY THE REV. C. D. MAITLAND. 

1 . THE HISTORY of NOAH'S DAY, practically considered, 

and viewed in connexion with our own Times, and the coming of the Son of 
Man. In a Series of Twelve Discourses, preached at St. James's Chapel, Brighton, 
June 1832. Svo. 8s. bds. 

2. DISCOURSES on the HUMANITY and DEITY of our LORD JESUS 
CHRIST. 12mo. 6s. 6d. bds. 

3. NINE DISCOURSES on the Parable of the Ten Virgins. Second Edition, 
5s. 6d. bds. 

4. EXPOSITORY SERMONS on the viiith and xth ofRotnaBs. 10s. 6d. 

PRACTICAL SERMONS for every day in the Year. 

Fourth Edition, 2 vols. 12mo. 12s. bds. 

By the same Author, 

Another Volume of PRACTICAL SERMONS, to which are added, Family 
Prayers. 12mo. 5s. 6d. bds. 

SERMONS, chiefly Practical. By the Yen. EDWARD 

BATHER, M. A. Archdeacon of Salop, in the diocese of Lichfield and Coven- 
try ; and Vicar of Meole Brace, Salop. In 2 vols. 8vo. 24s. bds. 

The ORDINANCES of RELIGION, Practically illus- 
trated and applied. By JOHN DAV1ES, B. D. 8vo. 7s. 6d. bds. 

By the same Author, 

AN ESTIMATE of the HUMAN MIND ; being a Philosophical Inquiry into 
the Legitimate Application and Extent of its Leading Faculties, as connected 
with the Principles and Obligations of the Christian Religion. 2 vols. 8vo. 
18s. bds. 

SERMONS, Plain, Brief, and Explanatory, on the 

LORD'S PRAYER and TEN COMMANDMENTS. By JOHN NANCE, D. D. 
l2mo, 6s. bds. 

THE BOOK of GENESIS Considered and Illustrated in 

a Series of Historical Discourses, preached in the Church of the Holy Trinity, 
Cheltenham. By the Rev. F. CLOSE. Second Edition. 12mo. 5s. bds. 

By the same Author, 

A COURSE of NINE SERMONS, intended to Illustrate some of the Leading 
Truths Contained in the Liturgy of the Church of England. Fourth Edition. 
12mo. 5s. bds. 

SERMONS, chiefly Practical. Preached in the Parish 

Church of Clapham, Surrey. By the Rev. WILLIAM DEALTRY, D.D. F.R.S. 
Rector of Clapham, and Chancellor of the Diocese of Winchester. Second 
Edition. 8vo. 10s. 6d. bds. 

SERMONS. By the late Rev. John Venn, M. A, 

Rector of Clapham. A new Edition, in 2 vols. 8vo. 24s. bds. 

POPULAR LECTURES on the PROPHECIES relative 

to the JEWISH NATION. By the Rev. HUGH M'NEILE, M. A. Rector of 
Albury, Surrey. 8vo. 7s. boards. 

By the same Author, 

A VOLUME of SEVENTEEN SERMONS. Second Edition. 8vo. 12s. bds. 



WORKS PUBLISHED BY J. HATCH ARD AND SON. 



SERMONS, By the Rev. JOHN EDMUND JONES, 

M. A. adapted for Family Reading. Second Edition. 12mo. 6s. bds. 

SERMONS intended chiefly for the Use of Families. By 

the Hon. and Rev. GERARD T. NOEL, M. A., Curate of Richmond, Surrey ; 
and late Vicar of Rainham, Kent. New Edition. 2 vols. 12mo. 12s. bds. 

By the same Author. 
A BRIEF ENQUIRY into the PROSPECTS of the CHURCH of CHRIST, 
in Connexion with the Second Advent of our Lord Jesus Christ. Second Edition. 
12mo. 5s. bds. 

SERMONS, illustrative of some of the leading Doctrines 

of the, Gospel, in connexion with Christian Temper and Experience. By 
the Venerable Archdeacon HODSON. Second Edition. 12mo. 6s. bds. 

SERMONS and EXTRACTS, consolatory on the Loss of 

Friends ; selected from the Works of the most eminent Divines. Third Edition. 
8vo. 12s. bds. 

The SACRED PRECEPTOR ; or a Series of Questions 

and Answers, elucidating the Doctrines, Practice, and Natural History of Scrip- 
ture. For the Use of Schools and Young Persons. Second Edition. 18mo. 3s. 
neatly half-bound. 

EARLY IMPRESSIONS ; or Moral and Instructive En- 

tertainment for Children, in Prose and Verse. Illustrated with 12 Designs by 
Dighton, 12mo. 6s. bds. 

FIRST STEPS TO ASTRONOMY and GEOGRAPHY. 

Illustrated with Plates. 12mo. 9s. bds. 

ALICE SEYMOUR. A Tale. 12mo. 4s. 6d. bds. 

The COURSE of DIVINE JUDGMENTS: Eight 

Lectures, principally in reference to the PRESENT TIMES, and the IM- 
PENDING PESTILENCE, delivered at Godstone during the Season of Advent, 
1831, by the Ven. ARCHDEACON HOARE. 12mo. 3s. 6d. bds. 

The INFANT'S DAILY SACRIFICE. A Book of 

Short Hymns for Children. With Plates. 16mo. 5s. bound in canvas. 

" A sweet little book of Short Hymns for Children, and adorned with many ap- 
propriate plates. It is a delightful composition, in the purest, the kindest, and 
the most truly Christian spirit ; pious withoutausterity, and admirably calculated 
to make a right impression on the minds of children." — Lit. Gaz. Jan. 15, 1831. 

The THIRD PART of the HISTORY of HENRY 

MILNER, a Little Boy who was not brought up according to the Fashions of 
this World. By Mrs. SHERWOOD, Author of the " History of the Fairchild 
Family," &c. &c. 12mo. 6s. bds. 

By the same Author. 
2. The HISTORY of HENRY MILNER. 12mo. Part I. price 3s. 6d. bds. 

2. //• price 5s. bds. 

3. The HISTORY of the FAIRCHILD FAMILY. 1 vol. 12mo. price 5s. 
bds. Ninth Edition. 



SOCIAL DUTIES on CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES. 

Second Edition, enlarged, 12mo. 4s. bds. 



VINDICATION 

OF 

DR. PALEY'S THEORY OF MORALS. 



LONDON: 

IBOTSON AND PALMER, PRINTERS, SAVOY STREET, STRAND. 



A VINDICATION 

OF 

DR. PALEY'S THEORY OF MORALS 

FROM THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS OF 

MR. DUGALD STEWART ; MR. GISBORNE; 
DR. PEARSON ; AND DR. THOMAS BROWN. 

WITH AN APPENDIX, 

CONTAINING 

STRICTURES ON SOME REMARKS OF DR. WHATELY, 
PRINCIPAL OF ST. ALBAN'S HALL, OXFORD. 



REV. LATHAM WAINEWRIGHT, M.A..F.S.A. 
il 

OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, 
RECTOR OF GREAT BRICKHILL, BUCKINGHAMSHIRE, AND MEMBER 
OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LITERATURE, 

4c. 



Cognitis autem reram finibus, cum intellegitur quit sit et lionorum 
extremum et malorum, inventa vita? via est conformatioque omnium 
officiorum. Est igitur quo quidque referatur; ex quo id quod omnes 
expetunt, beate vivendi ratio inveniri et comparari potest. 

Cicero de Finibus, L. V. c. 6. 



LONDON : 

J. HATCHARD AND SON, 187, PICCADILLY. 
1830. 



» 



TO THE RIGHT REVEREND 

CHARLES RICHARD SUMNER, D.D. 

LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER, 
ifc. fyc. fyc. 

THE FOLLOWING PAGES, 

IN DEFENCE OF ONE OF THE FIRST WRITERS OF THE AGE, 

ARE INSCRIBED 

WITH SENTIMENTS OF UNFEIGNED RESPECT, 



BY HIS LORDSHIP'S 
MOST OBEDIENT AND FAITHFUL SERVANT, 

THE AUTHOR. 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



The Author thinks it incumbent on him to 
state, that before the last sheet of the present 
publication was sent to the press, he had not seen 
the second edition of Dr. TVliately's " Essays 
on some of the Difficulties in the Writings of 
St. Paul " but he now learns from the preface 
to that edition, that Dr. TV. explicitly avows his 
intention of never answering any objections which 
may be made against the opinions he has publish- 
ed, and has explained his reasons for adhering to 
the resolution he has deliberately formed. Had 
the Author of the ensuing pages been previously 
apprised of this, though he would still have thought 



viii 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



it requisite to offer the observations contained in 
the Appendix, he would probably have altered 
a few of the expressions, and have given a some- 
what different form, perhaps, to one or two of 
the statements. He must, therefore, trust to Dr. 
Wliately's liberality to make whatever allowance 
that circumstance may, in his estimation, ap- 
pear to require. Deviations, however, from 
general rules of this nature, may in many cases 
become expedient, if not necessary ; and on this 
account, it is not detracting from Dr. Paley's 
pre-eminent merit in other respects, to consider 
him as culpable in retaining some few passages 
in his writings liable to objection, without even 
noticing the repeated remarks levelled against 
them by his opponents, and in not openly defend- 
ing or renouncing some of the opinions which he 
must have been well aware had engendered either 
doubt or misapprehension in the minds of his 
readers. Controversy, it is fully admitted, 
however temperately conducted, may sometimes 
be productive of evil, both to the combatants and 
the spectators, but it equally becomes us to re- 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



member, that without this intellectual species of 
ivarfare, neither the truths of revelation nor the 
discoveries of science could have triumphed, as 
they so decidedly have, over the assaults and 
machinations of their bitterest enemies. 



PREFACE. 



It is not an unfrequent remark, that the 
study of metaphysics has been declining in 
this country for some years past, and that 
to devote our attention to a subject so 
remote from the concerns of active life, 
is little better than a misapplication of 
time. Were it meant by that term to 
designate the ontology of the scholastic 
ages, or the chimerical systems which, at 
a much later period, were framed by the 
followers of Plato, Aristotle, and Pytha- 
goras, to say nothing of the more recent 
speculations of German origin, the truth of 



Xll 



PREFACE. 



the assertion might be readily admitted. 
But if, on the contrary, a dispassionate 
investigation of the powers and operations 
of the human mind constitutes, as it now 
more usually does, and as it always ought 
to do, the legitimate object of that science, 
the neglect into which it is said to have 
fallen would afford ample cause for the 
expression of regret. But the truth is, 
that if w T e advert to the various publications 
that have appeared in our own language 
within no great length of time on the im- 
portant topics which it embraces, we shall 
find that this department of knowledge has 
not been so much disregarded, as many have 
allowed themselves to suppose. No writer 
of eminence, perhaps, has contributed more 
than Mr. Dugald Stewart, by the peculiar 
attractions of his style, and the almost uni- 
form correctness of his taste, to revive the 
attention of the thinking part of the pub- 



PREFACE. 



Kill 



He to rational inquiries relative to the 
mental faculties, and to the practicable 
means by which they may be more suc- 
cessfully cultivated. But there is another 
circumstance, which, though not so pro- 
minent as to have obtained general notice, 
must yet be allowed to possess no small share 
of influence with regard to the point in ques- 
tion. As long as Locke's " Essay on the 
Human Understanding" shall continue to 
be made use of as a text-book in the 
public examinations at Cambridge for a 
bachelor's degree, (and what other work has 
yet appeared which, taken as a whole, is en- 
titled to occupy its place ?) we have no tri- 
fling security that the study of intellectual 
philosophy can never become entirely obso- 
lete in this country. 

That it should not be so much encou- 
raged in the recent plans for affording 
instruction to the uneducated orders of the 



xiv 



PREFACE. 



community, can occasion neither surprise 
nor censure. The different branches of 
natural science, especially those connected 
with the mechanical arts, together with 
the biographical sketches of men whose 
merit has raised them to distinction, are 
not only better suited to their comprehen- 
sion, but are more likely to be advantageous 
to them in the laborious occupations which 
they are destined to pursue. But since 
this is not the case with those whose station 
in society affords them leisure and oppor- 
tunity for making more extensive attain- 
ments, the philosophy of the human mind 
ought to hold a prominent station in that 
liberal course of studies which no man in 
polished society can now entirely neglect 
without incurring disgrace. Besides the 
other numerous arguments in favour of this 
pursuit, there is one which the purpose of 
the present publication leads me more par- 



PREFACE. 



XV 



ticularly to notice, and that is, the close 
alliance which subsists between the intel- 
lectual and the moral part of our nature. 
Without some acquaintance with the struc- 
ture and operations of the human under- 
standing-, we cannot investigate with suc- 
cess the source and complex nature of the 
different emotions and passions in which 
our actions originate, nor the influence of 
those moral causes and motives by which 
the character of individuals is invariably 
framed. The paramount importance of the 
knowledge to be derived from the study of 
ethics will, in the present age, scarcely be 
disputed; and though no one in a country 
where the Christian faith is professed, can 
be entirely ignorant of the practical pre- 
cepts which are to regulate his conduct, 
yet the theoretic part also, comprising the 
origin, the criterion, and the obligation of 
virtue, merits the diligent examination of 



xvi 



PREFACE. 



all those whose circumstances enable them 
to receive a more finished education. It is 
obvious therefore, that he will come best 
prepared for studying this branch of the 
subject, whose mind has been previously 
imbued with the principles of intellectual 
philosophy. 

Whatever defects may be discovered in 
the execution, the design of the following 
pages is to vindicate a theory of morals 
which has not only been misapprehended 
by those who have viewed it superficially, 
but has even been condemned by men of 
undisputed sagacity, who have unfortu- 
nately been too much absorbed in the con- 
templation of its weaker points, to be able 
to estimate the solidity of the basis on 
which it rests. I trust, however, that in this 
attempt to answer the arguments of Dr. 
Paley's opponents, I have not violated the 
rules of candour and courtesy, nor been 



PREFACE. 



XVII 



deficient in avowing- that deference which 
must at all times be due to those who have 
enlightened and adorned society by their 
talents and virtues. 

Though I cannot be supposed to regard 
with any high degree of approbation the 
great aim of Mr. Stewart in his metaphy- 
sical writings, which was to defend and 
illustrate the doctrines of Dr. Reid, I still 
conceive that his works have been pro- 
ductive of no small advantage in subduing, 
by the beauties and the eloquence of his 
composition, the prejudices of many of those 
who had before felt an almost insuperable 
aversion to approach any subject of abstract 
speculation. But, independently of all theo- 
retic peculiarities, there are many parts of 
his writings which, while they display the 
happy facility of the author, in divesting 
recondite questions of their repulsive form, 
are replete with observations of the highest 

b 



XV111 



PREFACE. 



practical utility. His chapters on the as- 
sociation of ideas, on the faculties of me- 
mory and imagination, together with his 
discussions relative to the process of in- 
ductive reasoning - , might be pointed out as 
abundantly sufficient to verify this remark ; 
and the extensive information which he 
possessed in the various departments of 
science and literature has communicated 
to the topics of his inquiry a degree of 
interest, of which the generality of stu- 
dents would have thought them to be alto- 
gether unsusceptible. 

The majority of Mr. Gisborne's works 
are too well known to the public, to require 
any allusion, and the wide circulation which 
some of them have obtained, is at once an 
indication of the esteem in which they are 
held, and of their tendency to improve the 
manners of society. But I cannot help 
thinking that his treatise on the " Prin- 



PREFACE. 



XIX 



ciples of Moral Philosophy" but little 
corresponds with the character which it 
received from Mr. Stewart, and may be 
deemed as the least successful in establish- 
ing- his conclusions, of any of his publi- 
cations, with perhaps one exception. — Dr. 
Pearson was, I believe, better known as 
an author in that illustrious University 
where he held a conspicuous station, than 
to the world at large ; and distinguished 
as he was, by his sound understanding, 
and his rational and candid manner of ex- 
amining ethical questions, we can only 
regret that incidental circumstances should 
have rendered his works less extensively 
beneficial than they otherwise would have 
been, if we may be allowed to judge from 
the intrinsic merit which they undoubtedly 
possess. 

Of Dr. Brown it is impossible not to 
speak in terms of high admiration. His 

b 2 



XX 



PREFACE. 



acuteness in reasoning, his freedom from 
undue attachment to any pre-established 
system, the warmth of his imagination, his 
fertile powers of language, and the amia- 
ble spirit that breathes through every page, 
all combine to conciliate the reader's atten- 
tion, and to inspire him with an ardent 
wish to become better acquainted with the 
subject of discussion. And even when 
they fail in producing conviction, they 
leave an impression on the mind in the 
highest degree favourable to the talents 
and worth of the accomplished author. 
By far the greatest benefit, however, ef- 
fected by his metaphysical labours, has 
resulted from his opposition to that part 
of Dr. Reid's system, which at once places 
an effectual barrier against all rigid and 
extended disquisition, by pronouncing facts 
to be ultimate when there is sufficient evi- 
dence that they are not so, and by assign- 



PREFACE. 



xxi 



ing to various operations of the mind dis- 
tinct and peculiar faculties, when they may, 
in truth, be traced to one common source. 
It was by contending for the free use of 
analysis, and by successfully exercising it 
in his own writings, that Dr. Brown was 
enabled to accomplish more perhaps than 
any single philosopher since the time of 
Locke, (for the vibrations of Hartley have 
scarcely an advocate remaining,) in extend- 
ing our knowledge of the mental faculties, 
or, in his own more accurate language, of 
" the mind existing in certain states." 
This remark is, however, chiefly applica- 
ble to his examination of the intellectual 
powers; for in the ethical part of the sys- 
tem he has developed, his views are by 
no means so enlarged, nor is his mode of 
reasoning, on many points, either luminous 
or conclusive. 

The declamation in which he is some- 



XXII 



PREFACE. 



times too fond of indulging, and the re- 
petition of the same arguments and reflec- 
tions, when uncalled for by any peculiar 
difficulty in the case, are defects which 
we can readily pardon. But there is one 
fault of greater magnitude which is oc- 
casionally conspicuous in some of his 
writings, and against which the nature 
of the subject renders the exercise of cau- 
tion doubly incumbent. The want of per- 
spicuity, to which I here allude, most as- 
suredly cannot be attributed, as in the 
case of Aristotle, to his leaving too much 
to the perspicacity of his readers from the 
brevity of his style. It principally arises, 
as I conceive, from his propensity to re- 
finement when reasoning on abstruse points, 
and to the construction of his protracted 
sentences, often interrupted by qualifying- 
clauses and rhetorical allusions. Fortu- 
nately it occurs more frequently in his less 



PREFACE. 



XX111 



known treatise on Cause and Effect, than 
in the work which constitutes his principal 
claim to celebrity. Whatever Dr. Brown's 
defects may be, there cannot be a doubt 
that they are greatly outweighed by his 
solid, not less than by his brilliant, quali- 
ties ; and he must ever be regarded as ex- 
hibiting a striking example of the union 
of a sound judgment with a glowing ima- 
gination. With all his excellences, how- 
ever, there is some reason to apprehend 
that it will be reserved for another genera- 
tion to do justice to his character as a phi- 
losopher, and to be fully sensible, I will 
not say of the discoveries, as some of his 
enthusiastic admirers have done, but at all 
events, of the essential improvements he 
has introduced into the science of mind. 
And that this apprehension is far from 
being altogether groundless is but too 
apparent, from the comparative neglect 



Xxiv PREFACE. 

which he has experienced in his own 
country, as well as from the fact, that 
while the writings of Dr. Reid and Mr. 
Stewart have been translated, or accu- 
rately studied by authors so distinguished 
among the French as M. Royer Collard, 
(the patriotic President of the Chamber of 
Deputies,) M. Jouffroy, and the still more 
celebrated Victor Cousin, no similar notice 
has been taken of Dr. Brown's works. But 
whatever popularity the speculative tenets 
of M. Cousin may have obtained at Paris, 
there are very few, I believe, in this king- 
dom, who, with the slightest knowledge of 
their nature, would entertain a momen- 
tary wish of seeing them form part of our 
English philosophy. 

For the freedom with which I have criti- 
cised the remarks of Dr Whately, I feel 
convinced that he will not conceive any 
apology to be called for by the occasion. 



PREFACE. 



XXV 



It is sufficiently evident from the general 
spirit and tone of his writings, that he is 
not to be classed in the number of those 
who are deterred by the narrow-minded 
notions of a particular party, or by a blind 
predilection for any favourite theory, from 
dispassionately examining the arguments 
of their opponents, or from relinquishing a 
long cherished opinion when discovered 
to be fallacious. Were the same liberality of 
sentiment, and the same temperate zeal 
usually conspicuous in his discussion of 
controversial topics, more prevalent among 
the leading members of every denomina- 
tion of religion, the great doctrines of 
Christianity would be better understood, 
and the merits of our own Church less 
frequently called in question. 

Amidst the facilities which are daily 
increasing for imparting to all classes of 
the community information of the highest 



XXVI 



PREFACE. 



value, and the measures now pursuing- for 
ameliorating the public taste, we need not 
despair of seeing the intellectual and 
ethical branches of science regain that 
elevated station which they are entitled 
to hold, and receive that assiduous and 
extensive culture which can alone render 
them subservient to the practical purposes 
of civil society. 

For my own part, I entertain not the 
slightest doubt that the progress of know- 
ledge will eventually prove to be the pro- 
gress of general happiness. The spirit of 
investigation, no longer confined to the 
student's chamber, is now traversing the 
busy haunts of men, eager for the dis- 
covery of truth, and the detection of error. 
The weak may be alarmed, and the bigot- 
ed may oppose : but they will find it too 
late to indulge the faintest hope of pro- 
hibiting the flight of ignorance and torpor 



PREFACE. 



xxvii 



which so long oppressed the human under- 
standing". Unless objections can be devised 
far different in their nature from any which 
have hitherto been urged, it requires no in- 
spiration of prophecy to foretel that the ef- 
forts which may hereafter be employed to 
obstruct the diffusion of mental improvement 
will be found, in the result, to be utterly 
powerless. This improvement may at inter- 
vals, perhaps, be retarded in its career by the 
prejudices of one party and the interested 
motives of another; but to put a final stop 
to its advancement, to fix the boundary 
beyond which it cannot pass, none but 
the most infatuated can for a moment 
imagine it to be possible. As well might 
the royal Dane have expected that the 
utterance of his feeble mandate would 
stem the influx of the ocean's tide. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 



Remarks on the selection of Paley "s " Moral Philoso- 
phy," as a text-book, in the public examinations at Cam- 
bridge. — The first objections here considered, are con- 
tained in Vol. II. of Mr. Dugald Stewart's " Elements of 
the Philosophy of the Human Mind." — His complaint 
that efficient are often confounded with final causes, by 
ethical writers, and particularly by Dr. Paley, answered. 
— The principle of general expediency, or utility, as 
inculcated by Paley, misapprehended by Mr. Stewart, 
who in this case neglects the distinction between the 
criterion and the obligation of virtue. — The necessity 
of general rules explained by Paley, and that these 
rules ought to be founded on expediency. — Individuals 
very rarely called upon to calculate the general conse- 



XXX 



CONTENTS. 



quences of their actions, notwithstanding Mr. Stewart's 
assertion ; but when they are, utility their best guide. — 
The objections contained in Mr. Stewart's " Philosophy 
of the Active and Moral Powers of Man" next con- 
sidered. — He contends for an intuitive moral sense. — 
His remarks on the difference between duty and in- 
terest. — His proofs of an original conscience derived 
from the universality of its existence, and from the 
early period of life at which it appears. — Paley does 
not deny the distinctions contended for, but accounts 
for them in a different way, which renders an innate 
or an intuitive conscience unnecessary. — Mr. Stewart's 
abstract ideas of virtue and obligation. — Right and 
wrong, he maintains, are simple ideas incapable of being 
defined. — The notions of Dean Sherlock and Abp. King, 
respecting the nature of virtue, very similar to those of 
Paley. — The opinions of Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart^ 
with regard to ultimate facts, and their discouragement 
of deep investigation censured . . . page 1 



CHAPTER IL 

The arguments contained in Mr. Gisborne's " Prin- 
ciples of Moral and Political Philosophy," declared by 
Mr. Stewart to be unanswerable. — Mr. Gisborne's own 
theory examined, and shown to be fraught with the 



CONTENTS. 



xxxi 



same difficulties as those alleged against Paley's. — The 
ohjections to the former often greater than those urged 
against the latter. — The former also more liable to the 
charge of selfishness. — Mr. Gisborne, as well as Mr. 
Stewart, condemns Paley's system for allowing of ex- 
ceptions to the rules of morality. — Several cases ad- 
duced, in which such exceptions are clearly justifiable. 
— Examples of the same to be found in Scripture. — 
Mr. Gisborne's inconsistency in this particular. — A 
striking example of such an exception, afforded by 
Mr. G. in the case of the West Indian slaves. — The 
exceptions to general rules, defended by Paley, upon 
the same principles as the rules themselves, viz. be- 
cause in particular instances they produce the greatest 
quantity of good . . . . P a 9 e 47 



CHAPTER III. 

Dr. Pearson's objections considered. — His objection 
to Paley's definition of virtue admitted to be just ; but, 
as the latter writer adopts the threefold division of 
the moral duties, no mistake can arise from the de- 
finition. — Pearson's own definition of virtue objectiona- 
ble. — Two other definitions stated, more exempt from 
defects than the former. — The question, whether an 
action is right because it is commanded by the Deitv, 



xxxii 



CONTENTS. 



or whether he commands it because it is right, briefly 
considered. — Dr. Pearson's opinion respecting the foun- 
dation of virtue. — Denies that there is any rule, or 
criterion, universally applicable. — His ideas respecting 
moral obligation. — This he maintains refers to the 
principle of virtue, and has no connexion with the 
motive. — He is by no means clear on this point. — That 
obligation and motive coincide, the opinion of numerous 
moralists. — That nothing can oblige a moral agent 
which is not in some way or other necessary to his hap- 
piness, the opinion of Bishop Law, Puffendorf, Bishop 
Cumberlandj and many other writers. — Dr. Pearson 
insists that obligation arises from a principle of duty, 
which, when examined, differs but little from the former 
opinion. — His singular assertion that right and wrong 
cannot be applied to. motives, examined. — Paley's defini- 
tion of obligation defended. — Shown to be consistent 
with Pearson's, in which it is derived from the will of 
God. — The latter writer agrees, that the true motive 
to the practice of virtue is individual happiness, but 
thinks that Paley ought to have included the happiness 
of the present, as well as that of the future. — The 
latter moralist, however, shown to be consistent on that 
point. — The question briefly considered, whether Re- 
gulus, Mutius, the Decii, &c. were morally obliged to 
perform the heroic deeds recorded of them, and in 
what the obligation could consist. . V a 9 e 70 



• 



CONTENTS. 



XXX111 



CHAPTER IV. 

The objections of Dr. Brown examined. His prin- 
cipal charge against Paley is the selfishness of his 
theory, which he regards as more deserving of cen- 
sure, than any other modification of the selfish system. 
— Paley vindicated from this aspersion. — His theory 
as remote from selfishness, as far as the present life 
is considered, as any other with the highest pretensions, 
and even with regard to the next life, as soon as a habit 
of virtuous conduct is established, it becomes perfectly 
disinterested. — But this state of perfection scarcely 
ever attainable in the present world, nor is it required. — 
If the motive arising from the prospect of a future 
state of happiness be regarded as selfish, then is Chris- 
tianity the most selfish religion in the world. — Our 
Saviour and his Apostles constantly enforce their 
precepts by this sanction. — In the Gospels and in 
the Epistles a perpetual reference to a future retri- 
bution. — Several passages quoted in proof of this as- 
sertion. — Dr. Brown's own theory, when strictly ex- 
amined, shown to be selfish. — According to him, the 
feelings of approbation or disapprobation constitute 
both the criterion and the obligation of virtue. — The 
dilemma to which he is reduced by this theory. — The 
idea of making virtue its own reward visionary in our 



xxxiv 



CONTENTS. 



present condition. — Some objections in the Quarterly 
Review relative to Paley 1 s theory briefly noticed. — They 
chiefly relate to the origin of our moral sentiments. — 
The proofs of an innate conscience derived from the 
feelings and conduct of the uneducated classes shown 
to be deceptive. — The examples adduced by the re- 
viewer from the instantaneous expressions of approba- 
tion among the Hindoos, and among the lower orders 
at a theatre, not to be depended upon. — Warburton's 
notions on the subject. — Recapitulation of the argu- 
ment, and Conclusion ..... page 112 



APPENDIX. 



In a note contained in Dr. Whatley's Logic on 
the meaning of the term reason, Paley charged with 
denying that man is possessed of a moral faculty, 
or the power of distinguishing right from wrong. — This 
accusation shown to be groundless. — Paley denies that 
this faculty is either instinctive or intuitive, and dis- 
putes the common arguments in favour of an innate 
conscience. — The existence of such a power he fully 
admits, but he maintains that it is acquired by edu- 
cation, discipline, imitation, and the associating prin- 
ciple. Asserted by Dr. W., that Paley's principle 



CONTENTS. 



XXXV 



is equally applicable to brutes. — This statement shown 
to be erroneous. — Discipline quite as necessary for 
forming the human character as in training some of the 
lower orders of animals for the use of man. — Two 
citations from Archbishop King to show that his opi- 
nions on the nature of virtue were similar to Paley's. — 
Remarks on King's " Origin of Evil," and Bishop 
Law's notes annexed to the English translation. — On 
Dr. Whately's re-publication of the Archbishop's 
" Discourse on Predestination." — On the pernicious ten- 
dency of the peculiar doctrine of analogy there in- 
culcated. — That view of the subject leads to erro- 
neous conceptions of the divine attributes, and highly 
favourable to the system of Calvinism. — The doctrine 
of analogy defended by Archbishop King, encouraged 
by a few modern divines, in order to remove the 
difficulty of reconciling the divine fore-knowledge 
with man's free-will. — In Dr. Whately's second Ap- 
pendix to the " Discourse" he censures the " Natural 
Theology" of Archdeacon Paley for not deriving the 
proof of the moral attributes of the Divine Being, from 
the similar qualities existing in man. — Paley vindicated 
in this particular — If the exclusion of metaphysical ar- 
guments had not been intended, a regular answer ought 
to have been given by the author to Hume's sophistry 
respecting the nature of causation, as more import- 



f 

f 



XXX Vi CONTENTS. 

ant than the omission alleged by Dr. W. — Passages 
from Mr. Dugald Stewart, showing how widely he 
differs from the latter author on the subject of 
analogy. — A striking instance of inconsistency in Dr. 
Whately's censure of Paley . . . page 171 



VINDICATION, 

Sfc. 



ERRATA. 

ige 13, line 9 from the bottom, for doe, read cioe. 
77, — 5, for the revelation, read revelation. 
121, — 3, for done, read done, in the French quotation. 
145, — omitted in the margin, a reference to the Quarterly Re-- 
view, No. 76. 

152, — 4 from the bottom, for eternal condition, read external 
circumstances. 



our two most ancient and influential Uni- 
versities, should be scrupulously weighed, 
and that the objections to which it may 
have given rise should be impartially scru- 
tinized. For some years past, and, indeed, 
ever since the return of peace, it is well 
known that both of these venerable insti- 
tutions have been crowded with under- 
graduates, and that at Cambridge in par- 

B 



XXXVI CONTENTS. 

ant than the omission alleged hy Dr. W. — Passages 
from Mr. Dugald Stewart, showing how widely he 
differs from the latter author on the subject of 
analogy. — A striking instance of inconsistency in Dr. 
Whately's censure of Paley . . . page 171 



VINDICATION, 

SfC. 



CHAPTER I. 

Of the Objections advanced by Mr. Dugald 
Stezvart. 

It is unquestionably a matter of no trifling 
consequence to the general interests of edu- 
cation, that the merits of every work which 
has been adopted as a text-book in either of 
our two most ancient and influential Uni- 
versities, should be scrupulously weighed, 
and that the objections to which it may 
have given rise should be impartially scru- 
tinized. For some years past, and, indeed, 
ever since the return of peace, it is well 
known that both of these venerable insti- 
tutions have been crowded with under- 
graduates, and that at Cambridge in par- 

B 



2 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



ticular, the number of students has been so 
much augmented, as to impose the neces- 
sity of extending its collegiate buildings. 
In the latter University, the work which 
has long been selected on the subject of 
Ethics, in the principal annual examination 
for a Bachelor s degree, is one which, with 
all its celebrity, and all its extensive circu- 
lation in the remotest parts of the kingdom, 
has yet incurred the severe censure of many 
eminent writers, and has even been charged 
with inculcating doctrines not a little pre- 
judicial to the interests of virtue. But 
notwithstanding the accusations which have 
been thus urged against Dr. Paley's "Prin- 
ciples of Moral and Political Philosophy," 
it would be difficult to point out a publi- 
cation which has suffered less from frequent 
opposition, or which has hitherto better 
sustained its character in the estimation of 
the public. We have, at all events, a right 
to infer that the learned body, by whom so 
decided a preference has been shown for 
this treatise, cannot possibly regard the 
principles which it maintains as unfit to be 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



8 



inculcated on the minds of the young, 
though it cannot but excite some degree of 
surprise that no champion from that quar- 
ter should have hitherto stood forward in 
its defence, and that it should have been so 
long exposed to accusation and obloquy, 
without any effort to repel their effects. 

It is not my intention, however, in the 
following pages, to enter into an examina- 
tion of the whole work. On the present 
occasion, I have confined myself to the 
consideration of what is usually termed the 
theory of morals, comprehending the origin 
of our moral sentiments, together with the 
foundation, the criterion, and the obligation 
of virtue ; and after the severity of censure 
which has been indulged against the opi- 
nions of that eminent moralist on these par- 
ticular points, I need scarcely apologize for 
offering a few remarks in justification of 
the choice which has been made by a body 
of men, not less deserving of admiration for 
their liberality, than distinguished by their 
achievements in learning and science. 

Of the numerous writers who have ex- 

B 2 



4 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



pressed their strong disapprobation of the 
theory which is advocated by Archdeacon 
Paley, it will be sufficient to notice the 
more eminent ; and if it can be shown that 
the latter have failed in substantiating their 
charges, it will be needless to indulge any 
solicitude respecting the others. Mr. Du- 
gald Stewart, Mr. Gis borne, Dr. Pearson, 
the late Master of Sidney College, Cam- 
bridge, and Dr. Thomas Brown, the late 
able professor of Moral Philosophy at Edin- 
burgh, have all decidedly censured the opi- 
nions of our great moralist, though they 
materially differ from each other in the 
arguments they have advanced. 

The first remarks of Mr. Dugald Stewart, 
immediately connected with the subject be- 
fore us, occur in the second volume of his 
" Elements of the Philosophy of the Human 
Mind," where he strongly reprobates the 
practice of confounding efficient with final 
causes, and cites the authority of Dr. Adam 
Smith to show the danger with which it is 
more particularly attended in treating of 
Ethics. Of this erroneous mode of reason- 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



5 



ing, he considers Dr. Paley's work on Moral 
Philosophy as affording a striking example ; 
and in confirmation of this opinion, he has 
cited two passages, which, from their appa- 
rent tendency, have also excited the ani- 
madversion of other authors.* But he has 
not examined the purport of these passages 
in connexion with the context, nor does he 
appear to have recollected that the most un- 
just inferences are frequently deduced from 
insulated expressions, which have not always 
been weighed by the author with sufficient 
attention. t To me it appears evident, how- 
ever, that in the application of his remarks 
respecting the confusion of efficient with 
final causes to Dr. Paley, and in his reason- 
ing against general expediency as the prin- 
ciple of moral obligation, he has greatly 
misapprehended the nature and extent of 
the real doctrine which that moralist has 
inculcated. 

* Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human 
Mind.— Vol. II. c. iv. s. 6. 

f Paley's Mor. & Polit. Phil. Vol. I. p 70. (5th 
Edit.) and Vol. II. p. 411. 



6 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



I cannot help thinking, also, that Mr. 
Stewart is chargeable with some degree of 
unfairness in placing Dr. Paley in the same 
class of moralists with Hume and Godwin, 
and thus associating one of the most power- 
ful advocates of Christianity, with two of 
its most insidious and determined enemies, 
because they appear to agree in regarding 
utility as the principle which renders virtue 
obligatory on mankind. I say appear to 
agree ; for if no other distinction could 
be discovered between writers, who, in 
reality, possess so little in common with 
each other, it would be quite sufficient to 
point out the difference of meaning affixed 
by these two parties to the same term. In 
the one case, utility is considered as the 
sole obligation ; in the other, as the rule or 
standard, to which we are to refer, when- 
ever the rectitude of an action becomes 
doubtful. According to the former system, 
the views of the agent are confessedly 
limited to the present life ; according to 
the latter, he is directed to look forward 
to a state of existence beyond the grave. It 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



7 



is not to be denied, however, that Dr. 
Paley's language is often defective in pre- 
cision, and that a few instances of obvious 
inconsistency may be pointed out in differ- 
ent parts of his work. Of this an apposite 
exemplification is furnished in the first of the 
passages quoted by Mr. Dugald Stewart: 
"Whatever is expedient is right. It is the 
utility of any moral rule alone which con- 
stitutes the obligation of it,"* &c. But still 
it is abundantly evident from the context, 
and the general purport of his work, that 
what he means to inculcate is, that utility 
is merely the rule or criterion of virtue, and 
is then only to be followed as our guide, 
when certainty is not to be obtained from 
the language of Scripture. In a more limited 
sense, utility might nevertheless be des- 
cribed as the obligation, since there is un- 
questionably a distinction between the mo- 
tive which immediately influences the con- 
duct, and the ultimate motive. Nor is the 
reality of the latter to be disputed, because 
it is not always present to the mind, and 

* Prin. of Mor. Phil. Vol. I. p. 70. 



8 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



because inducements less remote in their 
operation may be sufficiently influential in 
the ordinary transactions of life. On this 
account, what has been observed by some 
writers concerning- the divine will, might 
be applied to expediency. It might be made 
the rule and the motive at the same time ; 
and we might in this manner vindicate the 
language of Dr. Paley, when he asserts that 
the utility of a rule constitutes the obliga- 
tion of it. But, in truth, it would have 
been more consistent with the Author's for- 
mer explanation, to substitute the term cri- 
terion for that of obligation, as we find that 
he has done in the very next page. Hence 
we may regard the expression as it here 
occurs, as nothing more than a verbal inac- 
curacy, by no means affecting the general 
reasoning of the work. 

Against this system of morals, however, 
which makes utility the criterion of right 
and wrong, Mr. Dugald Stewart (and seve- 
ral other writers coincide with him) has 
alleged an objection which he regards as 
alone decisive of its merits, — that it entrusts 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



9 



to every individual the power of deciding 
what line of conduct will, at all times and 
in all places, be most beneficial to the great 
bulk of mankind. And I frankly admit, 
that were this representation true in the 
extent here supposed, were it always left 
to the private judgment of each person 
to ascertain the expediency of his future 
conduct, in all its bearings, before he should 
begin to act, not only great perplexity, but 
the most serious results, might often be ap- 
prehended. The truth is, that the eminent 
writer, to whom this objection is applied, 
does not sanction this liberty in the latitude 
here alleged ; and as an ample refutation of 
the charge adduced by his opponents, it 
would be sufficient to refer to the example 
of the assassin,* which he has aptly intro- 
duced for the purpose of elucidating his 
meaning. But if still further evidence of 
this assertion were required, it is only 
necessary to peruse the admirable observa- 
tions contained in the chapters immediately 
succeeding that in which the passage ob- 

* Prin. of Mor. Phil. B. II. c. vi. 



10 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY's 



jected to occurs. He there strenuously con- 
tends for the necessity of general rules in 
every moral government ; and by moral 
government, he means "any dispensation 
whose object is to influence the conduct 
of reasonable creatures." It is undoubtedly 
true, that these general rules are founded on 
the distinction between the general and par- 
ticular consequences of an action, so Avell 
exemplified in the chapters referred to ; 
but then it must be recollected that the 
rules themselves are not left to be framed 
by every private individual for his own 
guidance. The sources from which they 
are derived, are either the writings of reve- 
lation, the laws of the state, or the expe- 
rience which has led the more instructed 
portion of mankind to form maxims of 
wisdom of universal application : and hence 
it is obvious that the conduct of the great 
mass of the human race is not entrusted to 
their own decision respecting what is right 
or wrong, nor to their own conceptions of 
what may be most conducive to the wel- 
fare of society at large. In Christian coun- 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



11 



tries, (and to Christians alone does Paley 
address himself,) the inhabitants may always 
become acquainted with the positive com- 
mands contained in the sacred Volume, more 
easily perhaps, than with the laws of the 
government under which they live, and in 
by far the greater number of cases there can 
be no room for hesitation in what manner 
private individuals ought to regulate their 
moral conduct. 

But in those instances in which no spe- 
cific directions can be discovered in Scrip- 
ture, general rules must be founded (as, 
indeed, they are always professed to be, 
in free countries) on the tendency of par- 
ticular actions to promote the welfare of the 
community. On this principle have been 
framed all the best codes of human laws ; 
and though the actual utility of every re- 
gulation cannot always be ascertained with- 
out experience, to what other criterion, I 
would ask, can the statesman refer ? It 
has been repeatedly affirmed, as an argu- 
ment of great weight, that to determine the 
utility of actions, when considered with 



12 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'.S 



reference to society at large, is beyond the 
limited powers of man ; but we know that 
in numerous instances it can be effected, 
and of this the illustrations adduced by 
Dr. Paley in his chapters on general con- 
sequences, afford sufficient evidence. A 
more apposite example, indeed, of its prac- 
ticability cannot be found than in the case 
of legislation ; and where the decision is left 
in the hands of an assemblage of intelli- 
gent and patriotic men, I can perceive no 
substantial cause for the apprehension of 
danger. * That the frequent exercise of 

* Whatever difference many persons may imagine 
to exist between the science of ethics and that of poli- 
tics ; between the laws enacted by the state, and the 
moral rules for private conduct ; they are both, in fact, 
framed upon the same principles, and both rest on the 
same basis. And hence the propriety of combining the 
discussion of moral and political philosophy in the same 
treatise. It is not a little satisfactory to find, that so 
able and liberal a writer as the Marquis Beccaria, in 
his tract on " Crimes and Punishments," coincides with 
Paley in many of his opinions, and, amongst others, on 
the measure of moral delinquency. " Abbiamo ved^o," 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



the same power entrusted to private in- 
dividuals would be equally free from ob- 
jection, I by no means venture to affirm ; 
nor, let it be recollected, is our Cambridge 
moralist an advocate for any such liberty 
as is here supposed. On the contrary, he 
plainly acknowledges, that " between indi- 
viduals it is found impossible to ascertain 
every duty by an immediate reference to 
public utility, not only because such refer- 
ence is oftentimes too remote for the direc- 
tion of private consciences, but because a 
multitude of cases arise in which it is in- 
different to the general interest by what 
rule men act, though it be absolutely neces- 
sary that they act by some constant and 

he observes, " qual sia la vera misura dei delitti, cioe 
il danno della societd. Questa e una di quelle palpibili 
verita che quantunque non abbian bisogno ne di qua- 
dranti ne di telescopj per essere scoperte, ma sieno alia 
portata di ciascun mediocre intelletto, pure per una 
maravigliosa combinazione di circonstanze non sono con 
decisa sicurezza conosciute che da alcuni pochi pen- 
satori uomini di ogni nazione e di ogni secolo." — Bec- 
caria Dei Delitti e Delle Pene. Ediz. 27. § xxiv. 



14 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALRY'S 



known rule or other,"* &c. However 
requisite the consideration of general con- 
sequences must obviously be in the con- 
struction of universal rules, it can very 
rarely happen that any person in the or- 
dinary stations of life is called upon to 
make the calculation for himself, f If the 
action he is about to commit is manifestly 

* Prin. of Mor. and Polit. Philos. Vol. II. p. 412.— 
Edit. 5. 

if: " It is on few only and great-occasions that men de- 
liberate at all ; on fewer still that they institute any 
thing like a regular inquiry into the moral rectitude or 
depravity of what they are about to do; or wait for 
the result to it. We are, for the most part, determined 
at once ; and by an impulse which is the effect and 
energy of pre-established habits : and this constitution 
saems well adapted to the exigencies of human life and 
to the imbecility of our moral principle. In the cur- 
rent occasions and rapid opportunities of life, there is 
oftentimes little leisure for reflection; and were there 
more, a man who has to reason about his duty, when 
the temptation to transgress it is upon him, is almost 
sure to reason himself into an error.'" — Prin. of Mor. 
and Polit. Phil. Vol. I, p. 43. In the chapter on 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



15 



contrary to any of these established rules, 
he is justly taught to regard it as decidedly 
unlawful, notwithstanding the advantages 
to which, in his own apprehension, it might 
lead. Mr. Gisborne, however, argues as 
if these were not in fact Paley's opinions, 
because the latter, in his second volume, has 
introduced an example relative to the right 
of the subject to resist the tyranny of civil 
governors, under circumstances in which it 
becomes unavoidable that each individual 
should decide for himself. Whether this, 
or any other exception, can be properly 
justified, is a question to which I shall 
have occasion to advert in the sequel of 
these observations ; but what has been so 
clearly stated by our Author on the sub- 
ject of general consequences, and more 
especially on habit, ought to be deemed 

Virtue, from which this quotation is taken, the reader 
will find more to the same effect ; but it deserves to 
be noticed, that the supposed neglect of these very sen- 
timents is always alleged by the opponents of Paley, 
as affording a strong argument against the truth of his 
system. 



10 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



a full confutation of the charges ad- 
vanced by his opponents on this particular 
point. 

But though it is sufficiently clear that 
these general rules, whether derived from 
Scripture, from the law of the land, or from 
experience, require unhesitating obedience 
when fully understood ; it is nevertheless 
true that many of them are expressed in 
terms so comprehensive as to leave much to 
the discretion of those to whom they are 
addressed. And even when their purport 
is free from every shade of doubt, the 
proper application of them in numer- 
ous cases that actually arise, must de- 
pend upon the judgment of the indi- 
vidual. No moral precept is more fre- 
quently inculcated in the New Testa- 
ment, than that which enjoins the practice 
of charity ; and yet in what mode it can 
best be applied, is a point which leaves 
room for much deliberation. This virtue, 
with all its excellence, if exercised indis- 
criminately, would inevitably defeat its own 
object ; and we need scarcely to be re- 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



17 



minded that some benevolent plans, which 
long attracted universal approbation, are 
now discovered to be indisputably errone- 
ous. Nor can we assign any other reason 
for this change, than that such plans, if 
generally carried into execution, would be 
prejudicial to the welfare of the community. 
The congiaria distributed among the popu- 
lace of ancient Rome, the stated supply of 
provisions to the indigent and idle by the 
opulent monasteries before the Reformation, 
and in more modern times the periodical do- 
nations of money to the poor, so long regarded 
as meritorious by Christians of every de- 
nomination, and which to this hour are not 
altogether abolished, may furnish examples 
of a mistaken method of relieving poverty. 
It is at length beginning to be understood, 
that whatever tends to diminish the ex- 
ertions of industry, whatever habituates the 
poor to expect that from the charitable dis- 
position of others which might be procured 
by their own activity, ought most decidedly 
to be condemned. We may very consist- 
ently applaud the motive, while we repro- 

c 



18 VINDICATION OF DR. PA LEY'S 



bate the measure. In what particular 
manner, therefore, the precept which en- 
joins beneficence towards those in distress 
can best be fulfilled,* must be left to the 

* Though there are few considerate persons in the pre- 
sent day who would not in theory readily condemn every 
measure which tends to promote an increase of population 
beyond the demand for labour, or which encourages the 
imprudence of marrying among the labouring classes be- 
fore they possess the means of supporting a healthy 
offspring, yet there are many who in practice utterly 
disregard the maxims thus acknowledged to be essential to 
the welfare of society. Notwithstanding the unjust 
clamour raised on the subject, and which even now has 
not entirely subsided, the world will at length become 
fully sensible of the supreme value of the doctrines 
which Mr. Malthus has so clearly proved and illustrated 
in his " Essay on Population," and which the present 
Bishop of Chester has so ably and judiciously defended. 
It matters not that some few errors of minor conse- 
quence may have been discovered in the details of that 
work : it matters not whether the proportion there 
stated, between the increase of population and the means 
of subsistence, be perfectly correct; the leading facts, 
on which the whole fabric rests, have been shown by 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



19 



judgment of communities and individuals; 
nor is there any other method so likely to 

subsequent investigation to be substantially true. They 
have indeed been disputed, but they have never been 
disproved. 

A practical work on the best mode of distributing 
charity to the poor has long been wanting; and it is 
much to be wished that some person of liberal views and 
competent experience would undertake so useful a tasL 
The duty of extending relief to those who are in penury 
and distress, no one can for a moment call in question ; 
but in what manner this duty should be fulfilled, so as 
at once to alleviate individual misery and promote the 
common good, it is not always very easy to determine. 
All stated donations in money, provisions, and clothing, 
are now justly censured as tending to enhance the evil 
they were designed to mitigate, by encouraging the in- 
digent to resort to the compassion of others rather than 
to their own efforts for the supply of their wants, and 
thus to diffuse the ills of pauperism by the formation 
of indolent habits. On this account, we cannot approve 
of the first kind of charitable relief recommended by 
Paley as the best, in his excellent chapter on Pecuniary 
Bounty. Among the few admissible exceptions, how- 
ever, there is one channel in which humanity may be 

C 2 



20 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY*S 

lead to a right conclusion as considering 
what will be productive of the most ex- 
allowed its free course without apprehending any evil 
consequences, and that is, in alleviating the miseries of 
those who are labouring under the decrepitude of age, 
or the deplorable effects of accident or disease. 

Among the most eligible modes of improving the 
condition and diminishing the evils of the laborious 
orders of society, we may safely enumerate the follow- 
ing:— 

1. That which is paramount to all others, the educa- 
tion of the young, including the distribution of the 
Scriptures and of religious tracts. But in addition to 
this indispensable instruction in the duties of religion, 
it would be highly beneficial to the poor to impart to 
them such other information as may not only teach them 
economy in the management of their affairs, and pru- 
dence in forming the marriage connexion, but may 
enable them to perceive the absolute necessity of differ- 
ent ranks in civil society, convince them of the folly of 
discontentment with their lot, and stimulate them to seek 
for other sources of enjoyment beyond those of the senses. 

2. Another admirable mode of exercising beneficence, 
it is universally admitted, consists in regular subscrip- 
tions to hospitals, dispensaries, and asylums for those 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



21 



tensive advantage. Difficult as the task 
may sometimes be in cases of a more com- 

afflicted with painful maladies of body, or derange- 
ment of mind, and to institutions for reclaiming ju- 
venile depravity, or for extricating from embarrassment 
those whose integrity has made them the victims of 
successful knavery. 

3. A further method of conferring bounty on the neces- 
sitous, which, though in some measure perhaps liable to 
objection, deserves to be recommended, is the distribu- 
tion of articles of clothing, provision, and fuel, during 
the severity of winter, or in seasons of great scarcity, 
but requiring at the same time the payment of a small 
sum from those who receive these donations. By this 
means greater economy is ensured in the consumption 
of the articles given, and the spirit of industry does not 
experience that check which is the invariable conse- 
quence of unconditional gratuities. 

In all benefactions, however, of this nature to the 
poor, there are two circumstances which require great 
precaution on the part of the donors. If, in consequence 
of these private charities, the parochial relief before 
allowed should be withdrawn or diminished, the actual 
benefit will not be conferred, as it was intended, on the 
indigent individuals themselves, but on those who are 



22 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



plicated nature, and where some degree of 
hesitation is unavoidable, we may still con- 
fidently ask — what better criterion can be 
appealed to than general expediency, for 
determining the rectitude of the maxims 

liable to the payment of the poorVrates, that is, the 
landed proprietors, the farmers, and the tradesmen. 

In the second place, when any charitable donation is 
bestowed on a married woman (for example) with a 
large family in a state of indigence, if the husband is 
induced, on account of the bounty thus extended, to 
diminish the portion of his weekly wages which he was 
in the habit of allotting to the wife, what is the con- 
sequence ? The woman receives no more than she was 
accustomed to do, and the benefaction, which was de- 
signed to form an addition to the scanty support of a 
numerous family, serves no other purpose than to enable 
the husband to squander more at the public-house. 
These cases, I am sorry to observe, are not imaginary. 
Their reality is but too well attested by those who are 
acquainted with the habits of the labouring classes. 

It must not be forgotten, that in the distribution of 
all charitable donations, whether wholly or partially 
gratuitous, utility is the only rule which ought to in- 
fluence cur conduct. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



23 



which have been framed for the guidance 
of our conduct ? Mr. Stewart, I am well 
aware, would at once reply, that a much 
more unerring standard is to be found in 
the faculty of conscience, invariably de- 
veloped, as it is said to be, in the human 
mind. 

This leads me to the consideration of the 
objections he has advanced against Dr. Pa- 
ley s theory in the latest of his publications t 
entitled " The Philosophy of the Active 
and Moral Powers of Man ;" where he 
enters with more minuteness into the prin- 
cipal questions connected with ethics, and 
where his animadversions on the present 
topic are carried to a greater extent. In 
the commencement of his observations* to 
show that the moral faculty is an original 
principle of our nature, he alleges against 
that celebrated writer, that he is one of the 
most zealous advocates of the selfish system 
of morals, and that he confounds all our 
notions of duty with a regard to our own 
happiness. He then proceeds to refute this 

* Vol. I. p. 152. 



24 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEV'S 



system, (which in truth is wrongly attri- 
buted to Paley,) and adduces the following 
arguments in proof of its fallacy : — that 
there are in all languages words equivalent 
to duty and interest, which men have always 
distinguished in their signification : — That 
the emotions arising from the contemplation 
of what is right and wrong in conduct, are 
different both in degree and kind from 
those which are produced by a calm regard 
to our happiness ; (and here he appeals, by 
way of illustration, to the emotions pro- 
duced by contemplating the characters ex- 
hibited in history or in novels, or repre- 
sented on the stage :) — that though a sense 
of duty and a regard to our own happiness 
conspire in most instances to give the same 
direction to our conduct, yet (he observes) 
the connexion between virtue and happi- 
ness is by no means obvious to the common 
sense of mankind, but is deduced from an 
accurate investigation of the remote conse- 
quences of our different actions : — and that 
the same distinction is strongly confirmed 
by the early period of life at which our 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



25 



moral judgments make their appearance, 
long before children are able to form the 
general notion of happiness, and indeed, 
in the very infancy of reason. 

The facts here advanced Mr. Stewart 
considers as furnishing a sufficient refuta- 
tion of the selfish theory of morals ; but 
before he dismisses the subject, he thinks 
it necessary to notice a doctrine which he 
describes to be "fundamentally the same, 
though modified in such a manner as to 
elude some of the foregoing arguments," 
and which he believes to be at present the 
prevailing opinion of moralists in England. 
"According to this doctrine we do, indeed, 
in many cases, approve or disapprove of 
particular actions without any reference to 
our own interest at the time, but it is as- 
serted that it was views of self-interest 
which originally created these moral sen- 
timents and led us to associate agreeable 
or disagreeable emotions with human con- 
duct." Thus " a particular action, which 
was at first approved or disapproved of 
merely on account of its supposed tendency 



26 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



with respect to our own interest, comes, in 
process of time, to be approved or disap- 
proved of the moment it is mentioned, and 
without any reflection on our part that we 
are able to recollect."* The author ac- 
knowledges that this refinement, as he calls 
it, on the old selfish system, gives it a de- 
gree of plausibility which it did not origi- 
nally possess, and obviates one of the ob- 
jections to it already stated ; but still he 
maintains that the others retain their full 
force. 

The argument on which he lays the prin- 
cipal stress is, " the degree of experience 
and reflection necessary for discovering the 
tendency of virtue to promote our happi- 
ness, compared with the very early period of 
life, when the moral sentiments display 
themselves in their full vigour." He warmly 
combats the answer which is given to this 
statement — that the generation of these 
moral sentiments is to be ascribed to imita- 
tion, to instruction, and to the association 
of ideas in the infant mind ; and strenuously 
Vol. I. p. 164. 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



27 



denies that these causes are sufficient to 
account for the origin of the powers of moral 
perception, and of our notions of right and 
wrong-. The great object of this writer (as 
he tells us himself,) is to prove that " the 
moral faculty is an original principle of our 
constitution, which is not resolvable into 
any other principle or principles more 
general than itself." 

But after examining with calmness the 
several objections which have been here 
adduced by Mr. Stewart, against what has 
been termed the selfish system, it is scarcely 
possible to avoid feeling surprised at ob- 
serving to how little they really amount, 
when applied to the theory embraced by 
Dr. Paley. Thus 3 with respect to the dis- 
tinction between duty and interest, it is, in 
truth, as fully acknowledged by the latter, 
as by any other writer, though he explains 
it in a different manner. Duty, according 
to Dr. Reid and his disciple, Mr. Stewart, 
is a simple idea, incapable of being defined. 
But duty and right, it will be admitted, are 
synonymous ; and right is defined by Paley 



28 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



to be consistency with the will of God. 
Now as strict conformity with the divine 
will must not unfrequently interfere with our 
immediate interest, it is impossible that this 
writer could be said to have overlooked the 
distinction, even supposing that he had said 
nothing more on the subject. In his chap- 
ter on Obligation, however, he has explicitly 
stated what he conceives to be the differ- 
ence between prudence or a regard to our 
interest and duty ; and though he main- 
tains that in the one case we consider what 
we shall gain or lose in the present world, 
and in the other case, what we shall also 
gain or lose in the world to come ; this dis- 
tinction is abundantly sufficient to answer 
every moral purpose proposed by those who 
contend for an instinctive principle of duty, 
which, while they pronounce it to be impe- 
rative, they are unable to define. All that he 
means to affirm is, that interest and duty are 
resolvable into what conduces to our present, 
and what conduces to our future happiness ; 
but still he maintains that they must not be 
suffered to interfere with each other, and that 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



29 



whenever a competition arises, the former 
must invariably yield to the latter. The ex- 
pression of acting 1 from a sense of duty occurs 
in various places of his Moral Philosophy ; 
and since this evidently implies a regard to 
the divine will, (which ultimately coincides 
with a regard to our future happiness,) the 
distinction contended for is fully preserved, 
without having recourse to instinct or in- 
tuition, and without ascribing to the term 
any mysterious, undefinable meaning. What- 
ever proximity may be thought to exist 
between this Author's notions of interest 
and duty, and though it is conceded, beyond 
all question, that they must ultimately coin- 
cide, they are yet as much distinguished 
from each other, even according to this 
theory, in all that concerns our conduct in 
the present life, as finite from infinite, as 
time from eternity. 

Again, when Mr. Stewart alleges that the 
emotions arising from the consideration of 
what is right or wrong are very different 
from those which are produced by a regard 
to our own happiness, and that the dis- 



30 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEV's 



tinction between duty and interest is con- 
firmed by the early period at which our 
moral judgments make their appearance, 
long- before children can form a general 
notion of happiness ; there is nothing in 
Paley which contradicts these sentiments. 
On the contrary, he fully admits the truth 
of this statement, though, from the language 
of some of his opponents, we might be led to 
suppose that he actually doubted whether 
the valour of Leonidas, for example, would 
excite the admiration of a child old enough 
to comprehend the narrative, or whether 
the same child would experience feelings of 
horror on hearing of the atrocities of Cali- 
gula. But whether this moral approbation 
and disapprobation would arise instanta- 
neously in the mind of an untutored savage, 
similar to the wild boy* caught in the woods 
of Hanover, could any means be devised 

* "Were it possible, 1 ' observes Dr. Adam Smith, who 
was decidedly opposed to the theory of utility, " that a 
human creature could grow up to manhood in some 
solitary place, without any communication with his own 
species, he would no more think of his own character, 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



31 



of relating to him the same historical facts, 
is a very distinct question, and one respect- 
ing which Paley does not pretend to decide, 
because the experiment is altogether im- 
practicable. The purport of what he con- 
tends for is, that these moral emotions are 
not instinctive nor intuitive, and that their 
origin, however early, is easily accounted 
for, without supposing the existence of any 
peculiar faculty like the moral sense and 
conscience of Shaftesbury and Hucheson. 
Nor is he combating, as Mr. Stewart asserts, 
a phantom of his own raising, but that 
theory of morals which maintains that an 
original faculty is implanted in the human 

of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and 
conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, 
than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All 
those are objects which he cannot easily see ; which 
naturally he does not look at ; and with regard to which 
he is provided with no mirror which can present them 
to his view. Bring him into society, and he is imme- 
diately provided with the mirror which he wanted be- 
fore." — Theory of Moral Sentiments, Vol. I. part III. 
chapter i. 



32 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



mind, to inform us of what is right and 
wrong, without leaving room for a mo- 
ment's hesitation, and to urge us by the 
vivid feelings which it excites, to pursue 
the one and shun the other. That no such 
unerring guide was ever given to man in 
his natural state, we have the strongest pre- 
sumptive evidence, from the practices of 
savage nations, and even from those which 
were often countenanced among civilized 
heathens : and although Mr. Locke's details* 
on this point are sometimes censured, as 
being derived from works of disputable 
authority, the facts furnished by history 
are more than sufficiently numerous to 
prove either that no such innate or intuitive 
moral principles exist, or that, if they do, 
they are totally inadequate to regulate the 
conduct of no inconsiderable portion of 
mankind-f 

* Essay on Human Understanding, Book I. c. 3. 

•f- For one who contends for the supreme authority 
of conscience, and the immutability of the moral prin- 
ciple, the following concession of Mr. Stewart is, I 
confess, not very consistent. " Where the police, there- 



I 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



33 



But notwithstanding the feelings of alarm 
excited in the breast of the amiable Scotch 
metaphysician, by the principles inculcated 
in Paley's theory, it will appear to any one 
who attentively examines the arguments 
advanced, that these celebrated authors by 
no means differ from each other so entirely 
as the language of the former would lead us 
to infer. Thus, they both agree in believing 
that there is an essential difference between 
right and wrong ; that, in the great majority 
of cases, this difference is at once perceived 
by the mind, long anterior to the exercise 
of the reasoning powers, and consequently 
without adverting to the influence of ac- 
tions on the general welfare ; and that this 

fore, is weak, murders must not only be more frequent, 
but are really less criminal, than in a society like ours, 
where the private rights of individuals are completely 
protected by law, and where there hardly occurs an 
instance, except in a case of self-defence, in which one 
man can be justified for shedding the blood of another." 
See Philos. of the Active Mor. Powers of Man. Vol. I. 
p. 187. 

D 



34 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



perception is accompanied with an emotion 
of approbation or disapprobation.* With 
regard, however, to the manner in which 
these moral perceptions and sentiments are 
generated, there is unquestionably a con- 
siderable difference in their opinions. While 
their origin is attributed by Paley to edu- 
cation, to the imitative powers of the infant 
mind, and to associations which are formed 
at so early a period, as to induce many to 
suppose that the principles themselves are 

* In addition to the decisive passage already quoted 
from Paley's chapter on Virtue, to show that he does 
not contend for the necessity that the great mass of the 
people should calculate the remote consequences of ac- 
tions, I will here appeal to another of similar import in 
his chapter on Right — (Vol. I. p. 83.) " By virtue of 
these two principles, that God wills the happiness of 
his creatures, and that the will of God is the measure 
of right and wrong, we arrive at certain conclusions ; 
which conclusions become rules; and we soon learn to 
pronounce actions right or wrong, according as they 
agree or disagree with our rules, without looking any 
farther." 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



35 



innate ;* Mr. Stewart pronounces the moral 
judgments of man to be intuitive, and in- 

* It is always satisfactory to know Mr. Locke's sen- 
timents on topics of this nature. " There is a great 
deal of difference," he observes, " between an innate law, 
and a law of nature ; between something imprinted on 
our minds in their very original, and something that we, 
being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of by 
the use and due application of our natural faculties. 1 ' 
Again : " I doubt not but, without being written on 
their hearts, many men may, by the same way that they 
come to the knowledge of other things, come to assent 
to several moral rules, and be convinced of their obliga- 
tion. Others also may come to be of the same mind, 
from their education, company, and customs of their 
country ; which persuasion, however got, will serve to 
set conscience on work, which is nothing else but our 
own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or 
pravity of our own actions. And if conscience be a 
proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate 
principles ; since some men with the same bent of con- 
science prosecute what others avoid." — Essay on Hum- 
Unders. Book I. c. 3. Locke's account of conscience 
would have been entirely free from objection, if he had 
included the emotion which accompanies, with more or 
less vividness, the judgment of the understanding. 

D 2 



36 VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY's 



variably to arise on the development of 
the mental faculties ; regarding right and 
wrong as qualities of actions which affect 
the mind with as much certainty as the 
qualities of material bodies affect the senses, 
and which derive none of their primitive 
force from considerations of utility. Let 
it be observed that the disciples of Paley do 
not deny that a capacity of pleasure and 
pain is coeval with our birth ; but they 
assert that the operation of the causes he has 
stated on this acknowledged susceptibility, 
are sufficient, without the aid of other 
principles, to account for the power of moral 

How erroneously numerous habits, when acquired 
at a very early period of life, have been identified with 
instinct, is also the observation of an acute French logi- 
cian, whose works were at one time in high repute on 
the continent. Ce sont ces habitudes, qu'on nomme 
mouvemens naturels, actions me'caniques, instinct, et 
qu'on suppose faussement etre nees avec nous. On 
evitera ce prejuge, si Ton juge de ces habitudes par 
d'autres qui nous sont devenues tout aussi naturelles, 
quoique nous nous souvenions de les avoir acquises." La 
Logique, par Condillac. Premiere Partie. Chap. IX. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



37 



discrimination observable in man, and for 
the feelings by which it is accompanied. 

Why this latter view of the subject should 
be regarded as productive of so much dan- 
ger, I confess myself at a loss to compre- 
hend. In comparing the two systems to- 
gether, we cannot but observe that in one 
of them there is a degree of mysteriousness 
attached to our moral constitution, which I 
cannot persuade myself really belongs to it, 
and which is certainly no recommendation 
of the theory itself ; while the other is de- 
cidedly more comprehensible, and affords at 
the same time a more satisfactory explana- 
tion of the phenomena arising from this 
part of our mental frame. 

The class of moralists, amongst whom Dr. 
Paley occupies so distinguished a place, 
admit with as little hesitation as Mr. Stew- 
art's school, the essential distinction between 
right and wrong, virtue and vice ; but they 
do not rest satisfied with supposing that 
these are simple ideas incapable of being 
resolved into any other elements. They 
very properly extend their analysis beyond 



38 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



the limits assigned by Dr. Reid and his 
disciples, and maintain that whatever volun- 
tary actions can be proved to produce per- 
manent happiness, are alone entitled to be 
denominated virtuous ; and those which are 
destructive of this happiness are for that 
sole reason esteemed vicious. Mr. Stewart 
frequently insists on the necessity of regard- 
ing - right and wrong as qualities of actions. Let 
it be conceded ; but what are these qualities ? 
They are not, as he would represent them, 
totally inexplicable, but consist in the power 
which certain actions possess to produce 
pleasure or pain. That the moral qualities 
of actions consist in nothing more than 
their aptitude to promote natural good or 
evil, is an opinion which has often been 
defended by eminent and orthodox divines- 
Dr. Sherlock, the celebrated opponent of 
South, has expressed himself on this topic 
with clearness and decision. " Whereas," he 
observes, "we distinguish between moral and 
natural good and evil ; the only difference 
between them is this — that moral good or 
evil is in the will or choice, natural good or 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



39 



evil is in the nature of things ; that which 
is good or hurtful to ourselves or others, is 
naturally good or evil ; to love, to choose 
to do that which is good or hurtful to our- 
selves, or others, is morally good or evil ; or 
is the good or evil of our choice or actions. 
If you will but recollect yourselves, you will 
find that you have no other notion of good 
or evil but this. When you say, such a 
man has done a very good or very evil 
action, what do you mean by it ? Do you 
not mean that he has done something very 
good, or something very hurtful, to himself 
or others ? When you hear that any man 
has done good or evil, is not the next ques- 
tion, what good, or what hurt has he done ? 
And do you not mean by this, natural good 
or evil? Which is a plain evidence that 
you judge of the moral good or evil of 
actions by the natural good or evil which 
they do," * &c. Thus, also, Archbishop 
King, in answering an objection to his 
mode of reasoning, that it confounds na- 
tural and moral evils, which all divines had 

* Sherlock on Judgment, p. 20 — 24. 



40 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



till then distinguished, observes, that " All 
evil is inconveniency, but that some incon- 
veniencies arise from the series of natural 
causes, without our consent, and sometimes 
our knowledge ; these we call natural evils : 
but others happen from the abuse of elec- 
tions, when an undue choice occasions 
them ; and in this case, besides the natural 
evil that arises from them, there is likewise 
an obligation on the person that makes the 
choice, to answer for the hurt he has done 
by it. Now these choices that bring incon- 
veniences are called moral evils, and the 
difference between natural and moral evil 
is not but that they both bring incon- 
veniencies, and hurt ourselves or others, 
(for therein consists the nature of their evil,) 
but that the ill effects of the one proceed 
from the choice, those of the other from 
natural causes ; and hence the author of that 
choice is answerable for the one, but 
nobody for the other. Moral evil, there- 
fore, is natural evil with choice super- 
added."* The same author is not less 

* King's Origin of Evil, p. 318. Edit. 3. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



41 



explicit in another passage : "It must be 
observed that elections (volitions) are there- 
fore esteemed evil, because they lead us 
into natural evils. For if an election con- 
tain nothing absurd or prejudicial, it is not 
a wrong one. Hatred of God, rebellion 
against his commands, murther, theft, lying, 
are sins, because they are hurtful to our- 
selves or others, because they deprive us of 
natural good, and lead to evil. Elections, 
therefore, are wrong and undue on account 
of the natural evils which sometimes attend 
them. Natural evils, then, are greater than 
moral; for that which makes any thing 
bad, must necessarily be worse itself."* 

This account of virtue and vice is, I can- 
not but think, much more satisfactory and 
intelligible than the vague and undefinable 
notion of an original and immutable recti- 
tude, which is supposed to be equally in- 
dependent of the Divine will, and of the 
results it may produce ; and, which is not 
less obscure and peculiar in its nature than 
the eternal principle of monads, which Leib- 

* King's Origin of Evil, p. 386. 



42 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



nitz chimerically supposed to constitute the 
essence of perception and appetite. Paley, 
indeed, has notentered into adistinct inquiry 
relative to the original foundation of right 
and wrong ; but his sentiments are never- 
theless perfectly consistent with this view 
of the subject.* It appears to me, however, 
I confess, that the question respecting the 
origin of our moral feelings does not possess 
that importance which Mr. Stewart and 

* That this conception of virtue or goodness in the 
abstract, of those immutable principles which were sup- 
posed to be totally unaffected by the external creation, 
Quae neque concursum cceli, neque fulminis iram, 
Nec metuunt ullas tuta atque eterna ruinas, 
were at variance with the sentiments of the greatest of 
heathen philosophers, the immortal Socrates, is suffici- 
ently apparent from the following passage in Xenophon's 
Memorabilia. (L. III. c. 8.) Being asked by Aristippus 
whether he knew of any thing that was good : 'Apa yap 
(he replied,) ipuyraq pe u ri oiSa TrvpzTov ayaOov Ovk 
eyu>y etftr). AXXa bcpOaXp'iag ; OuSe tovto. AXXa 
X'ipov ; Ov^£ Xipov. AXXa fxr\v, £<pr), eiy epoyrag ps, 
E( ri ayaOov oi<5a b ptSevog ayaOov iariv, our' 6iSa, k<pr} } 
ovTi ctouai. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



43 



others are so anxious to attach to it. 
Scarcely any person, I imagine, who has 
attentively exercised his observation, can 
be found, who would deny that the major 
part of mankind are placed in circum- 
stances, which, at an earlier or a later 
period, give rise to the moral sentiments * 
in the breast, and that these sentiments 
possess, on the whole, a great degree of uni- 
formity, subject nevertheless to exceptions 
and variations which a difference of exter- 
nal condition, and consequently of mental 
culture, will satisfactorily explain. Whe- 
ther these moral perceptions and feelings 
are to be deemed instinctive, or whether 
they derive their origin from the more 
rational process described by Locke, Hart- 
ley, and Paley, the practical results are 
precisely the same, and the essential dis- 
tinction between virtue and vice remains 
unaltered : and hence it cannot but excite 
surprise, that the latter opinion should 
have been opposed with a degree of warmth 
so little justified by the occasion. When 
we can account for any striking pheno- 



44 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEV'S 



mena, whether physical, mental, or moral, 
from causes which are acknowledged by 
all parties to be constantly in operation, 
it is surely, to say the least, highly 
unreasonable to resort to some other cause, 
which is not only superfluous and un- 
definable, but of which the very exist- 
ence is a subject of dispute. It is not to 
the mere use of the words conscience and 
moral sense, that any objection is made by 
the followers of Paley : on the contrary, 
the terms are readily admitted to be ex- 
tremely useful in the nomenclature of ethics. 
All that is affirmed is, that the faculty 
they are intended to designate is neither 
innate nor instinctive ; because, in the first 
place, such a supposition is not at all requi- 
site ; and in the second place, it is destitute 
of substantial proof. We must not forget 
the rule of philosophizing laid down by 
Newton in his " Principia," that "No more 
causes of the phenomena of nature ought to 
be admitted, than are known to exist, and 
are sufficient to explain their appearances." 
But however ready Mr. Stewart may be 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



45 



to admit the truth of this maxim in natural 
philosophy, yet, with singular inconsistency, 
its justness, if not expressly denied, is mani- 
festly disregarded both by himself and Dr. 
Reid, in their theory of mental and moral 
science. These writers find no difficulty in 
believing that the attraction of gravitation 
and cohesion, the various chemical affi- 
nities, the attractive powers of electricity 
and magnetism, may all of them be nothing 
more than modifications of one simple cause ; 
but when they come to discuss the opera- 
tions of the human mind, and the moral 
principles which influence human conduct, 
their love of simplicity at once deserts 
them ; they condemn those philosophers 
whose investigations have led them to as- 
cribe mental phenomena to a few adequate 
causes, and forbid the analysis of many of 
the more complex operations of the under- 
standing, by pronouncing them to belong 
to those ultimate facts, which are incapable 
of being resolved into simpler elements. 
This mode of conduct, alike favourable to 
the indolence of some, and the prejudices of 



46 



VINDICATION, &C. 



others, has been successfully exposed in the 
more recent publications of Dr. Brown ; 
nor is it possible to deny, that the serious 
obstacle which it presents to the advance- 
ment of truth, must materially diminish the 
value of every system in which it is found. 
However undisputed the merits of such a 
system may be in other respects, it must at 
all events be extremely unfit to be adopted 
by those whose duty it is to promote the 
diffusion of accurate knowledge, and to 
encourage a habit of assiduous inquiry. 



CHAPTER II. 



Reply to the Objections of the Rev. Thomas 
Gisborne, M.A. Prebendary of Durham, 

SfC. 

The observations of so respectable a writer 
as Mr. Gisborne, must at all times merit 
our attention ; but after the encomium passed 
by Mr. Dugald Stewart, on his "Principles 
of Moral Philosophy," it becomes doubly 
incumbent on us to examine the arguments 
contained in that work against Dr. Paley's 
theory, and to inquire how far they are 
entitled to be called " quite unanswerable."* 
Few persons, I should imagine, who have 
adopted the Christian faith, will hesitate 

* Stewart's Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. II. 
Note cc. 



48 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 



in acknowledging', that whenever the Divine 
will can be clearly ascertained by referring 
to the pages of Inspiration, immediate con- 
formity becomes our imperative duty, with- 
out pausing to consider to what extent it 
may coincide with our previous senti- 
ments. But " when (as Mr. Gisborne* 
asks) the Scriptures do not give the detail 
of moral information which is found requi- 
site, by what rule is the will of God res- 
pecting points of morality to be ascer- 
tained ?" It is in the answer to this ques- 
tion that he considers Dr. Paley's theory to 
be chargeable with error and danger. In 
the opinion of the latter moralist, expe- 
diency, estimated according to the best of 
our judgment, must alone be resorted to 
for discovering the Divine will, while, by 
the former of these writers, the truth of 
this doctrine is strenuously denied. The 
arguments, on which Mr. Gisborne chiefly 
dwells in support of his reasoning, are 
derived from the alleged difficulty imposed 

* Principles of Moral Philosophy examined, &c. 
Chap. V. p. 90. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



49 



by the rule in question on the inadequate 
faculties of man, and from the abuse to 
which it must of necessity be constantly 
liable ; but with what justice these objec- 
tions are described as peculiar to the doc- 
trine of expediency, will be sufficiently ap- 
parent from a brief examination of the 
theory substituted by Mr. Gisborne him- 
self. In the fifth chapter of his "Princi- 
ples of Moral Philosophy," he lays down 
this proposition : "Every man sins against 
God who does not act in such a manner 
with respect to the use, defence, and dis- 
posal of his rights, as he is of opinion will, 
on the whole, fulfil most effectually the 
purposes of his being/' * When he pro- 
ceeds to inquire what these purposes are, 
he justly observes, "The primary end of 
the being of every man is obviously to 
promote and secure his own final happiness ; 
an object which he can attain by no other 
method than by a zealous and faithful 
obedience to the will of his Maker. "f In 

* Gisborne's Prin. of Mor. Phil. p. 102. 
t Ibid. p. 150. 

E 



50 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



the same chapter he afterwards adds : ' ' There 
are subordinate purposes conducive, how- 
ever, to the principal one already men- 
tioned, which not only his reason, but the 
very frame and constitution of his nature 
show that he was formed to answer. These 
are, promoting- the final welfare of his fel- 
low-creatures, and their present happiness, 
as well as his own."* Again, in the eighth 
chapter, where he enters more into detail, 
he tells us that, " since the Almighty be- 
stows no gift but for an end adequate to 
the value of that gift, there is a presump- 
tion, antecedent to all reasoning, that each 
right of which an individual finds himself 
possessed, is necessary to enable him to ac- 
complish the purpose of his existence, or 
at least is adapted to be of material use in 
promoting them; and consequently that 
God wills him to retain it. He therefore 
sins against God if he slights that pre- 
sumption, and forbears from resisting, by 
all requisite force, every invasion of his 
rights; unless he is convinced, by a full 

* Gisborne's Prin. of Mor. Phil, p.150. 



THEORY OP MORALS. 51 

consideration of the benefits likely to re- 
sult from his forbearance as well as from 
his resistance, that the former measure will, 
upon the whole, conduce, at least as much 
as the latter, to the ends for which he was 
created. In the one case, therefore, it be- 
comes no less his duty to forbear, than in 
the other case it would have been to resist 
with his utmost ability." * Mr. Gisborne 
admits, at the same time, that much de- 
liberation is necessary, and that much dif- 
ficulty occurs in determining- when forcible 
means ought to be resorted to in the de- 
fence of our rights. 

Let us now observe in what particular 
points Mr. Gisborne's system differs from 
that of Dr. Paley. In the first place, it is 
laid down by the former as an incontro- 
vertible maxim, that " our own final hap- 
piness is the primary end of our being ;" 
and that 'our conduct must be determined 
by what we believe will best fulfil that 
purpose. Does not this precisely accord 
with the "everlasting happiness" expressed 

* Gisborne's Prin. of Mor. Phil p. 163. 

E 2 



52 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 

in Paley's definition of virtue ? These two 
writers agree likewise in thinking- that the 
will of God ought always to be regarded 
as the rule of our actions ; but in cases 
where the Scriptures are silent, they differ 
with respect to the mode of discovering 
that will. It is affirmed by the one, that 
whatever is generally expedient, that is, 
whatever tends to promote the welfare of 
the human species, must be agreeable to 
the divine will ; and hence he regards 
utility as the great criterion by which our 
judgment must be formed. By the other 
it is contended, that this will can only be 
ascertained by inquiring what will best 
fulfil the ends of our being ; that is to say, 
first, the final happiness of ourselves ; se- 
condly that of our fellow-creatures ; and 
lastly, the present happiness of both. With 
regard to the difficulty attending this in- 
quiry, the first question which presents 
itself is, in what respect it is less than that 
which is involved in the criterion of utility. 
According to Mr. Gisborne's system, be- 
fore any person can determine whether any 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



53 



particular action will best fulfil the pur- 
poses of his being, there are four points 
to be deliberately considered, — its ten- 
dency to promote the final happiness of 
himself, and that of his fellow-creatures, 
and then their present happiness, and his 
own. Now the extent of the examination 
here enjoined must undoubtedly exceed 
^hat which is required by general expedi- 
ency ; and if the latter be supposed to be 
beyond the capacity of the human mind, 
it will scarcely be denied that the former 
must be still more so. But Mr. Gisborne's 
theory not only demands a previous inquiry 
more difficult in its execution ; it is also 
more liable to the charge of selfishness, 
which has been so repeatedly urged against 
that which he so warmly opposes. If the 
former be admitted, every man is bound 
to regulate his conduct by what he believes 
will most conduce to the final and temporal 
happiness of himself, and then, as a colla- 
teral consideration, by what will promote 
the same objects with regard to his fellow- 
creatures ; whereas in the latter system, 



54 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 



our own individual interest is to make no 
part of our inquiry in the formation of 
general rules. The principle of obligation, 
let it be recollected, is a distinct question, 
and I am now speaking only of the criterion 
of virtue. Whatever after mature delibera- 
tion (according to Paley's system) promises 
to contribute most effectually to the welfare 
of others, that must be made the sole rule 
of our conduct, without any regard to self ; 
and to that we must steadily adhere at the 
risk of our worldly prosperity. Mr. Stew- 
art, however, pronounces expediency to be 
a most dangerous principle * of action, and 

* Dr. Adam Smith, for whose opinions this writer 
always professes the greatest deference, certainly does 
not evince that degree of alarm which this theory so 
constantly excites in the mind of his friend. Speaking 
of the defects peculiar to the three systems of morals, 
which represent virtue as consisting either in propriety, 
or in benevolence, or in prudence, he makes the follow- 
ing observation : — "But, notwithstanding these defects, 
the general tendency of each of those three systems is 
to encourage the best and most laudable habits of the 
human mind: and it were well for society, if, either 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



55 



alleges that it has been appealed to by the 
most execrable of the human race, to justify 
the worst crimes. But is the calculation 
of what will be most likely to secure the 
greatest happiness of ourselves and others 
so strongly recommended by the writer, 
on whom Mr. Stewart has bestowed such 
unqualified praises, at all less fraught with 
danger ? To me it appears manifest, that 
if the objections which have been urged 
against Paley's criterion of utility be well 
founded, they will apply with much greater 
force to that of Mr. Gisborne ; and that 
if an inquiry into the general welfare of 
others, with a view to the regulation of our 
moral conduct, be attended with difficulty 
and danger, these evils must be increased 
in a tenfold degree, when this inquiry is 

mankind in general, or even those few who pretend to 
live according to any philosophical rule, were to regu- 
late their conduct by the precepts of any one of them. 
We may learn from each of them something that is 
both valuable and peculiar.'" Theory of Moral Senti- 
ments. Vol. II. part 7. sect. 2. 



56 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



to be preceded by another in which the 
passions and prejudices of mankind must 
more powerfully tend to lead us into error. 
Our first and principal attention, Mr. Gis- 
borne tells us, must be directed to the con- 
sideration of what will best contribute to 
our individual welfare. Though it be true, 
that an enlightened regard to our own in- 
terest may, and in the opinion of a numer- 
ous class of philosophers must, supply the 
ultimate motive to conformity with any 
moral rule, it ought on no occasion what- 
ever to be allowed to form the rule itself. 
In guarding against danger, we have more 
to apprehend from the domineering influ- 
ence of the selfish feelings of our nature, 
than from the limited extent of the human 
understanding. It is a singular circum- 
stance, however, that the same writer, who 
has severely condemned the use which has 
been made of final causes in some theories 
of morals, and particularly in Paley's, 
should so highly approve of Mr. Gisborne's 
work, in which there is a constant refer- 
ence to the final cause of the creation of man. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



57 



But after all that has been advanced on 
the subject, the difficulty attending the 
theory of expediency has been greatly ex- 
aggerated. It is the observation, indeed, 
of the same able, I cannot say unpre- 
judiced, Scotch moralist, that " the dis- 
covery of this connexion between virtue 
and utility, is the slow result of extensive 
and philosophical combinations ; and would 
soon cease to have a foundation in truth, if 
men were to substitute their own concep- 
tions of expediency, instead of those rules 
which are inspired by the wisdom of God."* 
Surely this author cannot mean to say, that 
in all the more flagrant crimes it requires 
the divine inspiration to enable us to per- 
ceive their opposition to the well-being of 
society ; or, that we must await the slow 
result of extensive and philosophical cal- 
culations, before we can ascertain their 
destructive tendency. Is it possible, in any 
state of society short of the grossest barba- 
rism, not to be aware of the ruinous effects, 
for example, of murder, adultery, theft, 

* Elem. Philos. of the Hum. Mind. Vol. II. p. 510. 



58 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



and perjury ? Or is there any difficulty in 
discovering-, without either the aid of hea- 
venly inspiration, or the delay of extensive 
inquiry, the advantages attendant upon 
honesty, temperance, compassion, and cha- 
rity ? And even in those doubtful cases, 
which sometimes occur in the affairs of 
real life, as well as in casuistry, neither the 
dictates of conscience, nor the intuitive 
suggestions which, according to Mr. Stew- 
art, arise on the exercise of our under- 
standing, supply a readier guide for our 
actions, than the consideration of their 
influence on the welfare of society. 

With regard to the passage in Dr. Paley's 
second volume,* represented both by Mr. 
Stewart and Mr. Gisborne as so highly 
objectionable, where it is affirmed that 
"moral philosophy cannot pronounce that 
any rule of morality is so rigid as to bend 
to no exceptions ;" whether it might have 
been expressed in a less decided tone, 
is a point which it is now needless to 

* Prin. of Mor. Polit. Philos. Vol. II. chap. xii. 
p. 411. 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



59 



determine ; but we may rest assured that 
the author never intended that it should be 
criticised in an insulated form, nor that it 
should be interpreted otherwise than in 
perfect conformity with the principles en- 
forced in the rest of his work. That general 
rules are absolutely indispensable cannot be 
disputed ; nor has any one enforced this 
truth with more earnestness, than the emi- 
nent moralist whose theory has so often 
been attacked, with more zeal perhaps than 
discretion. The only question to be con- 
sidered is, whether these rules should ever 
admit of exceptions ; and I confess, that in 
my judgment, the affirmative may very 
consistently be defended. 

Few rules, for example, are more univer- 
sally acknowledged to be obligatory, than 
that which prohibits every act of appro- 
priating to ourselves the property of others 
without their consent. But will any one 
affirm that the disciples of Christ were cri- 
minal in plucking the ears of corn and 
eating them, as described in the narratives 
of three of the evangelists ? And yet it is 



60 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 



very certain, that if every passenger had 
followed their example, at the conclusion of 
the season, not a vestige of that particular 
crop would have remained for the use of the 
owner.* But without any reference to the 

* When we come to examine a little more minutely 
the exception here adduced, Dr. Paley's principle of 
utility will still be found to be applicable. For sup- 
posing the practice of plucking the ears of grain to be 
general, (sufficiently improbable in itself,) to believe « 
that the passengers would confine themselves to one 
particular field, would involve a yet higher degree of 
improbability. And if these trifling acts of spoliation 
(to give them a dignified title) were divided promis- 
cuously amongst all the corn land of Judea, the loss 
sustained by each proprietor would be too minute for 
calculation : in other words, no injury would be either 
inflicted or intended. We find, however, by referring 
to a passage in the Pentateuch, (Deut. xxiii. 25.) that 
the practice itself was sanctioned by the Levitical law ; 
and hence the complaint of the Jews was limited to the 
supposed infraction of the Sabbath. The sequel of the 
same narrative in the New Testament, furnishes another 
example that general rules admit of occasional excep- 
tions. The Jewish law, which strictly prohibited every 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



Gl 



history of the Jews, it has been remarked, 
that to take a single grain of wheat from 
a farmer's barn, or to keep a pin found in 
the streets without inquiring- for its lawful 
owner, is a violation of abstract justice ; and 
that such conduct would be equally atro- 
cious with stealing the whole contents of 
the barn, or purloining a whole manu- 
factory of pins, if we paid no attention to 
the injury committed or intended. If the 
grain of corn were of a particular species, 
and had been reserved for some agricultural 

person except the priests from eating the shew-bread 
which was weekly deposited in the Tabernacle, (and 
afterwards in the Temple,) was violated by David and 
his attendants, as recorded in the first book of Samuel 
(xxi. 6.) and this violation was expressly justified by 
our Saviour, in vindicating his disciples against the 
accusations of the Pharisees. The latter example, it is 
true, relates solely to an exception to a positive com- 
mand; but it must be recollected, that in the Jewish 
polity the moral and the positive law were regarded as 
equally obligator}', where they did not interfere with 
each other, and that disobedience to either was punished 
with equal severity. 



62 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY's 



purpose, or were the pin the first of its kind, 
and designed for a model, the same act which 
was before innocent, would then become ne- 
farious.* Thus it is that "general rules 
must sometimes bend to circumstances." 

Again, the precept "Thou shalt not kill," 
has been regarded by some Christians as 
strictly obligatory in its literal meaning. 
Such was the opinion of the Latin Father 
Lactantius, who thus strongly expresses 
himself : " Itaque in hoc Dei precepto nul- 
lum prorsus exceptionem fieri oportet quin 
occidere hominem sit semper nefas, quem 
Deus sanctum animal esse voluit/'-f- Such 
also appears to have been the original per- 
suasion of that singular sect, the Waldenses, 
who, surrounded as they were by the 
grossest corruption, might not inaptly be 
resembled to an oasis in the desert, and by 
whom our Saviour's sermon on the mount 
was rigidly interpreted according to the 

* See Cogan's Ethical Questions, p. 389- 

t Lactant. Opera, lib. VI. De Vero Cultu, p. 369- 
Edit. Sparke. 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



63 



letter, and was regarded as applicable, in its 
strictest meaning, to every succeeding age 
of the world.* The solemn injunction deli- 
vered to mankind not to deprive a fellow- 
creature of life, demands beyond all ques- 
tion general attention ; but to say that it 
is unlawful for the state to inflict capital 
punishment for any crime, however atro- 
cious, and that no man, when unjustly 
attacked, is at liberty to destroy an enemy 
in his own defence, is to misinterpret the 
language of holy writ, and to loosen the ties 
of human society. 

If we direct our attention to another in- 
stance, no rational man will for a moment 
venture to deny that compliance with the 
laws of the country where we reside, and 
peaceable subjection to the authority of 
those entrusted with its government, are 
incumbent on all. But does it therefore 
follow that we must always submit to the 
arbitrary acts of every lawless despot who 
may abuse the power confided to him for 

* Mosheim's Ecclesias. History, by Maclaine. Vol. II. 
p. 455. 



64 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 



the benefit of the people, in harassing and 
oppressing them ? Will not the atrocities 
of a Tiberius, or a Philip II., be allowed to 
justify the resistance of those on whom they 
are exercised ? If, then, determined oppo- 
sition to the destructive measures of a des- 
potic government be on many occasions 
clearly justifiable, — and that man is un- 
deserving of the name who would dare to 
dispute it, — who is to judge of the proper 
time when this right ought to be called into 
action ? Neither Scripture nor conscience 
furnishes any precise rule to which we can 
appeal. It can be determined only by the 
private judgment of the people themselves ; 
nor is there any other criterion to which 
they can refer, than their own deliberate 
opinion of what will be most advantageous 
to the future happiness and tranquillity of 
the nation at large. The choice of one of 
two evils presents itself : there is no alter- 
native but submission or resistance. The 
decision may probably be difficult ; but, 
difficult as it may be, when once a general 
commotion has taken place, neutrality be- 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



65 



comes impossible, even to those who would 
gladly adopt it. 

I might adduce as a further confirmation 
of the necessity of deviating on particular 
emergencies from general rules, the practice 
of falsehood and deception towards those 
who are afflicted with insanity. Is there 
any one whose judgment is so perverted by 
mistaken scruples, as to believe that such 
conduct is indefensible ? " Cui unquam 
viro probo," says Dr. Burnet ; " viro pio, 
religio est, segrotos, pueros, aut mentis 
male compotes, in suum ipsorum commo- 
dum fallere et decipere ? — Malo dolo uti 
in alterius damnum nefas est ; sed ob com- 
mune bonum, et ad succurrendum infirmis 
fallimus et fallimur sine crimine. Est ali- 
quid magis sacro-sanctum et inviolabile in 
ratione boni quam in ratione veri ; quas 
cum pariter conciliari non possunt, cedit 
posterius priori."* 

* Archaeologia? Philosophical. Lib. II. c. 9- 

An illustration of the same sentiment is furnished 
by Locke. " Thus taking from another what is his, 

F 



66 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 



But I hasten to an example afforded by 
Mr. Gisborne himself, notwithstanding his 
animadversions on the licence allowed by 
his opponent. After asserting that " res- 
traints, the original imposition of which 
was unjust, may in some cases be continued 
consistently with justice," he alleges as an 
instance in point, " that the negroes al- 
ready in the West Indies, though they have 
been reduced to slavery by the most unjust 
means, may be detained in that state as 

without his knowledge or allowance, is properly called 
stealing ; but that name being commonly understood 
to signify also the moral pravity of the action, and to 
denote its contrariety to the law, men are apt to con- 
demn whatever they hear called stealing, as an ill action 
disagreeing with the rule of right. And yet, the pri- 
vate taking away his sword from a madman to prevent 
his doing mischief, though it be properly denominated 
stealing as the name of such a mixed mode ; yet when 
compared with the law of God, and considered in its 
relation to that supreme rule, it is no sin or transgres- 
sion, though the name stealing ordinarily carries such 
intimation with it." — Essay on Hum. Understanding. 
B. II. c. 28. § 16. 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



67 



long as there is sufficient reason to believe 
that, if emancipated, they would massacre 
the planters, and seize the islands." The 
truth of this position, I readily admit, will 
not be called in question, except by those 
who are governed more by a fanatical than 
a rational love of freedom. But why, we 
may ask, is the retention of the slaves here 
spoken of acknowleged to be just ? For no 
other assignable reason than because it is 
conducive to the welfare of the whole ; that 
is, because this exception to the injustice of 
inflicting slavery, is, in the estimation of 
those who are best able to form a correct 
judgment, clearly expedient. Here then, we 
have another exemplification of the truth 
of the assertion contained in Paley's chapter 
on War, respecting the utility of adhering 
to general rules: "that situations may be 
feigned, and consequently may possibly 
arise in which the general tendency is out- 
weighed by the enormity of the particular 
mischief." * 

* Paley's Prin. of Mor. & Polit. Philos. Vol. II. 
P>. VI. c. 12. Edit. 11th. In the passage quoted hy 

F2 



68 VIXDICATION OF DR. PALEYS 



If it be said, and it has indeed been often 
said, that a system like this must be con- 
tinually liable to abuse, I should wish to 
know if any other has been proposed that 
is exempt from this liability. The dictates 
of conscience, whether this faculty be in- 
nate or acquired, the consideration of the 
nature and fitness of things, and the sug- 
gestions derived from the exercise of reason, 
may all as easily be perverted to colour the 
worst motives of the heart, and are equally 

Mr. Stewart, there is an additional expression still more 
forcible, but, which in my edition of Paley, is entirely 
omitted. This clause immediately follows the words 
particular mischief; " and, of course, where the ulti- 
mate utility renders it as much an act of duty to break 
the rule, as it is on other occasions to observe it." But 
whether this additional clause be allowed to form part 
of the original text or not, whoever reads the qualified 
language of the remainder of the paragraph, will have 
no just cause for apprehending the injurious conse- 
quences which the maxim in question may be supposed 
to encourage. Mr. Stewart's citation occurs in a note 
to p. 504 of the second Volume of his Philos. of the 
Hum. Mind. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



69 



capable of affording to mankind a ready 
" apology for their deviations from the or- 
dinary maxims of right and wrong " The 
argument against the use of any thing, from 
its liability to abuse, trite as it is, has too 
often succeeded with the multitude where 
every other has failed ; but its real value 
is well estimated by Lord Bacon in his 
Novum Organum : " Should any one object 
that the arts and sciences may be abused 
to evil purposes, as luxury and wickedness, 
let this sentiment be allowed to have no 
weight. The same objection would equally 
apply to all the most excellent things in 
the world, — as genius, courage, strength, 
beauty, riches, and even light itself." 

Whatever theory we may profess to fol- 
low, that some room for the exercise of his 
own discretion must be left to the individual 
in framing his moral conduct, will be found 
to be unavoidable ; and indeed, we are 
furnished with exemplifications of this 
truth, where, perhaps, we might least ex- 
pect to find them, — in the injunctions 
contained in the inspired writings. It is 



70 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



sufficient to refer to the precepts which 
relate to the malevolent affections, as they 
are termed by Dr. Hey, and a few other 
writers. The indulgence of anger, hatred, 
and resentment, is frequently forbidden in 
the sacred Volume, and yet it is satisfac- 
torily shown by this liberal and acute 
divine, that these passions are not only 
lawful, but salutary. In the same manner, 
we are to view the prohibitons in Scripture 
against killing, swearing, and the use of 
wine, for example, not as absolutely uni- 
versal, but as admitting of certain excep- 
tions. On what occasions we are to refrain 
from these actions, and when they may be 
lawfully indulged, must not unfrequently 
be left to our own decision ; and this decision 
must be regulated, as the same author has 
truly observed, by our persuasion of what 
will be productive of the greatest good.* 

* Discourses on the Malevolent Sentiments, Part I. 
p. 27. and Part VII. p. 172. 



CHAPTER III. 



The Objections of the Rev. Dr. Pearson, late 
Master of Sidney College, Cambridge, 
briefly considered. 

Having examined, with sufficient atten- 
tion I hope, the objections of Mr. Dugald 
Stewart, and of Mr. Gisborne, I will now 
advert to those which have been urged by 
Dr. Pearson. In the first place, he objects, 
as several other writers have done, to Pa- 
ley's definition of virtue, observing that the 
subject matter, as there stated, is not virtue 
itself, but virtuous actions, and that of the 
latter only one class is specified.* This 

* See Remarks on the Theory of Morals, containing 
an examination of the theoretical part of Dr. Paley's 
Principles of Mor. and Polit. Philosophy- 



72 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 

definition was, in fact, borrowed from the 
last of the essays prefixed to Archbishop 
King's work on the Origin of Evil, and it 
must excite surprise that, objectionable as it 
undoubtedly is, in more respects than one, it 
should have been retained by Dr. Paley in 
every successive edition of his Moral Phi- 
losophy, during his life time. The author 
of those Essays, if he agreed, as he appears 
to have done, with Mr. Gay, (who is known 
to have written the Preliminary Dissertation 
to the same work of the archbishop,) con- 
fined the appellation of virtue to those 
duties only which refer to our fellow-crea- 
tures. Those which regard ourselves in- 
dividually, he classed under the name of 
prudence, and the actions which relate im- 
mediately to the Deity he termed religious. 
Hence it is plain why the two latter classes 
of duties were omitted in his definition. 
But this was not the case with Paley, who 
in the very next page adopts the threefold 
division of the moral duties commonly 
made use of by ethical writers ; a circum- 
stance, let it be observed, which prevents 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



73 



the student from experiencing- any incon- 
venience from the defectiveness complained 
of. Again, we admit that in every defini- 
tion of virtue, reference must be made to the 
rule or criterion ; but this remark cannot be 
applied to the obligation, which ought to 
be kept entirely distinct. From the language 
of the definition before us, we might un- 
doubtedly be led to infer that no action can 
be virtuous which does not immediately arise 
from the prospect of a future reward. That 
this, however, was not the meaning- intended 
to be conveyed by Dr. Paley, is perfectly 
evident from his observations on habitual 
virtue, in the seventh chapter of his second 
book, to which I have already adverted. 
But, notwithstanding this explanation, I am 
free to acknowledge that a want of pre- 
cision in defining the terms of science, fre- 
quently gives rise to errors for which the 
author is justly responsible. 

The definition of virtue chosen by Dr. 
Pearson himself is, " voluntary obedience 
to the will of God." But since the term 
voluntary here implies design, no actions, it 



74 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



may be objected, can be deemed virtuous, 
which are not performed with an express 
intention at the time, of complying with 
the divine will ; though it is certain that, 
in the majority of his actions, the most 
exemplary man in existence has not this 
object immediately in view. Will any one 
hazard the assertion, that such a man must 
therefore be destitute of genuine virtue ? 
To remedy this imperfection, the author of 
an article on " Morals," in Dr. Rees's 
Cyclopsedia, has described virtue as con- 
sisting in the conformity of dispositions, 
and the actions which result from them, 
to the will of God ; and as far as these 
dispositions imply settled habits, and are 
sufficiently powerful to produce correspond- 
ing actions, this description must be allowed 
to be an improvement on the former. In 
point of fact, were we to judge from the 
variance observable in the language of dif- 
ferent ethical writers, it would appear to 
be no very easy task to frame such a de- 
finition of virtue, as shall be liable to no 
possible objection. When, however, it is 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



75 



affirmed that "those actions, habits, and af- 
fections, which tend to promote the greatest 
ultimate happiness of the agent, are alone 
entitled to be called virtuous f the correct- 
ness of the affirmation cannot, with any 
show of argument, be disputed by those 
who believe that man is destined for a 
future existence. Nor, again, can it be 
denied, that " an habitual compliance with 
the will of God," has an equal claim to 
the same apellation. The latter does, in 
fact, virtually coincide with the former ; 
for, supposing the benevolence of the Deity 
to be fully established, when our actions 
and affections are habitually conformed to 
his will, they must, from his also possessing 
supreme power and wisdom, inevitably 
produce our greatest attainable happiness. 
Epicurus unquestionably acted with more 
wisdom, in contending that virtue was to 
be considered as only the means of obtain- 
ing a further object, than his rival of the 
Portico, by whom it was regarded as the 
end itself. And hence, it may be briefly 
described as consisting in those actions and 



7(> 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



dispositions which naturally produce good, 
while those which produce evil constitute 
vice. The purport, indeed, of each of these 
forms of expression amounts to precisely 
the same thing- ; but wherever the divine 
origin of the Christian religion is fully 
admitted, the second definition — " habitual 
conformity to the divine will," — is so far 
preferable for the majority of mankind, that 
it does not impose the necessity of any 
inquiry beyond the commands of Scripture, 
except in those cases, in which the latter 
is either doubtful in its meaning, or is alto- 
gether silent. 

That Paley himself entertained similar 
sentiments with regard to the nature of 
virtue, notwithstanding his objectionable 
definition, is evident from what he observes 
of St. Paul, by whom moral rectitude and 
conformity to the divine will were deemed 
to be synonymous* The former, however, 
has not entered into any elaborate discus- 

* See Paley^ Chapter on the Duty of Children. 
Vol. I. p. 378. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



77 



sion respecting the primary foundation of 
virtue, as it is sometimes called, or, in other 
words, what makes an action virtuous, or 
the contrary, without adverting to the au- 
thority of the revelation. On this point, 
it has been sometimes asked, " whether an 
action is right, because the Deity com- 
manded it, or whether he commanded it 
because it was right ?" There cannot be a 
question that when we take into consider- 
ation the character of the Divine Being, 
whatever he commands must be right ; and 
the knowledge that it has been thus com- 
manded, ought to be considered as a suffi- 
cient evidence of its rectitude. But still 
it may be consistently inquired by those 
who have leisure to pursue the study of 
ethics as a science, whether the command 
is the sole cause of this rectitude, or whether 
the latter arises from some other source, 
altogether independent of any such com- 
mand. Dr. Pearson vindicates the affirma- 
tive of the first of these questions, while 
the eminently learned Cudworth, Dr. Sa- 
muel Clarke, Dr. Price, and many others, 



78 VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 



maintain that moral rectitude is a quality 
totally independent of the will of any 
being whatever. I confess, that in my 
apprehension, the most satisfactory answer 
which can be given to the questions here 
stated, is this : — it will scarcely be dis- 
puted that no moral laws are framed, and 
that no actions and dispositions have been 
enjoined by the Deity, which do not tend 
to promote the happiness of his intelligent 
creatures. What is termed the essential 
difference between right and wrong en- 
tirely depends upon this tendency to pro- 
duce happiness or misery : on no other 
account is the one commanded, and the 
other prohibited. That some actions and 
dispositions are productive of human en- 
joyment, and others of uneasiness and pain, 
must result from the relations arising from 
the circumstances in which man finds him- 
self placed ; but as these circumstances 
could not have any existence if no such 
being as man had been created, so far the 
consequent relations may be said to origi- 
nate with the Creator. When once, how- 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



79 



ever, the creation of man, such as he is, 
has taken place, and as long as the con- 
stitution of human nature continues unal- 
tered, the same relations will necessarily 
arise, independently of all ordination, or, 
in other words, the same kind of actions 
and dispositions will invariably tend to 
produce happiness, and those of an opposite 
character, to produce misery. But let it 
be observed, that although the foundation 
of the distinction between virtue and vice 
is to be traced to the relations of certain 
actions to rational agents, it by no means 
follows, that the mere view of these differ- 
ences in the nature of things, can alone 
create a sense of moral obligation, without 
taking into the account their tendency 
to affect our welfare. 

To arrive at a just conclusion concerning 
the question whether the difference of right 
and wrong arises from the relations of 
rational creatures to the beings and circum- 
stances around them, or whether it origi- 
nates entirely in the arbitrary decision of the 
Author of Nature, it is a matter of essential 



80 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



importance, that we entertain correct notions 
of his moral attributes. Unfortunately much 
obscurity is frequently observable in the lan- 
guage of writers on Natural Theology, when 
treating on this particular point ; and if it 
were true, as Bishop Brown, Archbishop 
King, and others have affirmed, that the qua- 
lities existing in the Supreme Being are dif- 
ferent, not only in degree, but in their nature, 
from those which bear the same name when 
applied to man, all that could be said on the 
subject would be little more than metaphysi- 
cal verbiage. If we did not refer those quali- 
ties of the human mind which imply any 
degree of perfection to the divine nature 
in the same sense, except as it regards their 
infinitude and immutability, how are we 
to prove the existence of any of those attri- 
butes which we are most concerned to be- 
lieve are real ? If it be said that the evi- 
dence is derived from the similarity of 
the effects, then I may ask, why suppose 
a difference in the nature of the cause ?* 
When we hear many authors declaiming, 

* See the Appendix at the end of this Volume. 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



81 



as they do, on the justice, veracity, and 
holiness of God, as qualities which he ex- 
ercises for their own sake, and without 
deigning" to consider any thing beyond 
their abstract and eternal rectitude, the 
whole appears to be mysterious and inex- 
plicable. But on the other hand, when 
these attributes are regarded solely as re- 
ferable to the communication of good, and 
the avoidance of evil, the explanation be- 
comes clear and intelligible. It is at once 
more satisfactory, and more pleasing, to 
view justice and holiness, and the other 
moral perfections, when ascribed to the 
great Supreme, as nothing more than modi- 
fications of his infinite goodness, and as 
implying that while he condemns those 
volitions, and the conduct resulting from 
them, which lead to the production of na- 
tural evil, he inflicts on his rational crea- 
tures no greater degree of punishment than 
is strictly requisite for the correction of 
vice, and for preventing the diffusion of 
its injurious effects. 

In considering what constitutes the 

G 



82 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



rule of virtue, Dr. Pearson maintains that, 
" if independently of that which deter- 
mines the moral quality of actions, we 
seek for a rule which may serve as an in- 
fallible test, criterion, or touchstone of vir- 
tue we seek for that which can nowhere 
be found."* To a certain extent he agrees 
with Paley in purport, though not in words. 
He admits that if the rules of moralists 
coincide with the foundation of virtue, they 
will hold universally ; but since this foun- 
dation is, in his opinion, no other than 
the will of God, it must likewise form the 
rule, and that rule the very same which is 
established by his opponent ; so often does 
it happen, that owing to the want of uni- 
formity in the language of ethical and me- 
taphysical writers, they appear to differ 
on points where in reality no difference 
exists. 

Dr. Pearson does not dispute the exist- 
ence of a moral sense ; and though he re- 
jects with Locke the doctrine of innate 
ideas, he believes in innate tendencies, 

* See Pearson's Remarks on the Theory of Morals, 

&c. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 83 

which that philosopher has not called in 
question ; but he at the same time ac- 
knowledges that this moral sense does 
not afford a general rule for our conduct. 
His objections against resorting solely to 
utility for our guidance, are similar to 
those advanced by Mr. Gisborne, and do 
not therefore require any additional notice. 
On one maxim he lays particular stress, 
and considers it as incontrovertible, — that 
no person can act virtuously who has not 
always in view obedience to the will of 
God ; but he contends that when our ob- 
ject is to ascertain what the will of the 
Deity is, with respect to any particular 
action, we are not confined to one mark 
or criterion, but are at liberty to make 
use of any mode by which it may be dis- 
covered with the greatest ease and certainty. 
The eternal fitness of things, conformity to 
trnth, the moral sense, and even general 
utility, may each, he affirms, be adopted 
on different occasions, as it may appear 
to be best suited to the purpose ; and in 
this view of the subject the author of the 

g2 



84 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



article before alluded to in Dr. Rees's 
Cyclopaedia appears to coincide. But in 
making this assertion, the former writer is 
apparently chargeable with inconsistency ; 
for while he affirms that the constituent of 
virtue is voluntary obedience to the will 
of the Deity, and that no one can be said 
to act virtuously who does not keep this 
will constantly in view, he denies that 
any rule can be found for the guidance of 
our conduct ! Notwithstanding his want 
of precision, he must, in fact, have in- 
tended to apply this remark merely to the 
different methods referred to of acquiring 
a knowledge of the divine will, and since 
they may undoubtedly be attended with 
error, his remark is so far true, that we have 
no infallible criterion to which we can ap- 
peal, where the light of revelation affords 
no assistance. I am nevertheless of opinion 
that whatever aid may occasionally be de- 
rived from the other sources, the safest and 
the most effectual method of estimating the 
moral character of actions (where Scripture 
is silent) will be found in a regard to their 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



85 



actual or probable effects on the welfare of 
society. Difficulties in morals will, un- 
questionably, occur as well as in other sub- 
jects, and all that wisdom can enable us 
to accomplish, is to adopt that system from 
Avhich the fewest are likely to arise. 

On no point of ethical science has there 
existed a greater diversity of sentiment, or 
more confusion of ideas, than on moral ob- 
ligation. Moralists have not even agreed 
in their definition of this term ; and it can- 
not therefore be surprising that they should 
materially differ as to the principle in which 
it consists, and the mode in which it ope- 
rates. By some writers, moral obligation 
has been defined to be the necessary con- 
nexion that subsists between the practice 
of virtue, and the attainment of its end, 
whether by the latter we understand obe- 
dience to the will of the Deity, conformity 
to the dictates of reason, or the greatest 
happiness of the agent. By Dr. Paley it 
is described to be "a violent motive re- 
sulting from the command of another ;" 
while Dr. Pearson denies that obligation 



86 



VINDICATION OF UK. PALEY's 



and motive can in any way be deemed sy- 
nonymous, and contends that the former 
term ought to be confined to the principle 
of virtue. " Motive is that," he observes, 
"by which we are actuated to the pursuit of 
any object, and refers to the end we have 
in view. Principle is that by which we 
are directed in the pursuit of our end or 
object, and refers to the mode of obtaining 
it." Respecting the distinction here laid 
down, Dr. Pearson is by no means clear 
in his manner of expressing himself ; nor 
does he offer any satisfactory proof, that 
obligation refers to principle, and not to 
motive. Several writers of celebrity, it is 
true, object to regard motive and obligation 
as bearing any similarity to each other ; 
and though it may certainly be conceded 
that it is not every motive which can be 
said to oblige the agent, yet it may, on 
the other hand, be contended that every 
obligation may be resolved into some effi- 
cient motive. This opinion is embraced 
by moralists of not less eminence, and 
more numerous perhaps than the former. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 87 

Among these are Bishop Cumberland, Puf- 
fendorf, and Bishop Law, who, I think 
have satisfactorily shown that nothing can 
be said to oblige us which is not in some 
way or other necessary to our happiness. 
The supposition of physical force is of 
course entirely excluded ; — and in what 
other way can the will be influenced, ex- 
cept through the instrumentality of mo- 
tives ? * Those ethical writers who, in con- 

* Obligatio enim legum naturalium quae hominibus 
naturalis dici protest, non adeo tollit liberi arbitrii 
vires, quin obligati suo periculo aliter facere possint : 
sed idoneum suppeditat argumentum seu causam im- 
pulsivam sufficientem, cujus consideratione moveatur 
obligatus ut agat aut ab agendo abstineat, prout ratio 
vel lex praeceperit. — Vincuiis enim propi'ie non astrin- 
gitur anirniis humanus. Nihil est quod necessitatem 
quicquam faciendi aut omittendi menti humanae de 
futuro deliberanti aft'erre potest, praeter cogitationes 
seu propositiones exhibentes indicia boni aut mali, aliis 
aut nobis ex iis quas faciemus proventuri. Quoniam 
autem naturali quadam necessitate ad bona praevisa 
prassertim maxima quaerenda, ad mala autem fugienda 
determinemur, hinc dictata ilia Rationis quae faciunt ut 



88 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



tending for the distinction here alluded to, 
define obligation to be the necessity of 
adopting certain means to obtain a definite 
end, do in reality concur with the opinion 
of Bishop Cumberland. For when the 
man of integrity pursues what he believes 
to be the best line of conduct, is not the 
object at which he aims, whether it be to 
secure the favour of the Deity, or his own 
personal welfare, the inducement by which 

ha?c ex actibus quibusdam nostris proventura esse 
videamus, necessitatem quandam eos exerendi vel cohi- 
bendi nobis inferre dicuntur, et nos obligare ; quippe 
bona ilia cum felicitate nostra quam naturaliter appe- 
timus, necssario sint conjuncta, actusque nostri ad 
illorum assecutionem plane sint necessarii. Ego itaque 
obligationem moralem sic universaliter nec incommode 
definiri posse arbitror; obligatio est actus legislatoris 
quo actiones legi sua? conformes eis quibus lex fertur 
necessarias esse indicat. Actio autem agenti rationali 
turn necessaria esse intelligitur, cum certum est earn 
contineri in causis necessario requisitis ad felicitatem 
illam quam naturaliter adeoque necessario expetit. — Cum- 
berland, De Legibus Natures Disquisitio Philosophica. 
Cap. v. § 26, 27. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



89 



he is actuated ? Thus, also when Dr. Pear- 
son insists that obligation arises from a 
principle of duty, he means that we are 
obliged, by a regard to the divine will ; and 
this, when properly analyzed, coincides 
with what he admits to be the ultimate 
motive for the practice of virtue — the at- 
tainment of individual happiness. The 
obligation which is made to depend on the 
will of the Deity can only, in fact, be de- 
rived from the power which he possesses 
of determining the condition of his intelli- 
gent creatures. Not only is it true that 
our interest and our duty ultimately coin- 
cide, but it is also impossible that any 
thing can be considered as our duty which 
is not equally our interest, when viewed in 
its fullest latitude. * 

There is another opinion of Dr. Pearson, 
in which he differs from the generality of 

* Amongst authors of more modern date, Dr. Tho- 
mas Brown, we may observe, uses the term moral obli- 
gation, as synonymous with moral inducement. — LecL 
V. iii. p. 137. 



90 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



ethical writers, and which it is not very 
easy to reconcile with the prevailing no- 
tions on the subject. He affirms that the 
term rectitude is totally inapplicable to 
motives ; that the latter cannot be either 
right or wrong in themselves ; and that of 
principle alone can these epithets be used 
with propriety. Does he mean to contend 
that the merit or demerit of an agent in 
any particular action, is not determined by 
the nature of the motive by which he is 
influenced ? Can it be disputed that a man 
is deserving of praise, if it be ascertained 
that he acts from right motives, and of dis- 
praise if his conduct proceed from bad mo- 
tives ? To contradict the truth of maxims 
so universally received, from a regard to 
verbal minutise, is more likely to create 
confusion of ideas than to facilitate the 
study of ethics by any supposed improve- 
ment in precision of language. Notwith- 
standing the observations of this intelligent 
moralist, we may justly ask, — what differ- 
ence does there, in effect, exist between act- 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



91 



ing from a right principle * and acting from 
a right motive ? 

* It seems to be almost universally admitted, that 
the moral conduct of mankind must be estimated by the 
nature of the motives by which they are influenced ; and 
this must, of course, depend upon the acquired habits 
and disposition of the mind. If then the epithets of 
bad and good, right and wrong, be applicable to the 
latter, and that they are so no one will attempt to dis- 
pute, they may surely without impropriety be made use 
of to characterize the former. Few terms are more 
general and more vague than that of principle ; and 
unless its purport be immediately obvious to the reader, 
it must often give rise to misconception in questions 
which require more than ordinary exactness of reason- 
ing. Dr. Pearson would have been very far from as- 
senting to the two following definitions of that term. 
"Principle in morals," says Mr. Bentham, " may be taken 
for an act of the mind ; a sentiment ; a sentiment of 
approbation ; a sentiment which, when applied to an 
action, approves of its utility, as that quality of it by 
which the measure of approbation or disapprobation be- 
stowed upon it ought to be governed". — Principles of 
Morals and Legislation. Vol. I. chap. i. sect. 2. 

In a very able work on Natural Theology, recently 
published by Dr. Crombie, the same term is thus ex- 



92 VINDICATION OF DR. PALET's 

Without entering into an examination of 
all the different modes of explaining - the 

plained. "The word principle, in its real and primitive 
import, means beginning. Hence it is referred to what 
is first, either in relation to order or in respect to im- 
portance. When it refers to some primary and established 
truth with which some process of reasoning, commences, 
or on which it is built, the term is correctly applied, 
and is perfectly intelligible. It is, for example, a prin- 
ciple in physics, that action and reaction are equal and 
contrary. When some cause of action, or the source 
whence it originates, is to be signified, we name this 
also, with sufficient propriety, a principle, a spring, or 
cause of action. Thus we say, ' he acts from good 
principles. 1 ' The principle from which his conduct 
proceeded, or by which it was governed, Avas virtuous. 1 
The term then signifies beginning, and hence is trans- 
ferred to denote a fundamental truth, a motive, or cause 
of action. 11 Vol. I. chap. i. sect. 7. 

It would appear, therefore, that Dr. Pearson's dis- 
tinction between motive and principle is not sanctioned 
by good authority. 

To show the absurdities into which some men are 
betrayed in arguing for a doctrine which they are re- 
solved to support, it is worthy of notice that Dr. Hcid 
has ventured to affirm, that motives are not uniformly 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



93 



the term obligation, to be met with in ethical 
treatises, I am now more immediately con- 
cerned with the opinions of that distin- 
guished divine, to whom we are indebted 
for the most luminous statements which 
have ever appeared of the evidences of 
natural and revealed religion ; and I con- 
fess that I can perceive but little cause 

the causes of voluntary actions, though he fnost incon- 
sistently acknowledges that the merit or demerit of any 
action depends entirely upon the motive. Mr. Stewart, 
on the other hand, is disposed to admit that actions 
always proceed from motives, but denies that the will 
is determined by what appears to us to be morally best 
and most eligible at the time. Another writer, Dr. R.H. 
Graves, (the son of the late Dean,) who is a genuine 
disciple of Reid, boldly appeals to experience and con- 
sciousness, and asserts that a man may "feel that he 
is not necessarily or unavoidably determined by any 
motive in willing and choosing ! !" — See Reid on the 
Active Powers of Man. Essay IV. c. 4. Stewart's 
Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers. Vol. II. 
p. 495 ; and Graves's arguments for Predestination and 
Necessity, contrasted with the Established Principles of 
Philosophical Inquiry. Appendix I. p. 148. 



94 



VINDICATION OP OR. PALEY's 



of objection to the definition he has given 
of moral obligation. The epithet violent 
may be considered by some persons as 
indicative of physical force; but it is evi- 
dent, that by " a violent motive," he means 
nothing- more than an inducement of supe- 
rior strength ; and if the work had been 
designed for any but those who embrace 
the Christian faith, it would be objection- 
able, I admit, to represent this motive as 
" resulting from the will of another," be- 
cause, though obligation arises in number- 
less cases from that source, it may, never- 
theless proceed from some other. An un- 
believer may consider himself obliged to 
practise virtue, because, generally speaking, 
it must be deemed to be the best means 
of securing present happiness ; but to those 
who believe in the divine origin of Chris- 
tianity, it must be perfectly clear that 
no conduct, however exemplary, could ever 
be instrumental in obtaining eternal happi- 
ness, without referring to the will of the 
Deity : he only has the power of conferring 
on mankind an endless futurity of bliss, 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



95 



and from his benevolent decree, therefore, 
must the chief motive to virtue derive its 
efficacy. 

If we concede that obligation, in its 
strictest sense, implies only that, in order 
to attain any particular end, it is requisite 
that we should adopt the proper means, then 
in morals it must consist in the necessity of 
practising" virtue for the sake of pro- 
curing permanent felicity. But whatever 
definition we may select, the great object 
of inquiry, and that which must be regarded 
as the most essential, is no other than this : 
— What is it which renders compliance 
with the precepts of virtue obligatory on 
mankind ? Is it our own greatest happi- 
ness, or that of others ? Is it the autho- 
rity of the divine will, or, of the dictates of 
eternal rectitude ? Or, is it derived from 
the suggestions of conscience, or from the 
nature and fitness of things ? Amidst all 
the variance observable in the language of 
moralists, these are, in truth, the questions 
which have occupied their minds, and em- 
ployed their arguments. Paley, as we have 



96 



V[ND1CATI0N OF DR. PALEY'.S 



seen, identifies moral obligation with the 
paramount motive which is presented by 
the prospect of futurity ; and we have 
therefore, only to inquire how far this opi- 
nion is justly liable to the severe censures 
expressed by his adversaries. Notwith- 
standing- the warmth with which Mr. Stew- 
art condemns the practice of confounding 
jinal with efficient causes, they will yet, in 
morals, be found ultimately to coincide. 
He allows that the final cause of virtue 
is the happiness of the agent ; and though it 
s true that the end is not always in our 
immediate contemplation at the time of 
action, it furnishes the only solution of the 
question, — Why are we obliged to comply 
with the duties enjoined by morality ? There 
may be, and there undoubtedly are, many 
subordinate reasons which influence the 
mind, but from this source alone can be 
derived the final answer, beyond which 
we cannot proceed. To establish this posi- 
tion is the object which Paley has in view, 
when he discusses the nature of obligation ; 
and it is only by a reference to the end 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



97 



of our creation, that a conclusive reply can 
be given to the inquiry. Why am I 
obliged, it may be asked, for example, 
to refrain from the commission of fraud ? 
Dr. Cudworth would answer, because the 
understanding informs us that it is right ; 
if we consulted Hutcheson, his reply would 
be, because it is the dictate of the moral 
sense; Hume would allege, because it tends 
to promote the general welfare of society ; 
and Warburton, because it is the will of 
God. But why should I act in conformity 
with what moralists have termed rectitude ? 
Why attend to the suggestions of con- 
science ? Why consult the general welfare 
of mankind ? Why obey the commands of 
God ? There is no absolute incongruity, 
no contradiction in proposing any of these 
questions ; and the only satisfactory answer 
which can be given is, that by so acting 
we shall secure our greatest possible happi- 
ness * To proceed farther, and to ask why 

* Mr. Stewart indeed observes, (Philos. of the Active 
and Moral Powers of Man. Vol. I. p. 294.) " It is 

H 



98 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



we should pursue our happiness, does in- 
deed involve a positive absurdity, because a 

absurd to ask why we are bound to practise virtue. The 
very notion of virtue implies the notion of obligation. 
Every being who is conscious of the distinction between 
right and wrong, carries about with him a law which he is 
bound to observe, notwithstanding he may be in total 
ignorance of a future state." This opinion entirely ac- 
cords with the philosophy of his master, Dr. Reid, who 
loses no opportunity of reprobating a minute analysis of 
the moral as well as of the intellectual faculties. " Such 
is the constitution of our nature,"" is his favourite reply 
to all desire of extended investigation ; and it is our 
business, he tells us, to rest satisfied at a certain point 
without any attempt at further inquiry. " When men 
have found," says Locke, " some general propositions 
that could not be doubted of as soon as understood, it 
was, I know, a short and easy way to conclude them 
innate. This being once received, it eased the lazy from 
the pains of search, and stopped the inquiry of the 
doubtful concerning all that was once styled innate, &c." 
A similar remark occurs in Thucydides (De Bello 
Peloponn. L. 1. c. 20.) Owrwg aTaXa'nrwpog toiq 
iroWoiq 7) ZflrnviQ tt)q aXrfctiaq /cat kin ra ZTOifia /naXXov 

TptTTOVTCll. 

The disciples, however, of the school to which Paley 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



99 



capacity for enjoyment, and a consequent 
desire to obtain it, are, it is universally 

belongs, do not consent to be guided by the discourag- 
ing maxims of Reid and his followers, but very properly 
endeavour to analyze the faculties and emotions of our 
nature, as far as it is possible to proceed, without vio- 
lating the rules of just reasoning. They do not admit 
that virtue carries with it its own authority, nor will 
they believe that any thing can ever morally oblige a 
man to act in opposition to his real happiness, taking 
the whole of his existence into consideration. Such a 
mode of conduct, they conceive, might afford a strong 
indication of fanaticism, but would be no proof of 
genuine virtue. — The same judicious and liberal writer 
to whom I have before referred, Beccaria, gives a very 
different account of the word obligation from that of 
Mr. Steward, or of Cudworth. " La voce obbligazione 
e una di quelle molto piu frequenti in morale che in ogni 
altra scienza, e che sono un segno abbreviativo d 1 un 
raziocinio, e non di una idea : cercatene una alia parola 
obbligazione, e non la troverete ; fate un raziocinio, e 
intenderete voi medesimo, e sarete inteso." — Dei De- 
litti, Sec. § IV. p. 14. Ediz. 27. Pavia. 

Notwithstanding the absurdity which Mr. Stewart 
attaches to the question above stated in the text, Dr. 
Adam Smith has not considered it as unworthy of an 

H 2 



100 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



admitted., inseparable from the human 
mind. 

answer. " When it is asked, why we ought to obey the 
will of the Deity ; this question, which would be im- 
pious and absurd in the highest degree, if asked from 
any doubt that we ought to obey him, can admit but of 
two different answers. It must either be said that we 
ought to obey the will of the Deity because he is a 
Being of infinite power, who will reward us eternally if 
we do so, and punish us eternally if we do otherwise; 
or it must be said, that independent of any regard to our 
own happiness, or to rewards and punishments of any 
kind, there is a congruity and fitness that a creature 
should obey its Creator, that a limited and imperfect 
being should submit to one of infinite and incompre- 
hensible perfections. Besides one or other of these two, 
it is impossible to conceive that any other answer can be 
given to this question." — Theory of Mor. Sent. Vol. II. 
p. 256. He afterwards adds, that the system which 
places virtue in utility, coincides with that which makes 
it consist in propriety ; and that the only difference is, 
that in the one case the measure of virtue is utility, and 
in the other case sympathy. Admirable as are the prac- 
tical observations and precepts contained in Dr. Smith's 
work, it is remarkable how few moralists have adopted 
his theory. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



101 



That an actual obligation is imposed on 
man to cultivate certain dispositions, and 
to perform certain actions, no one ventures 
to dispute : it is only when we come to 
inquire why they are thus obligatory, that 
so much discordance of opinion attracts 
our notice, and often excites our surprise. 
This variance, however, exists, in some 
cases, more in appearance than in reality ; 
and as an exemplification of this fact, I 
need only observe, that those writers who 
make moral obligation consist in the will 
of God, do, strictly speaking, coincide 
with those who derive it from the greatest 
happiness of the agent ; for it is alto- 
gether incredible that the divine will should 
be efficacious in influencing the mind as 
a predominant motive, without taking into 
consideration the divine attributes. The 
mere arbitrary will of any being, viewed 
abstractedly, could never present a rational 
excitement to actions at all at variance 
with the passions and inclinations of the 
human heart. To represent a sense of 
propriety, a favourite topic with some au- 



102 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 

thors, as sufficient for that purpose, is 
to use a language better suited to the 
recluse of the peaceful hermitage, than 
to him who has mingled in the tumultuary 
scenes of active life. In complying with 
the commands of the Deity, is it possible, 
I would ask, to overlook his power, his 
wisdom, and his benevolence ? Is it possible 
that the contemplation of these perfections 
should not produce an irresistible convic- 
tion, that obedience will necessarily ensure 
the favour of him on whom the happiness 
and misery of his creatures, must at all 
times depend ? If it be said, that although 
this will probably be the case at first, yet 
that when once the habit of compliance 
is established, nothing ulterior to the di- 
vine commands will afterwards be regarded, 
let it be recollected that the very same 
allegation is equally true, when applied 
to that theory of obligation which is rejected 
by many of its opponents, chiefly on ac- 
count of its interested views. 

Notwithstanding Mr. Dugald Stewart's 
severity of animadversion on what he con- 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



103 



siders to be confounding- obligation and 
motives with the final cause of our being-, 
it is not a little remarkable that the same 
author, of whose work he speaks in terms 
of the highest approbation, so far coincides 
with Paley, as to believe that happiness 
is the great end of our creation, and that 
our conduct must be regulated solely with a 
viexo to the promotion of that end* In the 
same manner, Dr. Pearson does not hesi- 
tate to acknowledge that the end of virtue 
is the happiness of the individual, and that 
private happiness is the proper motive to vir- 

* The difference of Mr. Stewart's opinion is abun- 
dantly evident, from the observations which occur in 
the fourth chapter of his second volume, on the Philo- 
sophy of the Human Mind. Speaking of the unity of 
design in the moral world, he thus expresses himself : — 
" It does not follow from this, that it is from such a 
comprehensive survey of the consequences of human 
conduct, that our ideas of right and wrong are derived, 
or that we are entitled, in particular cases, to form rules 
of action to ourselves, draAvn from speculative conclu- 
sions concerning the final causes of our moral con- 
stitution. 1 ' 



104 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



tuous conduct. " For though, in fact," he 
observes, " the end which God designed in 
the actions of man, is not always the motive 
to the agent, yet we may safely affirm, 
that, when known, it ought to be so." This 
differs but little, in substance, from Mr. 
Gisborne's statement. It is singular, how- 
ever, that manv ethical writers make no 
distinction between the immediate and the 
ultimate motives of human conduct. The 
former may, in many cases, be sufficient 
to regulate the actions of the great mass 
of mankind ; but however adequate and 
proper these motives may be for the ordi- 
nary transactions of society, it becomes 
those of more cultivated understandings, 
and who have more leisure to philosophize, 
to recur, at times, to the motives which 
lie more remote, and to analyze, as far 
as it is practicable, every incentive that 
operates on the mind, to its elementary 
principles. 

It has been alleged, as another objection 
against our great Cambridge moralist, that 
he restricts the motive in which he believes 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



105 



obligation to consist, to the happiness of 
the life to come, without noticing- the present 
advantages of virtue ; while, according to 
Hume, on the other hand, this motive 
is nothing more than the desire of temporal 
happiness. In Dr. Pearson's estimation, in 
order to render the motive perfectly cor- 
rect, the present and the future should be 
conjoined, comprehending, by this means, 
the general happiness of the individual. But, 
if we recollect that Dr. Paley openly pro- 
fesses to be writing for those only who be- 
lieve in the truth of revelation, the objec- 
tion will, in truth, be devoid of force ; for 
whoever aims at obtaining everlasting hap- 
piness, does, generally speaking, secure his 
temporal happiness ; but even when they 
are found to clash with each other, and 
amidst the turbulence and temptations of 
the world, this will sometimes unavoidably 
happen, still it is true that, by sacrificing 
his present enjoyment, he is taking the 
wisest means of obtaining the greatest 
amount of felicity on the whole. If we 
advert to the case of the heathens, and of 



106 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 

unbelievers, though it is not to be denied 
that virtue is more frequently conducive 
than vice to the well-being of mankind, 
even in this life, yet innumerable situations 
present themselves, in which the assertion 
is manifestly untrue. What inducement 
then can those moralists who reject the 
feeble guidance of conscience, offer to the 
infidel to abandon any nefarious but ad- 
vantageous project which he finds may be 
accomplished with perfect impunity ? The 
latter can feel no incentive to relinquish 
the gratification of his worst passions, or 
the practice of fraud and treachery, in all 
those cases where he has nothing to appre- 
hend from the laws of his country ; nor do 
I perceive how the obligation which con- 
sists in the greatest amount of individual 
happiness in the present life, can be appli- 
cable to those extraordinary deeds of valour 
and self-devotion recorded in the pages of 
ancient history. How could the return of 
Regulus, for example, to Carthage, when 
fully aware of the tortures which awaited 
him, 



THEORV OF MORALS. 



107 



Atqui sciebat qua? sibi barbarus 
Tortor pararet,* 

be consistent with his greatest ultimate 
happiness ? Or, how are we to account 
for the magnanimity of Codrus, the Fabii, 
Mutius, or the Decii, on that principle 
alone ? There cannot be a doubt that they 
acted from the predominating impulse 
of the purest patriotism. But still the 
question returns, why they should yield to 
a patriotic incitement so utterly incom- 
patible with their personal welfare, sup- 
posing a future existence to be excluded 
from their belief. Whatever principle we 
may assign to these and other extraordinary 
deeds of the ancients, it is perfectly clear 
that we must not make choice of the general 
happiness of the agent ;-\ and hence it fol- 

* Horat. Lib. III. car. v. 

-f- It would be extremely difficult to discover the moral 
obligation to perform many of the splendid deeds re- 
corded in ancient history, without supposing the authors 
to possess a confident expectation of a future existence. 
Cicero, it is true, has observed in his Tusculan Ques- 
tions, that " Nemo unquam sine magna spe immortalitatis 



108 VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY S 



lows, that the adoption of this form of 
expression, recommended by Dr. Pearson, 

se pro patria offerret ad mortem ;" but the prevalent 
belief, I apprehend, is expressed with more truth in the 
beautiful lament of Moschus on the death of Bion. The 
flowers of the garden, he exclaims, though they perish, 
again spring into life the following year ; not so even the 
illustrious of the human race : 

A^utec 8 01 /neyaXoi /ecu Kaprtpoi r/ (jo<f>oi avSpec, 
Ottttotb 7rpwra Savw^uEc avaKooi fv yQovi Ko'iXa 
Eik^uec £w fiaXa fiaicpov arepfiova vtiyperov virvov. 

Idyll. Ill, v. 103. 
A sentiment of the same kind occurs in Catullus, not to 
mention numerous passages of similar import in other 
authors : 

Soles occidere, et redire possunt : 
Nobis, cum semel occidit brevis lux, 
Nox est perpetua una dormienda. 

Car. V. v. 4. 

The opinion of the eternal duration of the human soul 
was confined to a comparatively small number of specu- 
lative philosophers ; and though the enthusiasm of Plato 
and Cicero on this question has called forth the finest 
displays of eloquence in their writings, we are yet com- 
pelled to ask whether all the arguments they have ad- 
vanced, when united, and placed in the strongest light? 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



109 



is no improvement upon that which he has 
thought proper to condemn. 

amount to any thing at all approaching to a legitimate 
proof. The Phcedo alone of the Athenian philosopher 
would furnish a sufficient answer to this inquiry ; for as 
the Roman orator was a disciple of the Academic school, 
he rarely deviated from the doctrines of its founder. 

Dr. Brown, arguing the question on a different gound, 
would say, that the neglect of any act of heroism, similar 
to those alluded to, which an individual was convinced 
would conduce to the salvation of his country, would be 
followed by his own disapprobation, and that of others, 
and that in this consists the real obligation. If it could 
be shown that the pain arising in the mind of Regulus, 
for example, from not returning to Carthage, would 
have exceeded that inflicted by the atrocious cruelty of 
his enemies, then it might be allowed that he was 
morally obliged to act as he did. But supposing it 
were possible to prove the fact, though I believe that 
very few, if any, of the heroes of antiquity, were at all 
influenced by considerations of this nature, the motive 
would be most indisputably selfish, and would there- 
fore be totally inconsistent with Dr. Brown's peculiar 
system. 

Again, by Mr. Bentham it would be alleged, that if 
deeds of this kind appeared to the agents likely to pro- 



110 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



cure the greatest portion of happiness to the community, 
this circumstance alone must be regarded as constituting 
the obligation. But why is a man obliged to sacrifice 
all his prospects of comfort here, in order to promote 
the well-being either of his own country or of the world 
at large ? It is impossible, we acknowledge, to avoid 
admiring, at the moment, such instances of patriotism 
and disinterestedness ; but when we come to examine 
the question more closely, we shall perceive that no 
human being can ever be under an obligation volun- 
tarily to submit to an evil which he at the time believes 
that no power on earth, no changes in the universe, can 
possibly repair. Respecting Mr. Bentham's admired 
work on " Morals and Legislation," in which it is ap- 
parent that he has devoted more of his attention to the 
latter of these branches than to the former, I shall only 
observe that it betrays much inconsistency in his manner 
of applying the principle of utility. When he describes 
" the greatest amount of happiness 11 to be the rule of 
our conduct, which he does in his first chapter, he so 
far agrees with Paley ; and where he considers it as 
the sole obligation, (Chap. II. sect. 19,) his opinion is 
closely allied to that of Hume. His commentators, 
however, maintain, that the great object he has in view, 
(though it is certainly mentioned in a very summary 
way, Chap. XVII. sect. 6. & 7,) is to show that every 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



Ill 



man, by consulting the greatest happiness of the com- 
munity, adopts the surest method of securing his own. 
If the truth of Revelation be admitted, there can be no 
question that this position may be fully established; 
but without this admission, the attempt would as clearly 
fail. In numerous instances it will not be denied that 
the assertion may be just; but since there are many 
cases in which the most patriotic sacrifices would be 
attended by no such result as is here predicted, I must 
again ask, — what can morally oblige any rational agent'' 
to pursue the welfare of the public, with pain, poverty, 
and ruin staring him in the face, and Avithout the re- 
motest prospect of any future recompense for all the 
immediate sufferings which this class of moralists con- 
sider him as called upon to undergo ? 

With this palpable defectiveness of explanation, we 
must at length agree with Dr. Young when he speaks of 

Virtue, which Christian motives best inspire, 
And bliss, which Christian schemes alone ensure. 

In a word, to solve the difficulties and doubts created by 
the facts alluded to, is a task which, without the aid of 
Christianity, we cannot hope to accomplish. 



CHAPTER IV. 



The Objections of Dr. Brown considered. 

The last of Dr. Paley's opponents to whom 
I have referred, is Dr. Thomas Brown, late 
professor of moral philosophy in the Uni- 
versity of Edinburgh; a man of unques- 
tionable genius, and to whose sagacity we 
are indebted for the detection of several of 
the errors contained in the metaphysical 
system founded by Dr. Reid, and so zea- 
lously advocated by his disciple, Mr. Du- 
gald Stewart. On many topics, however, 
Dr. Brown's judgment was influenced, im- 
perceptibly to himself, by his poetical ta- 
lents ; and the warmth and acuteness of his 
feelings, though they frequently added to 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



113 



the beauty of his style, were far from con- 
tributing to the correctness of his reason- 
ed 

ing. 

His charge of selfishness against Dr. 
Paley's principle of moral obligation, will 
appropriately exemplify what I have here 
asserted ; and although other writers coin- 
cide with him in the same sentiment, I 
know of no one who has expressed himself 
in more unmeasured language than this 
eloquent Scotch professor. " This form of 
the selfish system," he observes, when treat- 
ing of the modifications of that system, 
" which has been embraced by many theo- 
logical writers of undoubted piety and 
purity, is notwithstanding, I cannot but 
think, as degrading to the human cha- 
racter, as any other form of the doctrine of 
absolute selfishness ; or rather, it is in itself 
the most degrading of all the forms which 
the selfish system can assume."* The rea- 
son he alleges for making the latter as- 
sertion is, that the selfishness of which he 

* Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human 
Mind. Vol. IV. p. 91. 2nd Edit. 

I 



114 VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 

complains is, in the present case, rendered 
more offensive by the image of the Deity 
which it continually presents to the mind — 
" not to be loved, but to be courted with a 
mockery of affection." From the purport 
of this strong- language, so little accordant 
with the spirit of philosophical investiga- 
tion, we must infer that it is infinitely more 
degrading to direct our views to the attain- 
ment of an eternity of happiness, than to 
be devoted to the fleeting gratification of 
the animal passions. And such, indeed, 
extraordinary as it may appear, was Dr. 
Brown's deliberate opinion ! " The sen- 
sualist of the common system of selfishness, 
who never thinks of any higher object 
in the pursuit of the little pleasures which 
he is miserable enough to regard as hap- 
piness, seems to me, even in the brutal 
stupidity in which he is sunk, a being 
more worthy of esteem than the selfish of 
another life." In the next chapter also, 
he indulges in a similar strain, and des- 
cribes the theory in question to be, " in its 
very essence, as truly selfish as if it had 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



115 



defined virtue to be the pursuit of mere 
wealth or fame, or of the brief dignities, or 
still briefer pleasures, of this mortal exist- 
ence."* These extravagant sentiments, which 
have more the appearance of proceeding 
from the fervour of an ill-disciplined ima- 
gination, than from the calm exercise of 
the reasoning powers, carry with them 
their own refutation. Whether there can 
be the slightest degree of justice in applying 
the epithet degrading to the act of recurring 
to a future existence for motives to present 
obedience, is a question which I shall have 
occasion to notice in a subsequent page. 
Nor do I admit that the opinion which 
regards obligation as consisting in the gene- 
ral happiness of the individual, involves 
any thing which can justly be called 
degrading, though I willingly concede, that 
it is more liable than the former, to be 
abused by the ill-disposed or the ignorant, 
and particularly by those who deny the 
truth of revelation. To the latter class, 
indeed, that is, to those who confine their 

* Ibid. p. 98 

i 2 



116 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



views to the present world, it can never 
be satisfactorily proved that an undeviating 
adherence to virtue will ensure the greatest 
amount of individual happiness. Though 
this would undoubtedly be the case were all 
mankind resolved to follow its dictates, yet 
circumstanced as the world is at present, 
and influenced as its affairs now are by the 
tumultuary passions of the human heart, 
innumerable situations must occur, in which 
the best of men may be reduced to irre- 
mediable misery, and which may be solely 
attributable to their high sense of honour, 
and to principles too exalted for the cor- 
rupt practices of those around them. Re- 
mote, I apprehend, must appear, even to 
the most sanguine, that hitherto unattained 
state of society in which the mens sibi con- 
scia recti will be regarded by mankind as 
an ample reward for resisting the seductions 
of vice, and suffering in the exercise of 
duty, without the faintest hope of obtain- 
ing a more durable compensation. 

But if we examine this charge of selfish- 
ness a little more attentively, its basis will 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



117 



appear to be devoid of solidity. In the 
first place, with regard to the present life, 
the system of Archdeacon Paley demands 
the sacrifice of every personal interest, the 
moment it is found to interfere with the 
higher duties of our nature ; and a strict 
compliance with general rules is impera- 
tively required, at the risk of losing our 
dearest and most valuable enjoyments. In 
the next place, though the prospect of hap- 
piness in a future existence is declared 
to be the ultimate motive of our conduct, 
it is not denied that the most elevated 
degree of virtue is that which is practised 
without any direct view to its ulterior con- 
sequences ; and if this opinion is not stated 
by Paley in these precise terms, it is suffi- 
ciently sanctioned by his observations on 
habitual virtue. After citing his own defi- 
nition, he thus speaks : " yet a man shall 
perform many an act of virtue without 
having either the good of mankind, the 
will of God, or everlasting happiness, in his 
thoughts. How is this to be understood ? 
In the same manner as that a man may be 



118 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 

a very good servant, without being con- 
scious at every turn of a particular regard 
to his master's will, or of an express atten- 
tion to his master's interest ; indeed, your 
best old servants are of this sort ; but then 
he must have served for a length of time 
under the actual direction of these motives, 
to bring him to this." &c * And thus it 
is with virtue in general. The powerful 
incentives arising from the hopes and fears 
of futurity must operate for a long period, in 
the majority of cases, before they can pro- 
duce virtuous habits, and especially the 
habit of sacrificing our private interest to 
the welfare of others; but supposing the 
habits here spoken of to be once firmly 
established, those urgent motives will no 
longer be requisite, and the performance 
of every duty will be, in the strictest sense 
of the word, disinterested. 

But, in point of fact, how extremely 
rare are the instances in which this per- 
fection of the moral powers is ever attained 
by mankind ! Such is the weakness of 

* Prin. of Mor. Phil. Vol. I. b. i. c. 7 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



119 



human nature, and such are the external 
circumstances by which we are surrounded, 
that the prevalence of perfect disinterested- 
ness is altogether hopeless. Nor, indeed, 
do I conceive that the intrinsic value of 
well-formed habits consists so much in 
their exemption from interested views, when 
directed solely to an existence hereafter, as 
in the assurance they afford that the vir- 
tuous dispositions possessed by the agent, 
will be permanent in their duration, and 
uniform in their effects. I can never con- 
cede that an enlightened regard, in the 
mind of the genuine Christian, to his feli- 
city in another state of being, ought to 
be considered as detracting from the merit 
(if that term be ever allowable) of the 
duties which he performs with zeal and 
punctuality. That selfishness) though I deny 
the propriety of applying this word in its 
ordinary import to the present case) must be 
a truly desirable quality, which inculcates 
the practice of the purest disinterestedness 
in all our transactions in the present life, 
and which has so often led those who have 



120 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 

felt its influence, to abandon every earthly 
comfort, and even to endure the severest 
torture, for the sole purpose of promoting 
the good of mankind. 

The same opinion which Dr. Brown has 
maintained on this question, with so much 
warmth of feeling 1 , is not less zealously de- 
fended by the celebrated German metaphy- 
sician, Emanuel Kant, in his treatise on 
conscience. It is stated, however, by Ma- 
dame de Stael, that his opinion has been 
successfully combated by other German 
writers ; and I cannot help quoting- her own 
intelligent remarks on a point which she 
evidently viewed in its proper light. 
" Kant a pretendu que c'etoit alterer la 
purete desinteressee de la morale que de 
donner a nos actions pour but la perspec- 
tive d'une vie future ; plusieurs ecrivains 
Allemands l'ont parfaitement refute a cet 
egard ; en effet, l'immortalite celeste n'a 
nul rapport avec les peines et les recom- 
penses que Ton concoit sur cette terre ; le 
sentiment qui nous fait aspirer a l'immor- 
talite est aussi desinteresse que celui des 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



121 



autres ; car les premices de la felicite re- 
ligieuse, c'est la sacrifice de nous-memes ; 
ainsi done elle ecarte necessairement toute 
espece d'egoisme/' * 

There yet remains an argument, in re- 
ply to the accusation in question, of still 
greater weight, and one which I should 
have imagined would carry with it irresis 
tible conviction. If the ultimate motive 
derived from the expectation of a future 
existence is justly condemned as selfish and 
degrading, then are we authorized to apply 
these epithets, in their fullest force, and 
with all the odium attached to them, to the 
religion of Christ. Future rewards and 
punishments are constantly presented to 
the view of its disciples ; and by these sanc- 
tions, every precept it contains, and all its 
exhortations to imitate the example of its 
divine founder, are powerfully enforced. 
There is scarcely a chapter in the New 
Testament in which some reference to the 
same end does not attract the reader's no- 
tice ; and if the disinterestedness contended 

* De TAllemagne, Tome III. ch. 14. p. 206. 



122 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 

for by Dr. Paley's opponents be indispensa- 
bly requisite to constitute genuine virtue, 
it becomes a necessary inference, that the 
sacred writers have been guilty of the gross- 
est errors, and that their followers have to 
the present hour been lamentably deceived. 
What sentiment more strikingly pervades 
almost every page of the Christian Scrip- 
tures, than that which is expressed in the 
following citation ? — " For he that cometh 
to God must believe that he is, and that he 
is the rewarder of them that diligently seek 
him."* If we read our Saviour's sermon 
on the mount, do we not perceive the same 
truth perpetually inculcated, the same ex- 
hortation to disinterestedness in this world, 
and the same excitement of hopes and fears 
with regard to the next ? To those who 
are persecuted and slandered, what is the 
motive which our Lord holds out to patient 
endurance, and even to exultation under 
the severest treatment ? " Rejoice and be 
exceeding glad ; for great is your reward 
in heaven" What is the language which 
* Heb. xi. 6. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



123 • 



he employs when exhorting- his disciples to 
unostentatious charity, to frequent prayer, 
and to avoiding 1 hypocrisy ? " Thy father 
which seeth in secret, shall reward thee 
openly." And does not the sublime des- 
cription which closes the twenty-fifth chap- 
ter of our first Gospel, speak as forcibly to 
the same effect, and hold up the most solemn 
promises and denunciations, as incitements 
to the practice of compassion and benefi- 
cence ? Again, if we consult the Epistles, 
do we find that the first promulgators of 
the Christian religion, in their arduous 
efforts to benefit mankind, lost sight of their 
future reward ? Were not the early converts 
of that faith urged "to press toward the mark 
for the prize of their high calling," and 
"so to run the race that was set before 
them," as to obtain — not the mere appro- 
bation to their own consciences — not the. 
bare satisfaction of having acted in con- 
formity with the fitness of things, with the 
principles of eternal rectitude, or with the 
suggestions of right reason, — but " an in- 
heritance incorruptible, undented, and that 



124 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



fadeth not away }" Where shall we find a 
brighter example (if we except the Saviour 
himself) of the purest disinterestedness, as 
far as relates to the present sphere of action, 
than that which is afforded by the great 
apostle of the Gentiles ? No man laboured 
more abundantly, endured severer hard- 
ships, or made a greater sacrifice of all that 
is thought essential to human comfort and 
tranquillity. But did he on that account 
turn his view from the prospect of the ever- 
during recompense promised by that re- 
ligion to the propagation of which he de- 
voted every mental energy and every bodily 
exertion ? On the contrary, when the period 
of his martyrdom was not far distant, and 
the infliction of death appeared to be in- 
evitable, was he not animated by the joy- 
ful hope which, though it had never for- 
saken him, now beamed on his heart with 
redoubled splendour, and which he has 
described with all that fervour so charac- 
teristic of his style ? " For I am now ready 
to be offered, and the time of my departure 
is at hand. I have fought a good fight, I 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



125 



have "finished my course, I have kept the 
faith ; henceforth there is laid up for me 
a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, 
the righteous judge, shall give me at that 
day."* And if any further confirmation of 
what is here advanced could possibly be 
required, we find that the author of the 
Epistle to the Hebrews has applied lan- 
guage of the very same import to our bless- 
ed Saviour himself, "who for the joy that 
was set before him, endured the cross, de- 
spising the shame, and is set down at the 
right hand of the throne of God." f If, 
then, the immediate disciples of our Lord 
were thus influenced and encouraged by 
his example and precepts to look forward to 
a state of happiness hereafter, are their fol- 
lowers in succeeding ages to close their 
hearts against every similar feeling, and 
studiously to banish from their view all 
those powerful incentives by which the 
great founder of our faith so constantly 
enforced his instructions and commands ? 
It does, indeed, appear to me most un- 

* 2 Tim. iv. 7. 8. f Hebrews xii. 2. 



126 VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 

reasonable to maintain, as Dr. Brown and 
other moralists delight to do, that the cir- 
cumstance of being influenced by the 
prospect of retribution in another state of 
being-, at once deprives the actions of men, 
however strictly conformable to the Divine 
will, or however extensively beneficial to 
the world, of every pretension to virtue, 
and renders the most painful sacrifices of 
all that can render life desirable, to the good 
of others, as little entitled to be deemed me- 
ritorious as the most flagitious dereliction 
of acknowledged duty. It is, in effect, no- 
thing less than to affirm that the heroism 
of the illustrious heathens, to whom I have 
alluded in a former page, was decidedly 
superior, in point of virtue, to the martyrdom 
of the apostles and primitive believers, who 
voluntarily shed their blood in attestation of 
the truth of the most momentous, though, 
if we accede to the principles of this party, 
the most selfish, doctrine of the Christian 
religion. For it is unquestionably true 
that neither Codrus, nor Leonidas, nor 
Regulus, could expect any other conse- 



THJ50RY OF MORALS. 



127 



quence from his patriotism, in his own per- 
son, than certain death, and utter annihi- 
lation, since they had no evidence to dis- 
prove the latter; while the followers of 
Christ, so far from not indulging any hope 
of recompense for their self-devotion in the 
cause of the religion they had embraced, 
extended their expectations beyond the con- 
fines of mortality, to a reward far exceed- 
ing their most exalted conceptions. Were 
we to listen to the class of moralists of which 
Dr. Brown is so strenuous an advocate, 
they would willingly persuade us to regard 
the patriotic heroes to whom I have refer- 
red, and those who imitated their example 
among the nations of antiquity, as alone 
entitled to the praise of virtue, and to con- 
sider the humble apostles as men who, 
with all their ostensible excellence, were 
not less truly selfish in their views, than 
those who confine their search of happiness 
to the objects of sensuality. That they 
would venture to express themselves in this 
explicit language, when speaking of the 
promulgators and champions of Christian- 



128 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY's 



ity, is certainly more than I would under- 
take to affirm ; but that such is the legiti- 
mate inference to be drawn from the prin- 
ciples maintained in the lectures of that 
amiable Scotch philosopher, it is not possible 
to deny. Nor will it avail to say, that these 
future rewards are to be regarded as the 
sanctions, and not as the obligation, of ex- 
emplary conduct ; a distinction which has 
been made by some writers, but which, in 
truth, has no solidity. For what does the 
term sanction imply, but the proposal of a 
more powerful motive than any before ex- 
isting, and which is adapted to operate more 
effectually on every mind that has been pro- 
perly formed ? And in this view, therefore, 
it will obviously coincide with the obligation 
contended for by our Cambridge Divine. 

When we see an author of pre-emi- 
nent talents thus indulging in a style of 
severity so ill according with questions 
of a speculative nature, which can be de- 
cided by reasoning alone, and not by im- 
passioned declamation, we cannot help in- 
quiring what was the principle of obligation 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



129 



which he himself embraced. In that part 
of Dr. Brown's work devoted to the ex- 
amination of this point, his opinion is thus 
explained. "Persons acting- in a certain 
manner excite in us a feeling- of approval ; 
persons acting in a manner opposite to this, 
cannot be considered by us without an emo- 
tion perhaps as vivid, or more vivid, but of 
an opposite kind. Why does it seem to 
us virtue to act in this way ? Why does 
he seem to us to have merit, or, in other 
words, to be worthy of approbation, who 
has acted in this way ? Why have we a 
feeling of obligation or duty, when we think 
of acting in this way ? The only answer 
(he proceeds to observe) which can be given 
to these questions is the same to all, that it 
is impossible for us to consider the action 
without feeling, that, by acting in this way, 
we should look upon ourselves, and others 
would look on us with approving regard ; 
and that if we were to act in a different 
way, we should look upon ourselves, and 
others would look upon us with abhorrence, 

K 



130 VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY S 



or at least with disapprobation."* Now 
I should wish to ask in reply — what is the 
influential principle here described but one 
of pure selfishness ? If we are to under- 
stand the language of this writer in its na- 
tural import, the only reason why we are 
to consider ourselves obliged to conform to 
the precepts of virtue is derived from the 
feeling, that we should thus secure our own 
approbation, and that of others ; and the 
only consideration which is said to restrain 
us from an opposite conduct, is the con- 
sciousness, that by adopting it we should 
incur the abhorrence of ourselves, and of 
those around us ; though I am free to ac^ 
knowledge that, selfish as this principle 
undoubtedly is, it is never likely to become 
dangerous from its extensive reception. 
Notwithstanding, however, the opinion 
which Dr. Brown has so explicitly ex- 
pressed respecting the nature of virtue, 
and the obligation which it imposes, he 

* Lectures on the Phil, of the Hum. Mind. Vol. III. 
p. 533. 2nd. Edit. 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



131 



strenuously denies in his fourth volume, * 
that it is at all obnoxious to the charge of 
selfishness, which it was natural for him 
to anticipate. This charge, he observes, 
"arises chiefly from the pleasure which 
truly attends our virtuous aifections, but 
which though universally attending them, 
it seems to require no very great nicety 
of discrimination to distinguish as their 
consequence, r.c L their cause." I certainly 
agree with him in believing that, in point 
of fact, it is not with the view of experienc- 
ing the pleasure attendant on beneficent 
actions, that such actions are in numberless 
instances performed. But if this feeling 
of satisfaction which follows a virtuous act 
be regarded, according to his system, as the 
obligation, it must in that case necessarily 
possess an influential power over his general 
conduct, which will so far, therefore, de- 
serve the name of selfish. It is impossible 
that the man who admits of no other obli- 
gation or incentive to obedience than the 
knowledge that the latter will be followed 

* Brown's Lect. Vol. IV. p. 74. 

K 2 



132 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



by feelings of complacency, and an opposite 
conduct by feelings of remorse, can claim 
with justice the merit of disinterestedness. 

But to perceive how inconsistent this 
writer is in the arguments he employs in 
support of his theory, we need only recol- 
lect the doctrine which he constantly incul- 
cates, that " virtue is a relation, and no- 
thing more," that is, the relation of a cer- 
tain class of actions to the emotions of ap- 
probation which they excite in the mind.* 
In making this assertion he appears to have 
forgotten that according to his own system 

* Dr. Brown maintains that virtue, obligation, and 
merit, are terms which denote the same feeling modified 
by the difference of time, at which we regard the action 
exciting that feeling as present, future, or past. " To 
feel this character of approvableness in an action which 
we have not yet performed, and are only meditating on 
it as future, is to feel the moral obligation, or moral in- 
ducement to perform it ; when we think of an action in 
the moment of volition, we term the voluntary perform- 
ance of it virtue ; when we think of the action as already 
performed, we denominate it merit. — Brown's Lectures. 
Vol. IV. p. 138. (2nd Edit). This explanation, the 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



133 



of mental philosophy, a relation cannot arise 
without either the perception or the con- 
ception of two or more objects at the same 
time* Hence if we contemplate any action 
separately, it is impossible that any feeling 
of relation can exist in the mind, and the 
same may be said if the emotion of appro- 
bation be regarded singly. But if this 
latter emotion must of necessity take place 
at the very time when we are contemplating 
the action, in order to enable us to per- 
ceive any relation between them, how can 
moral approbation be said to be the conse- 
quence of a virtuous action. Such, however, 
is Dr. Brown's assertion, and he is therefore 
reduced to this dilemma. If the action 
precedes the emotion of complacency, then 
how can the latter operate as the principle 

author believed would tend to remove that indistinct- 
ness of conception so common on these topics ; but the 
attempt, I think, is as little calculated to answer that 
purpose, as Dr. Price's " Review of the Principal Ques- 
tions and Difficulties in Morals,*" was to dissipate the 
obscurities of former ethical systems. 
* See Brown's Lect. Vol. II. sec. 45. 



134 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



of obligation, even allowing- the propriety 
of his own definition ? If, on the other 
hand, a virtuous action follows the feeling 
of approbation with which it is viewed, 
or if a crime is avoided on account of the 
abhorrence which the previous conception 
of it produces, it can no longer be affirmed 
that selfishness is excluded. 

It can be no violation of truth to affirm 
that if Mr. Stewart's opinions respecting 
the criterion and obligation of virtue are 
unsatisfactory and ill- supported, those of 
Dr. Brown are still more so. According to 
the latter moralist, the feeling of appro- 
bation constitutes the sole rule of what is 
right, and the only inducement or obliga- 
tion which can lead us to practise it. A 
doctrine more pregnant with pernicious con- 
sequences, were it really adopted as a per- 
manent principle of conduct, is not often 
advanced ; for if every action which excites 
emotions of complacency in the mind of 
the agent is to be regarded as virtuous, 
there are but few nefarious deeds in the 
catalogue of human crimes which might 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



135 



not at different periods, have laid claim to 
that character. " Le larcin," says Pascal, 
" l'inceste, le meurtre des enfans et des 
peres, tout a eu sa place entre des actions 
vertueuses."* In short, if these emotions are 
to be thus highly estimated, we might al- 
most ask, why the brutes themselves may 
not be deemed capable of performing moral 
actions. And yet this amiable philosopher, 
and, on many points, powerful reasoner^ 
rejects Archdeacon Paley's principle of obli- 
gation, because he considers it to be dan- 
gerous and degrading !f 

But whether, in conformity with Mr. 
Stewart's system, moral obligation be re- 

* Pensees de Pascal, Premiere Partie, Art. VI. 

j " For such is the stuff that man is made of : in 
principle and in practice, in a right track, and in a 
wrong one, the rarest of all human qualities is con- 
sistency." — Benthmrts Principles of Morals and Legis- 
lation. Vol. I. p. 7. 

I forbear to notice other indefensible points in Dr. 
Brown's theory of ethics, as they are not immediately 
connected with the objection which we have here been 
considering. 



136 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 

garded as consisting in the paramount 
authority of conscience, or whether, accord- 
ing to Dr. Brown's theory, it be thought to 
originate solely from the feelings of appro- 
bation excited in the mind ; that man must 
be little acquainted with the actual state of 
human nature, or with the history of human 
society, who can imagine that these feeble 
incentives would avail to any extent against 
the perpetual assaults of temptation, and 
the powerful excitement of the passions. 
In the one case, a faculty of the mind is 
declared to be a faithful guide, though very 
inadequate to the office assigned to it, and 
in the other, our conduct is referred to the 
decision of mental feelings, which are by 
no means uniform amongst different na- 
tions, and which are as frequently made to 
sanction the atrocities of cruelty and vice, 
as the deeds of compassion and virtue. 
Constituted as the human faculties and 
affections are at present, to endeavour to 
persuade the great mass of mankind, or, 
indeed, any but visionary speculatists, who 
never mingle in the business and tumults 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



137 



of the world, that they ought to practise 
virtue either exclusively for its own sake,* 

* " Seized and rapt with this sublime idea, our phi- 
losophers do infinitely despise and pity whoever shall 
propose or accept any other motive to virtue." — Bishop 
Berkeley's Minute Philosopher. Dial. III. p. 113. 

There is an observation of Dr. Adam Smith, when 
opposing the theory of utility in Morals, which is re- 
garded by Dr. Brown in his answer to Hume, as pos- 
sessing great weight: — Why do we not regard a chest 
of drawers (supposing that theory to be true) with the 
same feelings with which we contemplate the conduct 
of the Christian ? We answer, and the answer entirely 
accords with Paley's system — because the one is a mass 
of inanimate matter, the other a rational and voluntary 
agent. Were the former capable of being influenced 
by motives, and consequently susceptible of merit and 
demerit, the question might be deemed pertinent. 

In estimating the moral worth of a rational agent, 
it is not merely the tendency of the action that is to be 
taken into the account ; it is essential (as Paley ex- 
pressly declares in his chapter on utility) that we ascer- 
tain his design. A decided lunatic might possibly, by 
the donation of a considerable sum of money, confer an 
essential benefit on a particular individual ; but, accord- 



138 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 

or from no other motive than the feeling of 
approbation which it inspires in the heart, 

ing to the very theory which the distinguished Scotch 
professor condemns, he would be as devoid of merit as 
the steam-engine, or the printing-press, by which the 
welfare of society has been so much augmented. Unless 
the agent be in full possession of his rational faculties, 
and his will be entirely free from restraint, nothing he 
can do will entitle him to the faintest praise. But ad- 
mitting this to be the case, there is still no incongruity 
whatever in believing that utility is the standard or 
criterion by which we are to determine whether an 
action be right or wrong. When Dr. Brown affirms 
that it is impossible to elude the force of Adam Smith's 
assertion, except by saying that it is only utility in cer- 
tain voluntary actions of living beings that awakens 
approbation, and that by this limitation, the very point 
in question is conceded, we do not allow, (whatever 
may be the case with Hume,) that these allegations at 
all invalidate Paley's system. To institute a compa- 
rison between a passive, inert, material substance, utterly 
incapable of volition, and an intelligent, voluntary 
agent, susceptible of moral feelings, appears to me 
to be altogether absurd. But, if instead of the inani- 
mate steam-engine or printing-press, be substituted the 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



139 



is, I cannot help believing, to the last 
degree, idle and preposterous. Did no 
other more powerful incitement exist; if 
men were to depend solely upon the 
guidance of an internal monitor, neither 
imperative in its dictates, nor uniform in its 
effects; if they were told that the only 
attainable recompense for the noblest acts 
of generosity and valour, or the most pain- 
ful exertions of forbearance and self-denial, 
would be the smiles of an approving con- 
science, " we may venture to affirm," in the 
language applied by Mr. Stewart to the 
theory of Dr. Paley, " that there would not 

contrivers of these machines, the comparison involves 
nothing objectionable; for if it could be proved that 
the inventors were actuated by an earnest desire to 
increase the comfort and happiness of mankind, by 
introducing these mechanical contrivances into use, we 
should view them with the same feelings with which we 
regard an exemplary Christian. Still there is nothing 
in this statement to prevent our considering utility to be 
the rule of our moral actions, and the foundation of 
every moral precept. The tendency of the action, and 
the design of the agent are two distinct considerations. 



140 VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY's 

be enough of virtue left in the world, to hold 
society together." * Let the Stoics con- 

* Even Dr. Reid speaks in much more favourable 
terms of the motive to human conduct derived from 
individual happiness, than either his disciple, Mr. Stew- 
art, or Dr. Brown, his frequent opponent. "We 
observed before, that the ancient moralists, and many 
among the modern, have deduced the whole of morals 
from this principle, (a regard to our own good,) and 
that when we make a right estimate of goods and evils, 
according to their degree, their dignity, their duration, 
and according as they are more or less in our power, it 
leads to the practice of every virtue: more directly, 
indeed, to the virtues of self-government, to prudence, 
to temperance, and to fortitude; and (though more 
indirectly,) even to justice, humanity, and all the social 
virtues, when their influence upon our happiness is well 
understood. Though it be not the noblest principle of 
conduct, it has this peculiar advantage, that its force is 
felt by the most ignorant, and even by the most 
abandoned. 

" If a man can be induced to do his duty even from a 
regard to his own happiness, he will soon find reason to 
love virtue for her own sake, and to act from motives 
less mercenary. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



141 



tend that Regulus in the midst of torture, 
and with no consolation but that which 
flowed from the conviction of his own 
worth, was equally happy with Metellus, 
possessed of all that prosperity could afford, 
or wisdom desire.* The ethics of Chris- 

" I cannot therefore approve of those moralists, who 
would banish all persuasives to virtue taken from the 
consideration of private good. In the present state 
of human nature, these are not useless to the best, and 
they are the only means left of reclaiming the aban- 
doned." — Reid on the Powers of the Human Mind, 
Vol. III. Essay v. Chap. i. 

These passages from Dr. Reid's principal work are 
not only replete with sound sense, but they are remark- 
able for containing the substance of the very answer 
given by those who adopt Paley's theory to the charge 
of selfishness so perpetually alleged against it ; though 
Mr. Stewart calls that answer in its detail, nothing more 
than a refinement contrived to evade the force of the 
arguments that have been urged on the other side. 

* The different opinions of the Epicureans, the Stoics, 
and the Peripatetics on the prolific topic of disputation 
which the ancients found in the summum bonum, are 
detailed with much interest in Cicero's treatise De 



142 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 

tianity, I apprehend, enforced as they are 
by the hopes and fears of futurity, would 

Finibus. The decision of the Stoics on the happiness 
of Metellus may be seen in the fifth book, c. 28. — Me- 
tastasio has well expressed one of the most extravagant 
sentiments of this school of philosophy in his animated 
drama of " Attilio Regolo." Thus in Act III. Sc. iii. 
this is the language of Publius : 

Si, lo confesso, 
Morir me sento ; 
Ma questo istesso 
Crudel tormento 
E il piu bel merito 
Del mio valor. 

That an exclamation so apparently heroic may attract 
momentary applause, I will not deny, but when estimated 
by its practical influence, it will deserve, I fear, no better 
description than that of Magnifiche parole, belle ad 
udir. 

After allowing all the praise that is due to many of 
the precepts and maxims of the Stoics, the character of 
the sect as delineated by La Bruyere contains, I really 
think, nothing more than is true. 

" Le stoicism est un jeu d'esprit, et une idee sem- 
blable a la republique de Platon. Les Sto'iques ont 



THEORY OP MORALS. 143 

be but ill exchanged for the dowerless phi- 
losophy of the Porch.* 

feint qu'on pouvoit rire dans la pauvrete, etre insen- 
sible aux injures, a Fingratitude, aux pertes des biens, 
comme a celle des parens et des amis, regarder froide- 
ment la mort, et comme une chose indifferente qui ne 
devoit ni rejouir, ni rendre triste ; n'etre vaincu ni par 
le plaisir, ni par la douleur ; sentir le fer ou le feu dans 
quelque partie de son corps sans pousser le moindre sou- 
pir, ni jetter une seulelarme; et cefantome de vertu et 
de Constance ainsi imagine il leur a plu de l'appeler un 
sage. lis ont laisse a l'homme tous les defauts qu'ils 
lui ont trouves, et n'ont presque releve aucun de ses 
foibles : au lieu de faire de ses vices des peintures 
affreuses ou ridicules qui servissent a Fen corriger, ils 
lui ont trace Fidee d'une perfection, et d'un heroi'sme 
dont il n'est point capable, et Font exhorte a Fimpos- 
sible. ,, — Caracteres, chap. xi. De F Homme. 

* Among those writers on Morals, who maintain that 
virtue carries with it its own obligation, exclusively of 
all regard to the Divine will, and of all advantage at- 
tending the practice of it, few have expressed their sen- 
timents more decidedly, and I may add, at the same 
time, with more inconsistency, than Dr. Samuel Clarke. 
After dwelling with great earnestness on the eternal ob- 



144 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



Before the preceding pages were finished, 
a critique on the writings of Dr. Paley 

ligation of virtue, the moment it is understood by the 
mind, and antecedently to every other consideration, he 
suddenly shrinks from his creed, and in reality gives up 
the point. " Though virtue is unquestionably worthy 
to be chosen for its own sake, (he observes,) even with- 
out any expectation of reward, yet it does not follow 
that it is therefore entirely self-sufficient, and able to 
support a man under all kinds of sufferings, and even 
death itself, for its sake, without any prospect of future 
recompense. Men never will generally, and indeed it 
is not very reasonable to be expected they should, part 
with all the comforts of life, and even life itself, without 
the expectation of any future recompense. So that if 
we suppose no future state of rewards, it will follow that 
God will have indued men with such faculties as put 
them under a necessity of approving and choosing virtue 
in the judgment of their own minds ; and yet has not 
given them wherewith to support themselves in the 
suitable and constant practice of it. The consideration 
of which inexplicable difficulty ought to have led the 
philosophers to a firm belief and expectation of a future 
state of rewards and punishments, without which their 
whole scheme of morality cannot be supported.'" — Evid. 
of Revealed Relig. Prop. I. § 7. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 145 

appeared in a periodical publication of the 
present day widely circulated among- the 
lovers of English literature, and though his 
works have for the most part been justly 
estimated, and his character ably vindicated 
by the author of the article in question, I 
by no means coincide with some of the 
remarks which have been applied to his 
Theory of Morals. The objections advanced 
by the reviewer do not, indeed, substan- 
tially differ from those of other authors, 
but still, considering- the reputation of the 
Journal in which they appear, they ought 
not to be suffered to pass entirely unnoticed . 
One of his great objections to making- utility 
the rule of our actions, is the fact that 
men neither do, nor can stop to calculate the 
consequences of their actions ; for if they did 
not act instantaneously, it would in many 
cases be too late. In answer to this, it may 
be safely affirmed, (as 1 have intimated 
before,) that with respect to the great ma- 
jority of human actions, there is not the 
slightest necessity for deliberation, and the 
fact is acknowledged by Paley himself in 

L 



146 VINDICATION OF DR. PA LEY'S 

a passage which I have already quoted from 
his chapter on War. Where the infant 
mind has been imbued with right princi- 
ples, and where a course of moral discipline 
has been duly enforced, a facility of acting 
properly is imperceptibly produced, the dic- 
tates of duty are immediately followed, and 
the feeling of approbation or aversion arises 
at once, when virtuous or vicious conduct 
is presented to its view. That this moral 
judgment, and the sentiment by which it 
is accompanied, are acquired, and not coeval 
with the birth of the agent, is sufficiently 
evident, from the circumstance that they 
are not universal, where early education 
and discipline have been either erroneous 
or defective. It cannot possibly be disputed 
that a habit of approving virtue may be so 
assiduously instilled into the mind, long 
before the full development of its powers, 
as to become instantaneous in its operation ; 
nor is the facility here spoken of, restricted 
to morals, but is acquired in numerous 
pursuits of human life, where the necessity 
of a peculiar faculty is never once imagined 



THEORY OF MORALS. 147 

to exist. But, however readily we may- 
admit the justness of the foregoing observa- 
tions, it is not to be disputed that many 
instances do occur in which a certain de- 
gree of deliberation becomes requisite, and 
where, yielding to the impulse of the mo- 
ment, though apparently meritorious, would 
in truth be deserving of censure. This 
cannot be better exemplified than in the 
familiar instance of an immediate com- 
pliance with the application of mendicants 
for pecuniary relief. The feelings and the 
motives of the donor who yields to their 
solicitations, may, in themselves, be ad- 
mitted to merit commendation, but yet the 
action, if unaccompanied by inquiry, would 
be decidedly wrong. If it be asked on 
what ground this judgment be founded, we 
answer, because instantaneous compliance 
might not only be prejudicial in that indi- 
vidual case, but would, if generally imi- 
tated, be most unquestionably injurious to 
the welfare of the community. Whenever 
deliberation is requisite, the only question 
is, to what standard we should refer for our 

l 2 



148 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



guidance, supposing- the Scriptures to be 
silent respecting the particular point to be 
decided. Shall we have recourse to con- 
science, or to general expediency ? In the 
case alluded to of vagrant beggars, con- 
science, we have seen, would too often 
lamentably deceive us, while a regard to 
the good of society would afford the best 
security to be obtained against serious error. 

The instances adduced by the reviewer in 
favour of the doctrine which maintains that 
the faculty, usually denominated conscience, 
is originally implanted in the human breast, 
are, I must acknowledge, to my apprehen- 
sion extremely unsatisfactory. Referring 
to the very interesting " Narrative of a 
Journey from Calcutta to Bombay," by the 
late lamented Bishop Heber, he remarks that 
the poor Hindoo, whom he describes as " a 
liar, and the worshipper of a lie, leaving his 
brother to perish by the way side, and not 
even robbing the vulture of his bones," the 
moment he hears a sentiment of natural 
mercy, or justice, or pity, drop from the 
lips of the bishop, instantly utters the 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



149 



strongest expressions of approbation, dic- 
tated by the natural feelings of his heart. 
The fact here stated we attempt not to call 
in question ; but still I would ask, — how 
does it happen that the same conscience, 
which gave rise to this warmth of applause 
on hearing the sentiments of this exemplary 
prelate, does not point out to them the 
heinousness of the crimes imputed to them 
by the reviewer, as well as of others of still 
deeper die mentioned by Dr. Buchanan, 
and by more recent travellers to our pos- 
sessions in India ? And yet it is well 
known that the natives are in the habit of 
committing these flagitious acts without 
the slightest hesitation, or the smallest de- 
gree of compunction * A conscience thus 

* " They are decidedly, by nature, a mild, pleasing, 
and intelligent race ; sober, parsimonious ; and when an 
object is held out to them, most industrious and per- 
severing. But the magistrates and lawyers all agree, 
that in no country are lying and perjury so common, 
and so little regarded ; and notwithstanding the ap- 
parent mildness of their manners, the criminal calendar 
is generally as full as in Ireland, with gang-robberies, 



150 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 



uncertain, thus contradictory, can surely 
be of but little advantage to the possessor, 
till corrected by rigid discipline; and the 
facts here stated afford a very unsatisfactory 
proof of its authority. Nor does the ap- 

setting fire to buildings, stacks, &c. ; and the number of 
children who are decoyed aside, and murdered for the 
sake of their ornaments, Lord Amherst assures me, is 
dreadful." — Heber's Narrative, Vol. III. p. 254. 

Nor should I omit to mention the horrid practice, 
related by the Bishop, which prevailed till lately in 
Guzerat, and other western districts of India, of 
murdering by far the greater part of the female infants ; 
a practice, which, though originating in pride and ava- 
rice, was strenuously defended by the natives ! See 
Heber's Narrative, Vol. II. p. 518. Another nefarious 
custom of great antiquity has recently been prohibited 
by the English Government, — the annual sacrifice of 
infants by their own mothers to the Ganges, whose 
waters are deemed sacred, and are still worshipped by 
innumerable devotees ! 

Such are the atrocities of that part of the human 
species who are said to afford clear indications of an 
instinctive conscience, designed to be the guide of their 
conduct in life ! 



THEORY OP MORALS. 151 



plauding acclamation of the lower class 
of the audience at a theatre, when any sen- 
timent of generosity or compassion is ut- 
tered on the stage, furnish any conclusive 
argument in favour of an instinctive moral 
faculty. Relying, as he does, with confi- 
dence on this tact, the reviewer would 
undoubtedly regard, as a signal proof of the 
prevalence of the moral sense, the reception 
which the celebrated sentiment in Terence, 
met with from a Roman audience : 

Homo sum, humani nil a me alien um puto.* 

But, as Bishop Warburton well observes, 
this very same person, by whom these feel- 
ing expressions are pronounced, this hu- 
mane Chremes, not only gave strict injunc- 
tions to Sostrata, his wife, to expose her 
new-born infant, but was afterwards filled 
with indignation, when he found that she 
had committed the charge to another per- 
son, and that by this act the child had 
been saved. 

* Heautontimorumenos, Act I. Sc. i. 



152 VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 

Tot peccata in hac re ostendis ; nam jamprimum, si 
meum 

Imperium exequi voluisses, interemptam oportuit.* 

That the utterance of the noble sentiment 
in the early part of this drama called forth 
a burst of applause from every part of the 
theatre, is sufficiently testified by the re- 
cords of antiquity ; but does it appear from 
the same, or any other testimony, that the 
conduct of the father towards his innocent 
offspring, that his execrable design of com- 
mitting infanticide, excited the slightest 
mark of reprobation ? It is not, however, 
the reality of the feelings here described 
that I would call in question, but merely 
the origin to which they are attributed by 
the reviewer, and the proofs which he 
believes them to afford of an innate con- 
science. Do not the associations formed 
in early childhood, and the rules of conduct 
originating from the eternal condition in 
which mankind are born, or from the religion, 
whether true or false, of the country which 
they inhabit, furnish an adequate cause for 
* Ibid. Act IV. Sc. 1. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



153 



the facts adduced by the reviewer, without 
unnecessarily resorting to any other source? 
The lono-established maxim, " entia non 
sunt multiplicanda proeter necessitatem," 
though admitted in theory, is too often 
discarded in practice. 

Nor must it be forgotten that the same 
individuals who display so much sensibi- 
lity to the sentiments of honour and virtue 
when expressed on the stage, testify feel- 
ings of delight not less vehement at scenes 
and allusions which the Christian moralist 
would decidedly condemn. "What then" 
(to adopt the writer's own language) " would 
be the worth of such a principle in the 
actual affairs of the world ?" But, notwith- 
standing this inconsistency, let it be ob- 
served, that the opponents of this school 
of ethics dispute not the fact of an imme- 
diate perception of right and wrong in the 
majority of cases, accompanied with feel- 
ings of approbation or aversion, more par- 
ticularly where education has not been 
entirely neglected. All that they contend 
for is, that these moral perceptions and 



154 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY's 



feelings are not the result of an instinctive 
faculty, but are generated by the circum- 
stances in which the mind is placed ; that 
they afford a very insufficient guide in cases 
of difficulty and doubt ; and that they may 
be ultimately traced to the original suscep- 
tibility of pleasure and pain, with which 
the human frame is unquestionably en- 
dowed.* 

* Warburton, not less than the writer in question, 
believed in an instinctive moral sense, or conscience; 
but of what avail he considered it, we may collect from 
some of the observations which occur in his Divine 
Legation of Moses, when answering the objections of 
Bayle. " Of how great power custom is to erase the 
strongest impressions of nature, much stronger than 
those of the moral sense, we may learn from that general 
practice which prevailed in the most learned and polite 
countries of the world, of exposing their children, whereby 
the strongest instinctive affection for the offspring was 
violated without remorse. And what makes more par- 
ticularly for my argument is, that custom is a power 
which opposes the moral sense, not partially or at cer- 
tain times and places, but universally. If, therefore, 
custom in the politest states, where a Providence was 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



155 



After an attentive consideration of the 
objections against Dr. Paley's theory, which 

taught and acknowledged, made such havock of virtue, 
into what confusion must things run, where there is no 
other barrier than the feeble idea of moral sense f" 

Though this renowned controversialist affirms that 
moral obligation consists in the will of God, it is never- 
theless evident that in reality his opinion on this point 
differs but little from that of Paley. In the same chap- 
ter from which the former passage was taken, he thus 
expresses himself : " The question then is, whether a 
clear conviction of right and wrong, abstracted from 
all will and command, and consequently from the ex- 
pectation of reward and punishment, be sufficient to 
influence the generality of mankind to any tolerable 
degree ? That it is not, will, I suppose, be clearly seen 
by the following consideration: — All who have con- 
sidered human nature attentively, have found that it 
is not enough to make men follow virtue that it be 
owned to be the greatest good, which the beauty, bene- 
fit, or rseaonableness of it may evince. It must first be 
brought home to them, and considered by them as a 
good that makes a necessary part of their happiness, 
before it can raise any desire in them.'" (Div. Legat. 
B. I. sect. 4.) Still stronger to the same purpose is the 
following passage : — "For if men do not follow the great- 



156 



VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY's 



have been adduced in the preceding pages, 
and viewing them in their strongest light, 
I confess that they appear to me to be 
utterly devoid of that solidity which has 
been attributed to them by their authors, and 
that no other theory hitherto offered to the 
world can boast of so decided a superiority 
as to be entitled to supersede that which 
is maintained by this celebrated moralist. 
Let it be conceded that his definition of 
virtue is, on the one hand, defective in the 
enumeration of the primary branches of 
duty, (though from the subsequent classifi- 
cation no inconvenience can occur to the 
student on that account) and that, on the 
other hand, it is redundant, by comprising 
in the statement the distinct question of 

est confessed possible good till they consider it as making 
a necessary part of their happiness, I ask which is the 
likeliest means of bringing them so to consider it ? Is 
it the reflection of the innate idea of the loveliness of 
virtue ? Or the more abstract contemplation on its 
essential difference to vice ? or is it not rather the belief, 
that the practice of virtue, as religion teaches it, is 
attended with an infinite reward P 11 — Ibid. 13. I. Se,c. v. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



157 



obligation ; let it be admitted that he has 
not always expressed himself with the degree 
of caution so requisite in works of a didactic 
nature ; and that some instances of incon- 
sistency may be pointed out in his mode 
of reasoning : I am nevertheless decidedly 
of opinion that his main arguments are 
well founded, and that the leading prin- 
ciples he has adopted, though liable, like 
all others, to some objections, are substan- 
tially true. In every theory of morals pro- 
posed to our notice, there are three prin- 
cipal questions which demand considera- 
tion ; — the source from which our moral 
sentiments are derived ; the criterion or 
rule by which we are to be guided in our 
estimate of virtue ; and, lastly, in what con- 
sists the obligation to practise it. In each 
of these particulars, the meaning of the 
writer whom I have here endeavoured to 
vindicate, has been too frequently misre- 
presented, and in each the imputations al- 
leged by the opponents of his system may, 
if I am not egregiously mistaken, be satis- 
factorily refuted. With reference to the 



158 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



first of these points, we have seen, that 
though he denies that the moral feelings 
are the result either of instinct or intuition, 
he admits that a provision is made for 
their generation in the mind by the ne- 
cessary influence to which mankind are 
by nature exposed, contending, at the 
same time, that an adequate explanation 
may be given of their origin, by recur- 
ring to the effects of early education, to 
the imitative powers invariably displayed 
in infancy, and to the agency of that prin- 
ciple of association by which the mental 
operations are so universally affected. This 
mode of explaining the phenomena of our 
moral frame has the double advantage of 
not requiring the aid of any other causes 
than such as are familiar to our observation, 
and of easily accounting for those excep- 
tions which we meet with in different states 
of society, and which, by the opposite hy- 
pothesis, are incapable of a satisfactory 
solution* But in point of fact, to what- 

* It is remarked by Bishop Sanderson, in his Prelec- 
tiones de Conscientid (delivered at Oxford during the 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



159 



ever degree of consideration it may have 
been thought entitled by some philosophers, 

civil wars,) as a singular circumstance, that throughout 
the whole of the Old Testament, no Hebrew word 
occurs which exactly corresponds with the English 
word conscience. The terms made use of by the sa- 
cred writers, as equivalent, are 3,b, ttb, and nil, the 
heart, the spirit. In the New Testament, the term 
<7wvh'§>)(T(c, conscientia, according to the statement of 
Schleusner and Wetstein, is used, in the modern signi- 
fication of the word, in little more than twenty in- 
stances. In the Septuagint version, the Greek word is 
met with only once, and then as the translation of JHD, 
scientia. But little stress, however, is to be placed 
on these circumstances. The absence of the term in the 
Old Testament does not imply that the Hebrews were 
destitute of the power of moral discrimination, nor does 
the occurrence of the Greek word in the New Testa- 
ment prove any thing more than the belief that such a 
faculty existed, without affording any intimation res- 
pecting its origin. Certain it is, that the inspired wri- 
tings were not intended to correct errors in philosophy ; 
but if any inference were allowable, I should be disposed 
to say, that the language of the Hebrew and the Chris- 
tian Scriptures is, in its general import, more unfavour- 



160 



VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



the question which involves the origin of 
our moral sentiments is not one of essential 
importance. The power of distinguishing 
certain actions which immediately excite 
our approbation, from others which excite 
the opposite emotion, is fully admitted to 
exist in the mind, whether according to 
some it originates in instinct, or in the es- 
timation of others, it is altogether acquired. 
And hence even Mr. Stewart, in one of the 
earliest of his works, acknowledges that the 
theory which maintains the latter supposi- 
tion does not tend "to weaken the foun- 
dation of morals," and that "it leads to 
no sceptical conclusions concerning the rule 
of life." * On the subject of the second 

able to the supposition of a distinct moral sense, 
implanted in the breast to be the guide of our conduct, 
than to the doctrine which asserts that the moral judg- 
ment and feelings do not result from any peculiar 
faculty, but are produced by the circumstances in 
which the infant mind is placed, operating with great 
uniformity, though liable to occasional variations. 

* " For although Ave were to grant, 11 observes the 
author, " that all our principles of action are acquired, 



THEORY OP MORALS. 



161 



question referred to, — the rule of virtue, 
the theory of our Cambridge divine, when 
disencumbered from the erroneous repre- 
sentations of those who deny its truth, 
amounts to no more than this • that when- 
ever the light of Scripture is sufficient to 
enable us to discern the path of duty, — and 

so striking a difference among them must still be ad- 
mitted as is sufficient to distinguish clearly those univer- 
sal laws which were intended to regulate human con- 
duct from the local habits which are formed by educa- 
tion and fashion. It must still be admitted, that while 
some active principles are confined to particular indi- 
viduals, or particular tribes of men, there are others 
which, arising from circumstances in which all the situa- 
tions of mankind must agree, are common to the Avhole 
species: such active principles as fall under this last 
description, at whatever period of life they may appear, 
are to be regarded as a part of human nature, no less 
than the instinct of suction ; in the same manner as the 
acquired perception of distance by the eye is to be 
ranked among the perceptive powers of man, no less 
than the original perceptions of any of our other senses." 
— Elem. of the Philos. of the Human Mind. Vol. I. 
p. 393. After these concessions, and after acknowledg- 

M 



162 VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S 

in the majority of situations this is un- 
doubtedly the case — our task is obvious and 
easy ; but when the assistance of this guide 
is not to be obtained, it then becomes ne- 
cessary to inquire what mode of conduct 
has the greatest tendency to promote the 
welfare of mankind ; rationally concluding 
that such conduct must be most conforma- 
ble to the will of a Being whom we believe 
to be possessed of infinite benevolence. To 
say that the inquiry must sometimes be 
attended with difficulty, or that it is per- 
petually liable to abuse, is to affirm no- 
thing more than what is applicable to 
every system which has been proposed to 

ing most explicitly, as this author does in the same 
page, that the theory in question does not appear to 
him to have any tendency to weaken the foundation of 
morals, nor to lead to any sceptical conclusions con- 
cerning the rule of life, what can be more idle, more 
truly inconsistent, than to oppose it, as he has done, with 
so much pertinacity, in his subsequent publications ? In 
truth, his adversaries cannot wish for a more satisfactory 
confession. 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



163 



the world, since Ethics became a topic of 
philosophical disquisition. Does it appear 
that the dictates of conscience, or the fit- 
ness of things, or the spontaneous sug- 
gestions of the understanding, or the cri- 
terion insisted upon by Mr. Gisborne, are 
in the slightest degree less susceptible of 
perversion, or more within the grasp of 
the mental faculties ? As subordinate 
means, let it be conceded that they may 
sometimes afford assistance in cases of per- 
plexity ; yet as a permanent mode of ascer- 
taining the will of the Deity, when not evi- 
dent from Scripture, t he tendency of an ac- 
tion to promote the well-being of society, or, 
in other words, its utility, is, I must still 
think, of all others the most likely to afford 
to the inquirer the best security against error 
in the formation of his private judgment, 
and more particularly in the construction 
of general rules. It is undoubtedly singu- 
lar, that in selecting the definition which 
we have admitted to be objectionable, it did 
not occur to this acute reasoner, that who- 
ever makes the will of the Deity to be the 

m2 



164 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 



criterion of virtue, must of course make 
virtue consist in compliance with that will. 
That such was his real opinion is obvious 
from various parts of his work ; and it is 
not less obvious that this opinion perfectly 
accords with his assertion, that " whatever 
is expedient is right," because the Divine 
will must at all times be coincident with 
the general welfare of mankind. 

And, lastly, in adverting to the principle 
of moral obligation supported by Dr. Paley, 
I Avould ask, — has the charge of selfishness, 
which has been so vehemently urged against 
it by some of his opponents, and particu- 
larly by Dr. Brown, been more successfully 
established than the other objections against 
his theory ? There is no system of morals 
whatever, I do not hesitate to affirm, which 
more strongly enforces the necessity of dis- 
interestedness, as far as it relates to the pre- 
sent world, than that which has been thus 
inconsiderately and unjustly accused, and 
which merely maintains that the promised 
felicity of another state of being is the ulti- 
mate motive to moral obedience, and fur- 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



165 



nishes the only conclusive answer to the 
question, Why are we obliged to practise 
virtue ? Nor does the able advocate of this 
system deny, that those who have reached 
the highest elevation of moral excellence 
attainable by human nature, may lose sight, 
for a time, of all future recompense, and 
derive the purest pleasure from the exercise 
of those virtuous habits which a long course 
of discipline may have taught them to 
frame. In fine, it may be truly affirmed, 
that if there be any real cause for the ap- 
prehension of danger in the rule which he 
has endeavoured to establish, the same 
cause is in no degree less prominent in the 
systems of those who are most strenuously 
opposed to him ; and if the motive he has 
described as constituting the obligation be 
represented as interested and degrading, 
it is precisely the same motive which is 
urged in almost every page of the New 
Testament. If the imputation be admis- 
sible in the one case, it may be applied with 
at least equal justice in the other. Whether 
the stigma, however, of selfishness be deem- 



166 VINDICATION OF DR. PALEY'S 

ed applicable or not, let it not escape our 
recollection, that the paramount duties of 
Christianity were never attempted to be 
enforced by its great Founder, and his dis- 
ciples, without appealing- to the hopes and 
fears of those whose conduct and character 
it was their object to reform. 

Convinced as I am of the truth of Dr. 
Paley's theory of morals when properly 
explained, and believing that the objec- 
tions which have been urged by those of his 
opponents, who are most likely to influence 
the sentiments of others, may be satisfac- 
torily refuted, I am, nevertheless, by no 
means insensible that it might have been 
more effectually rescued from misconcep- 
tion, had its celebrated supporter been 
more attentive to precision in his language, 
and more disposed to listen to the sugges- 
tions of contemporary writers. If, instead 
of his present definition of virtue, another 
had been substituted more consistent with 
the general principles of the work, and 
more accurately expressed ; if utility had 
been described to be the best criterion of 



THEORY OF MORALS. 



167 



virtue whenever it can be ascertained, in- 
stead of the only one ; and if the obligation 
insisted on had been uniformly called the 
ultimate motive (for in this light it is always 
intended to be viewed), though the argu- 
ments would for the most part have remained 
the same, the frame-work, if I may so call 
it, of the system, would have been so far 
improved as to be less liable to excite the 
prejudices of some, and less exposed to the 
cavils and unfounded accusations of others. 
In all its essential parts, I still think, this 
theory will bear the test of the severest ex- 
amination, and will survive every effort to 
destroy its stability. 

That some of the other opinions con- 
tained in this author's " Principles of 
Moral and Political Philosophy" are ob- 
noxious to just animadversion, I am far 
from being disposed to deny ; yet, taken 
as a whole, we may in vain search for any 
work in this department of knowledge, 
in the English language, which, for clear 
and forcible reasoning, for liberal and 
manly sentiment, for happiness of illus- 



168 VINDICATION OP DR. PALEY'S, &C. 

tration, and for uniform candour in the 
discussion of controverted topics, has an 
equal claim to the high reputation it has 
so long enjoyed, or to the patronage which 
it continues to receive from that learned and 
venerable body, for the improvement of 
whose academic system it was originally 
composed. Nor can I conclude without 
remarking, though the remark forms no 
part of the argument, that whatever may 
be the errors imputed to this eminent man 
by his opponents, whatever the occasional 
inconsistency in his manner of expressing 
himself, acknowledged by his friends, his 
two incomparable chapters, the one " on 
Happiness," in his Moral Philosophy, and 
the other on " the Goodness of the Deity," 
in his Natural Theology, would alone be 
sufficient to immortalize his name, and 
deserve to be transmitted for the instruc- 
tion and consolation of mankind to the 
latest as;es of the world. 



APPENDIX. 



APPENDIX. 



Containing a few Animadversions on some 
Remarks of Dr. Whately, Principal of St. 
A loan's HaU, Oxford, relative to the subject 
of the present Inquiry. 

When we perceive the doctrines and prin- 
ciples of Dr. Paley misunderstood and mis- 
represented by men of narrow views and 
superficial attainments, we perceive nothing 
more than what we might naturally expect ; 
but it is not a little surprising to find the 
same cause of complaint among writers of 
deeper reflection, who, we might imagine, 
would observe a greater degree of accuracy 
in stating the opinions of others. In a pub- 
lication of acknowledged merit on the sub- 
ject of logic by Dr. Whately of Oxford, a 



172 



APPENDIX. 



very erroneous representation of Dr. Paley's 
principles is placed before the student, in a 
note on the ambiguities of the word Rea- 
son ; sufficient to show how little consider- 
ation the former had bestowed on the sys- 
tem of Ethics against which his sarcasms 
are so injudiciously aimed. " The moral 
faculty," he observes, (p. 302,) "or power 
of distinguishing right from wrong, is one 
of which brutes are destitute. But then 
Dr. Paley, and some other ethical writers, 
deny it to man also. The description given 
by that author of our discernment of good 
and bad conduct, (viz. as wholly dependent 
on reward and punishment,) would equally 
apply to many of the brute creation, espe- 
cially the dog." In the first place, I must 
beg leave to reply to this observation, that 
the language of Paley can never be inter- 
preted, even with the most forced con- 
struction, into a denial that man possesses 
the faculty of distinguishing right from 
wrong. It must be obvious, I should have 
thought, to every reader not prepossessed 
against the author, that he admits the 



APPENDIX. 



173 



existence of this faculty in its fullest extent . 
but respecting 1 its origin, he undoubtedly 
differs most widely from those who contend 
for an instinctive or intuitive moral sense. 
On this question his opinions nearly coin- 
cide with those of Locke and Hartley. In 
the next place, Paley does not represent 
" our discernment of good and bad con- 
duct," as dependent on the expectation of 
reward and punishment ; nor has he in any 
instance confounded two points so essen- 
tially different, as the criterion and the 
obligation. When men have acquired a 
knowledge of their duty from Scripture, or, 
where that is silent, from the tendency 
of actions to promote the welfare of society, 
what is the inducement which will be found 
paramount to every other in producing 
compliance ? Paley answers, and, as I con- 
ceive, truly answers — the prospect of an 
infinite reward in another state of beina-. 
Dr. Whately affirms that this principle (the 
same in its nature, though not in its extent) 
is equally applicable to brutes ; and he 
attributes to the dog a feeling of expectation 



174 



APPENDIX. 



tantamount to foresight, of which no facts 
hitherto adduced in natural history can be 
deemed a sufficient proof. Nothing, indeed, 
can be more certain, than that the dog and 
the horse are trained into regularity and 
habitual submission, by a course of early 
and often rigid discipline. Must we on 
that account, therefore, refuse to believe 
that the moral habits of the human race 
also are formed by salutary discipline, and 
can, in truth, be formed by no other means ? 

Dr. Whately appears to have forgotten, 
when he passed these severe censures on 
Paley's theory, that one of his favourite 
authors, Archbishop King, entertained sen- 
timents, with regard to the foundation of 
virtue, extremely similar to those of the 
former. As in a preceding page I have 
quoted two passages from the cc Origin of 
Evil" on this particular point, I will merely 
add the following in confirmation of what 
is there asserted. 

The archbishop, when combating an ob- 
jection against one of his arguments — that 
it makes God require the several virtues 



APPENDIX. 



175 



from men, not because they are morally 
good, but because of the advantages which 
they produce, thus expresses himself:* "To 
this I answer, that the author (meaning 
himself) has showed in his book that moral 
evil is founded on natural, and that in the 
state of nature before revelation, men had 
no way to know what free acts were good 
or pleasing to God, but by observing what 
was advantageous to particular men, or to 
society. Observe all the laws of nature, and 
you will find them discovered and proved 
from this sole principle, as is manifest from 
all the books that treat of them. To pretend, 
therefore, that the natural mischiefs arising 
from vice, do not prove them to be morally 
evil, is an uncommon way of thinking ; 
since the very argument whereby we prove 
them morally evil, is because they are 
pernicious." In another passage in the same 
note, speaking of the natural turpitude 
of vice, he remarks — " In like manner, the 
turpitude of vices does not arise from the 

* Chap. V. Sect. i. Subsect. 4. Note (R.) 



176 



APPENDIX. 



simple nature of actions, but from some 
adventitious circumstances which bring evil 
on them ; and as they are undue and hetero- 
geneous, they, as it were, defile those actions 
to which they adhere." — With respect to 
this celebrated work of Archbishop King, 
the reasoning contained in the first four 
chapters on the evil of defect, and on 
natural evil, is, I think, rational and satis- 
factory, as far as it extends, considering 
the obscurity in which the disquisition is 
involved ; but when he comes to treat 
of the origin of moral evil, he seems to be 
totally unable to contend with the diffi- 
culty of his subject. * The hypothesis by 

* Agreeing, as I do, with the opinion of Sherlock, 
Dr. King, and many other divines, that moral evil con- 
sists in the voluntary production of natural evil, the 
argument derived from a gradation of ranks in the 
universe, has always appeared to me as possessing great 
weight. If it be asked why man was not created less 
subject to bodily pain and the calamities of accident, 
less exposed to temptation, and less prone to moral de- 
linquency, it might be answered, that to whatever finite 
height he might be raised in the scale, the same ques- 



APPENDIX. 



177 



which he attempts to reconcile the dif- 
ferent solutions of the long-debated ques- 
tion would still recur. There would be no termination 
to these unreasonable demands till the insatiable im- 
agination had arrived at a state of existence so exalted 
that it would be impossible for the Almighty to increase 
its enjoyment. And if one class is to be elevated to 
such a state, why not all classes down to the lowest 
forms of animated matter ? But what, let us for one 
moment ask, would be the inference to be deduced from 
this constitution of things? No other than this — 
that it would be utterly impossible to add to the 
happiness of a single individual throughout the vast 
regions of the universe. There could be no progress 
from lower to higher degrees, no possible improve- 
ment in knowledge and virtue, no room for the ex- 
ertion of omnipotence itself. We must imagine the 
boundless attributes of the Deity to be absolutely 
exhausted; and if the supposition of a limited in- 
finity be not one of the grossest of all absurdities, no 
absurdity can be framed by the wildest fancy. Hence 
a gradation of ranks appears to be inevitable, and if a 
gradation, then imperfection and evil follow in its train. 
It is sufficient for us to be assured, that the good greatly 
preponderates over the evil, and that intelligent crea- 
tures possess the capacity of continually rising from 

N 



178 



APPENDIX. 



tion respecting liberty and necessity, is as 
curious as it is unfounded ; namely, that the 
will possesses the power of rendering" things 
agreeable which were before indifferent, 
merely by its own agency. Numerous 
actions, therefore, we are told, afford plea- 
sure to the agent, not because they are 
good in themselves, but solely because they 
are the objects of choice, and derive all 
their goodness from the very act of election ! 
The notes of Bishop Law to the first part 
of this treatise contain many valuable, and 
some very profound remarks, but as soon 
as he undertakes the defence of his author's 

one degree of happiness and perfection to another, with- 
out ever approaching to a termination of their advance- 
ment. Better, therefore, would it become those whose 
minds are disturbed by objections of this nature, to 
follow the advice of our great moral poet : 

Submit — in this, or any other sphere, 
Secure to be as blest as thou canst bear ; 
Safe in the hands of one disposing Power, 
Or in the natal, or the mortal hour. 

Essay on Man, I. 285. 



APPENDIX. 



179 



singular hypothesis, his efforts are as little 
successful in producing conviction as those 
of the latter. Both the comment and the 
text have equally failed. 

I confess that, in common with many 
others, I felt no less regret than surprise 
on seeing the republication, by Dr.Whately, 
of Archbishop King's Sermon on Predes- 
tination. The doctrine which it inculcates 
on the subject of analogy is not merely cen- 
surable as an attempt to remove one per- 
plexity by adopting * another, but is com- 
pletely destructive of all just views of the 
divine attributes, and may be successfully 
employed by the abettors of Calvinism, 
in establishing some of its most revolting 
tenets. Speaking of the foreknowledge 
and pre-determination of the Supreme 
Being, as compared with ours, the author 
of the Discourse observes, that "they are 
quite of another nature, and that we have 

* 'EvrauSa /luvtol iravTa t avOpwTrojv voaei 
KaKoiq orav OeXwaiv iaaOai KaKa. 

Sophocles apud Stobcenm. 

N 2 



180 



APPENDIX. 



no proper notion of them any more than 
a man born blind has of sight and colours." 
And this assertion he considers as equally 
applicable to the moral attributes of the 
Deity. * Hence it follows as a necessary 

* " To give no other account of the nature of God 
and his ways, than that they are unintelligible, is to 
encourage the atheist, and to yield him the day. Unless 
we will entangle ourselves with making good some fic- 
titious attributes of God, or defend his providence upon 
false suppositions and circumstances, there will be no 
greater entanglements touching the notion of God and 
his providence, than there would be in the nature of 
those things we are sure do exist, though there were no 
God in the world. Wherefore, let me advise you to 
this, since you have such fast and certain hold of the 
existence of the Deity, by the repeated effects thereof in 
nature, not to let that hold go upon any grounds that 
are uncertain or false. For the Scripture declares nothing 
contradictory touching the nature of God ; nor is there 
any human authority that has any right to be believed 
when it propounds contradictions : nor are we bound to 
burthen the notion of a Deity with any thing we are 
not assured implies perfection. These cautions if we 
use, no man, I think, need be much entangled in his 



APPENDIX. 



181 



deduction, that if benevolence and justice 
be different qualities, as they exist in the 
divine nature, from what they are in man, 
then to select a small portion of the human 
race for the purpose of conferring on them, 
without the slightest regard to merit or 
demerit, consummate and eternal bliss, and 
at the same time to doom a tremendous 
majority, in no respect more criminal than 
the former, to endless torments, may be 
just and benevolent in the highest degree ! 
But these conclusions do not, perhaps, pre- 
sent to Dr. Whately's mind obstacles to the 
reception of that repulsive system so for- 
midable as they must to the minds of other 
anti-calvinists, since in a more recent pub- 
lication on the difficulties of St. Paul's 
writings, he places before us a far more 
favourable picture of Calvinism than a 
reference to the statements of its principal 
advocates will be found to justify ; and 

thoughts touching the nature of the Deity — Divine 
Dialogues by Dr. Henry More. Dial. I. p. 29- Second 
Edit. 1713. 



182 



APPENDIX. 



though he avers his disbelief that the 
peculiar doctrines of predestinarians are 
revealed, he yet confesses that he is " far 
from deciding that they are altogether un- 
true."* This concession appears to me to 
be fraught with consequences which no 
rational Christian can view without pain- 
ful emotions ; for though some of the more 
enlightened defenders of the Calvinistic 
tenets, who occasionally appear, have evi- 
dently been influenced by the increased 
liberality of the age, to divest their system 
of a portion of the harshness so repugnant 
to the feelings of their adversaries, we must 
still call to mind, that by this procedure 
they are departing from the original doc- 
trines which were handed down to their an- 
cestors by St. Augustine, Godeschalc, and 
Calvin. The Calvinism contemplated by 
Dr. Whately is not the Calvinism of Knox, 
of Owen, of Jonathan Edwards, nor of Mr. 
Vaughan of Leicester. Who, I may ven- 
ture to ask, but a rigid disciple of the Ge- 
nevan reformer, could ever persuade him- 

* See Essay III. on Election. 



APPENDIX. 



183 



self that doctrines so terrific can be found- 
ed in truth, on the supposition that the 
Supreme Being is possessed, I will not say 
of infinite benevolence, for that would be 
out of the question, but of common justice, 
in the sense usually annexed to that term? 
' ' Shall mortal man be more just than God ?"* 
But if malignity in man is no malignity 
when ascribed to the Deity, then the greater 
part of the sacred writings either have no 
meaning at all, or one which must excite 
horror in every mind not absolutely insensi- 
ble to the feelings of compassion. 

The distinction on this point most worthy 
of reception, and most consistent with the 
natural sentiments of mankind, is that which 
is stated by Bishop Berkeley, in his Minute 
Philosopher, and which has been adopted by 
the great majority of the most rational and 
eminent of our theological writers. When- 
ever any of the senses or bodily members 
belonging to man, or any of the evil pas- 
sions, are ascribed in the Scriptures to the 
great Author of the universe, the expres- 

* Jobiv. 17. 



184 APPENDIX. 

sions are to be regarded as metaphorical, 
because nothing which implies defect can 
possibly reside in the Divine nature. But 
with respect to qualities and attributes, 
which in themselves, abstractedly con- 
sidered, denote perfection, the case is 
widely different ; and in this class we must 
comprehend knowledge, wisdom, foresight, 
power, benevolence, justice, and mercy. 
When these, therefore, are attributed to 
the Divinity, the language is no longer to 
be considered as metaphorical, nor even 
as analogical, in the sense maintained by 
Bishop Brown, and Archbishop King. To 
affirm that these qualities are not the same 
in their nature, when predicated of the 
Creator, as those which we designate by 
the same names as existing in his creatures, 
is at once to render nugatory some of the 
plainest and most important precepts in 
the New Testament.* The only difference 

* " We will, therefore, acknowledge that all those na- 
tural effects which are vulgarly ascribed to knowledge 
and wisdom, proceed from a being in which there is, 



APPENDIX. 



185 



to be remarked is, that in the one case 
they are infinite in degree, and exempt 

properly speaking, no knowledge or wisdom at all, but 
only something else, which, in reality, is the cause of 
those things which men, for want of knowing, ascribe 
to what they call knowledge, and wisdom, and under- 
standing. — And now that we have granted to you that 
there is a God in this indefinite sense, I would fain see 
what use you can make of this concession. You can- 
not argue from unknown attributes, or, which is the 
same thing, from attributes in an unknown sense. You 
cannot prove that God is to be loved for his goodness, 
or feared for his justice, or respected for his knowledge: 
all which consequences, we own, would follow from 
those attributes admitted in an intelligible sense. But 
we deny that those or any other consequences can be 
drawn from attributes admitted in no particular sense, 
or in a sense which none of us understand." — Bishop 
Berkeley's Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher. Dia- 
logue IV. § 18 : "A book," says Mr. Stewart, " which, 
notwithstanding a few paradoxical passages connected 
with the authors system of idealism, may be safely re* 
commended as one of the mostinstructive, as well as enter- 
taining works, ofwhich English philosophy has to boast." 
I cannot help adding, that the student who should read 



186 



APPENDIX. 



from every alloy, while in the other case 
they are finite in extent, and mingled 
with imperfection. 

According- to the assertion of Dr. King, 
we can acquire no conception of the Divine 
attributes except from their effects. That 
such is the case we pretend not to dispute. 
And how, I would ask in reply, do we be- 
come acquainted with the qualities of men, 
but from their effects ? Why then should 
we not ascribe similar effects in both cases 
to similar causes, where no degree of im- 
perfection would be implied in the Divine 
nature ? Since there cannot be a question 
that we are altogether ignorant of mind, 
otherwise than from the qualities which it 
perceptibly exhibits, and since the author 
of the Discourse acknowledges, that though 

the Archbishop's discourse on predestination, and neg- 
lect to devote an equal share of attention to the fourth 
dialogue of the Minute Philosopher, would be acting 
almost as unfairly as if he were to study "Hume's Essay 
on Miracles," without afterwards examining the an- 
swers of Dr. Campbell or Bishop Douglas. 



APPENDIX. 187 

the physical and moral attributes of the 
Deity are entirely different from those 
bearing" the same name in man, he must 
yet possess " either these or other faculties 
and powers equivalent to them, and ade- 
quate to the mighty effects proceeding 
from them," the whole partakes more of 
verbal disputation than of solid argument. 
The purpose, however, to which this ana- 
logical principle is applied by the learned 
prelate, sufficiently explains the cause of 
his placing so much stress on it ; nor can 
there be a doubt that the sole reason why 
it has been recently revived, or, I should 
rather say, attempted to be revived, by 
some few of our theologians, (for happily 
they are but few,) is the impossibility of 
reconciling the Divine foreknowledge with 
absolute contingency, by the common argu- 
ments employed on that point, and the 
short method thus afforded them, as they 
conceived, of avoiding a difficulty which 
they found themselves unequal to combat, 
and the solution of which had baffled the 
efforts of so many distinguished polemics. 



188 



APPENDIX. 



This remark, however, I must add, is not 
applicable to Dr. Whately himself. 

In the second appendix of this author, 
to the sermon on which he has bestowed, 
I cannot but think, so much unmerited 
praise, he has not only made the same un- 
founded accusation against Paley, to which 
I have just alluded, but he has also viewed 
it as the ground of serious objection against 
the reasoning contained in that author's 
inestimable publication on the " Evidences 
of the Existence and Attributes of the 
Deity." 

Dr. Whately observes, that our notions 
of the moral attributes of the Supreme 
Being are not derived solely from the con- 
templation of the created universe; but 
that man, having in himself a moral faculty 
by which he is instinctively led to approve 
virtue and disapprove vice, is thence in- 
clined antecedently to attribute to the Crea- 
tor of the universe all those moral (as well 
as intellectual) qualities, which in his own 
judgment, seem the most worthy of admi- 
ration, and intrinsically excellent. This 



APPENDIX . 



189 



omission in the " Natural Theology" of our 
Cambridge moralist, is regarded by the 
Oxford divine as leaving a flaw in the 
argument* In reply to this objection, 

* To prevent misapprehension, I will quote the 
author's own words. " Our notions of the moral at- 
tributes of the Deity are not derived (as Dr. Paley con- 
tends they are) from a bare contemplation of the created 
universe, without any notions of what is antecedently 
probable, to direct our observations. Nor is it true 
(few indeed would now, I apprehend, assent to that part 
of his doctrine) that man has no moral faculty — no na- 
tural principle of preference for virtue rather than vice 
— benevolence rather than malice ; but that being com- 
pelled by the view of the universe to admit that God is 
benevolent, is thence led, from prudential motives alone, 
to cultivate benevolence in himself, with a view to secure 
a future reward. The truth, I conceive, is exactly the 
reverse of this ; viz. that man having in himself a moral 
faculty, or taste, as some prefer to call it, by which he 
is instinctively led to approve virtue and disapprove 
vice, is thence disposed and inclined antecedently, to 
attribute to the Creator of the universe, the most per- 
fect, and infinitely highest of beings, all those moral 
(as well as intellectual) qualities, which to himself seem 
most worthy of admiration, and intrinsically beautiful 



190 APPENDIX. 

I would observe, that if Dr. Whately means 
to censure Dr. Paley for not attributing' to 



and excellent : for to do evil rather than good, appears 
to all men (except to those who have been very long- 
hardened and depraved by the extreme of wickedness) 
to imply something of weakness, imperfection, corrup- 
tion, and degradation. I say " disposed and inclined, -1 '' 
because our admiration for benevolence, wisdom, &c. 
would not alone be sufficient to make us attribute these 
to the Deity, if we saw no marks of them in the crea- 
tion ; but our finding in the creation many marks of 
contrivance, and of beneficial contrivance, together with 
the antecedent bias in our minds which inclines us to 
attribute goodness to the Supreme Being, — both these 
conjointly lead us to the conclusion, that God is infinitely 
benevolent, notwithstanding the admixture of evil in 
his works, which we cannot account for. But these ap- 
pearances of evil would stand in the way of such a con- 
clusion, if man really were what Dr. Paley represents 
him, a being destitute of all moral sentiment, all innate 
and original admiration for goodness : he would in that 
case be more likely to come to a conclusion, (as many of 
the heathen seem actually to have done), that the Deity 
was a being of a mixed, or of a capricious nature ; an idea 
which, shocking as it is to every well-constituted mind, 



APPENDIX. 191 

the Deity those qualities which man feels 
existing in his own mental constitution, 

would not be so, in the least, to such a mind as Dr. Pa- 
ley attributes to the whole human species.'" — (Republi- 
cation of Abp. King's Discourse on Predestination, by 
Dr. Whately, Appendix. No. II. p. 119.) The pre- 
ceding representation of Paley's opinions, is not only 
ill-founded, but is expressed in a tone which betrays a 
strong feeling of prejudice against that most rational 
and amiable philosopher. In the first place, he no- 
where affirms, (as I have so often repeated,) that man is 
destitute of moral sentiment, and all admiration of good- 
ness. He is certainly averse to admit that these senti- 
ments are innate; — but does it follow that they are the 
less real on that account ? How many tastes does a 
man acquire in his progress from infancy to manhood ! 
But will any one dispute their reality, because he was 
not born with them ? In the second place, there is no 
pretence for saying that those who entertain the opinions 
of that moralist, would be most likely to conclude, from 
the admixture of evil with good in the world, that the 
Deity was a being of a mixed or a capricious nature. 
The mere contemplation of the phenomena that come 
under our own observation, is sufficient to prove the 
contrary. Evil in various forms we undoubtedly ex- 



192 



APPENDIX. 



and of which he is said to derive the proof 
solely from an instinctive moral sense or 
conscience, the latter acted judiciously, in 
my apprehension, in not making a disputed 
faculty the foundation of an important ar- 
gument. But if the former writer means 

perience in ourselves, and witness in others ; but it is 
impossible not to perceive, at the same time, such a pre- 
ponderance of good, as to convince us that the Supreme 
Author of the Universe is neither malignant in his dis- 
position, nor indifferent to the welfare of his creatures ? 
We cannot then hesitate for a moment in acknowledging 
his benevolence. But whatever quality can be proved 
to belong to a self-existent and eternal Being, can have 
no possible limitation. He who can believe, that per- 
fection and imperfection, infinite and finite, can reside 
in the same intelligent nature, would not scruple to ad- 
mit the grossest contradiction proposed to his assent. 
And hence we must necessarily infer, that the evils ob- 
servable in the creation were not only designed, but de- 
signed for effectuating the wisest and most beneficent pur- 
poses. Why the same portion of good could not be 
accomplished without the instrumentality of evil, is 
indeed a question confessedly too difficult for the hu- 
man faculties to explain. 



APPENDIX. 



193 



to affirm that Paley disbelieved altogether 
the reality of any moral faculty, and that 
consequently he was unable to make use of 
the argument which he is charged with 
omitting, I must repeat that nothing can be 
more erroneous and unfair than this reitera- 
ted insinuation. To any person who has 
read his works uninfluenced by prejudice, 
it must be obvious that he was as firmly 
convinced as any man can be, that the hu- 
man mind has the power of discriminating 
between right and wrong, and that the 
moral judgment, when formed, is attended 
with feelings of approval or disapproval. 
Dr. Whately believes this faculty to be 
instinctive, Mr. Stewart maintains that it 
is intuitive, and Dr. Paley that it is ac- 
quired. And if we admit the last case to 
be established, will it not answer every 
practical purpose, with the same facility, as 
if we referred the origin to instinct or in- 
tuition, and without having recourse to 
more causes than are requisite to account 
for the effects? Why impart to the hu- 
man race any faculty or power, which from 

o 



194 



APPENDIX. 



their mental constitution they are capable 
of attaining ? To suppose the intervention 
of divine agency in cases where the opera- 
tion of human means would be perfectly 
adequate, is to suppose what we never meet 
with in the economy of nature, and which, 
if proved, would certainly afford no very 
striking indication of superior wisdom. 

That those qualities observable in the 
human mind, which imply any degree of 
excellence in themselves, afford one proof 
of their existence in the Supreme First 
Cause, is most undoubtedly true ; but as this 
mode of reasoning is of a more speculative 
nature, it was not without cause omitted 
by Dr. Paley, as being less suited to pro- 
duce conviction in the understandings of 
the majority of his readers than the innu- 
merable evidences derived from the system 
of the world around us. The arguments 
taken from the external phenomena of 
nature are at once comprehended by 
those who are little accustomed to ex- 
tend their thoughts beyond the objects of 
sense, and will consequently to them, at 



APPENDIX. 



195 



least, appear more conclusive. And with 
regard to the exceptions which present 
themselves in considering- the moral attri- 
butes of the Divine nature, they will re- 
quire the same explanation, whether we 
select one or both of the modes of proof 
here alluded to. That the physical and 
moral attributes of the Divinity are, in 
the strictest sense, infinite, both in degree 
and extent, would still remain to be proved ; 
and this indeed can be effected only by the 
argument which I have adduced in the last 
preceding note. 

Had it been the design of that author, 
in his incomparable work on "Natural 
Theology," to enter into a metaphysical dis- 
cussion of the question, I should say that 
his argument was defective in a point of 
much greater consequence than that spe- 
cified by Dr. Whately ; since no regular 
answer is given to a formidable objection 
of Hume, which, if well founded, would 
place an insuperable obstacle to every proof 
that could be offered of the being and 
perfections of the Deity. It is maintained 

o2 



19G 



APPENDIX. 



by this acute sceptic, that all we know of 
causation amounts to nothing more than this, 
— that there is ^constant conjunction observa- 
vable between certain events, but that be- 
tween what we term cause and effect, we 
cannot prove any necessary connexion; * 
and hence it follows, that observation and 
experience will not enable us to demon- 
strate that the universe is the effect of 
creative intelligence. " When two spe- 
cies of objects have always been observed 
to be conjoined together, I can infer, by 
custom, the existence of one wherever 
I see the existence of the other ; and 
this I call an argument from experi- 
ence. But how this argument can have 
place where the objects, as in the pre- 
sent case, are single, individual, without 
parallel, or specific resemblance, may be 
difficult to explain. And will any man 
tell me with a serious countenance, that 
an orderly universe must arise from some 
thought and art, like the human, because 
we have experience of it ? To ascertain 

* See Hume's Essay on Cause and Effect. 



APPENDIX. 



197 



tliis reasoning, it were requisite that we 
had experience of the origin of worlds 5 
and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have 
seen ships and cities arise from human art 
and contrivance."* 

Considering the popular character which 
Paley intended should distinguish his work, 
he wisely avoided a formal refutation of 
this sophistry of Hume, though he has in 
effect answered a most material part of it 
by reasoning from an axiom, which to every 
sound understanding must appear at once 
indisputable, — that the adaptation of means 
to an end necessarily implies contrivance, 
and that contrivance cannot exist without 
a contriver. A stricter scrutiny will enable 
us to perceive, that between the contrivance 
carried into execution, and the mind of the 
contriver, there is not merely a constant 
conjunction, or the invariable antecedence 
of one event to another, but that necessary 
connexion which is usually implied between 
what Mr. Stewart properly defines to be 
an efficient cause, and its effect. Nor is 

* See Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. 
Part II. p. 300. Edit. Edin. 1793. 



198 



APPENDIX. 



there any occasion for that resemblance 
between different effects, which is contend- 
ed for by Hume, before we can infer an 
intelligent cause. It is sufficient, to au- 
thorise this inference, that we can discover 
an adjustment of means to some important 
end. But, to pursue this question further 
would be irrelevant to the immediate pur- 
pose of these observations. 

Before I dismiss the subject, I cannot 
avoid remarking that the eminent writer, 
to whom Dr. Whately appeals in confirma- 
tion of his position, not only expresses him- 
self as happy in being able to give his un- 
qualified praise to Dr. Paley's work on " Na- 
tural Theology," but affords an additional 
authority against that analogical mode of 
describing the physical and moral attributes 
of the Deity, to which Abp. King and his 
commentators are so strongly attached.* 
Among many passages which might be se- 
lected from different parts of Mr. Stewart's 

* I need scarcely remind those who are conversant 
with the subject, that the same opinion was entertained 
by Hobbes and Hume. It is curious to remark the 



APPENDIX. 



199 



works, I will cite two only from the 
second volume of his " Philosophy of 
the Active and Moral Powers of Man," 

similarity of the language adopted by the latter philoso- 
phical unbeliever to that of the Irish prelate. " But as 
all perfection is entirely relative, we ought never to 
imagine that we comprehend the attributes of the Divine 
Being, or to suppose that his perfections have any ana- 
logy or likeness to the perfections of a human creature. 
Wisdom, thought, design, knowledge ; these we justly 
ascribe to him, because these words are honourable 
among men, and we have no other language or other 
conceptions by which we can express our adoration of 
him. But let us beware, lest we think that our ideas 
anywise correspond to his perfections, or that his attri- 
butes have any resemblance to these qualities among 
men. 11 — Hume^s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, 
Part. II. p. 491. Edit. 1793. I would not, for a mo- 
ment, however, be understood to insinuate that, in any 
other particular, there subsists the slightest similarity 
between the sentiments of the Primate of Ireland, and 
the English historian. That the principles of the 
latter were truly atheistical, there cannot be a particle 
of doubt. He who denies that we can prove the ex- 
istence of a creative cause of the universe, unless we 



200 



APPENDIX. 



sufficient to evince the truth of my asser- 
tion.* " In entering on this subject, (evi- 
dences of benevolent design in the uni- 
verse,) we may lay it down as a fundamen- 
tal principle, that our ideas of the moral 
attributes of God must be derived from our 
own moral perceptions. It is only by attend- 
ing to these that we can form a conception 
of what his attributes are, and it is in this 

have experience of the origin of worlds, must, whatever 
he may consider himself, be neither more nor less than 
an atheist. If, by the term experience, he means per- 
sonal experience, he was sufficiently aware of the im- 
possibility, that every individual of the human race 
should possess that evidence. If he intended to signify 
the experience of others, we must then call to mind 
that we can become acquainted with that experience 
by no other means than by testimony. But it is one of 
Hume's favourite maxims, that no testimony, how- 
ever powerful, can prove a miracle, and such to man 
must be the creation of a world. The necessary in- 
ference is, that the existence of a Deity cannot be es- 
tablished. 

* Vol. II. p. 109. 



APPENDIX. 



201 



way we are furnished with the strongest 
proofs that they really belong to him." In 
a subsequent page he observes,* — " But not 
to insist on this metaphysical view of the 
subject, it is evident that if we believe that 
we have derived our existence from the 
Deity, we must ascribe to him, in an in- 
finite degree, all those powers and perfec- 
tions which he has communicated to us, or 
which he has rendered us capable of ac- 
quiring. From our own imperfect know- 
ledge we must ascribe to him omniscience ; 
from our limited power we must ascribe to 
him omnipotence ; and a fortiori, from our 
moral perceptions we must ascribe to him 
unerring moral rectitude, and goodness un- 
bounded towards all his creation. In op- 
position to this mode of reasoning, sceptics 
have frequently urged the impropriety of 
forming a deity after our own image, and 
have represented the argument I stated for 
the moral attributes of God, as arising from 
the same illusion of the imagination which 
* Vol II. p. ill. 



202 



APPENDIX. 



leads the vulgar to ascribe to him the hu- 
man form, and organs of perception ana- 
logous to our own. But the comparison is 
by no means just, &c." Enough has been 
said to show that Mr. Stewart's notions of 
analogy differ widely from those embraced 
by the archbishop and his disciples. 

But since Dr. Whately's opinion on this 
question is thus altogether at variance with 
Mr. Stewart's, it is not a little singular that 
it should escape his observation, that in the 
animadversions he has hazarded, and which 
I could not consistently allow to pass un- 
noticed, he has exhibited a palpable instance 
of self-contradiction. He first contends, that 
the moral and physical qualities of the Deity 
are totally different in their nature from 
those bearing the same name in man, and he 
then censures Dr. Paley for not deriving the 
principal proof , of the moral perfections of 
the Almighty, from the moral distinctions 
perceptible by the human mind ; that is, 
for not ascribing to the Deity those quali- 
ties in man which the same author had be- 



APPENDIX. 



203 



fore denied could exist in the Divine nature 
in any other sense than that which is de- 
rived from analogy. No exception is made 
in the theory embraced by the archbishop 
and his partisans which can be deemed 
at all favourable to Dr. Whately's state- 
ment, since the doctrine which they 
advocate is extended not less to the 
moral than to the intellectual attributes 
of the Supreme Intelligence. I will 
only ask, therefore, if these qualities, as 
they exist in the Creator and his rational 
creatures, are not of the same nature, (for 
in their extent the difference is admitted 
to be infinite,) what legitimate deductions 
can possibly be established by arguing 
from one to the other? Were, in short, 
the mode of applying analogical reasoning, 
which has been adopted by this particular 
class of Divines ever generally received in 
the latitude for which they contend, it is 
not too much to affirm, that there is scarcely 
any doctrine, however extravagant, scarcely 
any external rites, however deformed by 



204 



APPENDIX. 



superstition, which might not be made to 
assume the appearance of truth and recti- 
tude, and which, with a slight effort of in- 
genuity, might not be so interpreted to the 
multitude, as to be thought consistent with 
the language of the sacred writings. 



THE END. 



LONDON : 

1BOISON AND PAIMEIt, PRINTERS, SAVOY "STREET, STRAND. 



PUBLISHED BY THE SAME AUTHOR. 



1. The LITERARY and SCIENTIFIC PURSUITS of 
the University of CAMBRIDGE, briefly described and vin- 
dicated. 8vo. 1815. 

2. OBSERVATIONS on the Doctrine, Discipline, and 
Manners of the WESLEYAN METHODISTS, and of the 
EVANGELICAL PARTY, as far as they agree in the same 
System. 8vo. 1818. 

3. METHODISM INDEFENSIBLE; or Strictures on the 
Four Letters of Mr. J. Everett, in answer to the obser- 
vationsof the Rev. Latham Wainewright, Rector of Great » 
Brickhili, on the Wesleyan Methodists. By A True 
Churchman. 8vo. 1820. 

4. A FINAL REPLY to Mr J. Everett's Letters in 
Vindication of Methodism. By A True Churchman. 8vo. 
1821. 

5. A VISITATION SERMON, Preached at Stony 
Stratford, before the Archdeacon of Bucks, and the Clergy, 
June 28th, 1810. 

6. A THANKSGIVING SERMON, Preached in the 
Parish Church of Great Brickhili, January 13th, 1814. 



WORKS 

PUBLISHED BY 

J. HATCHARD AND SON, 187, PICCADILLY. 



THE ANNALS of the POOR; containing the Dairy- 
man's Daughter, the Negro Servant, and Young Cottager ; to which 
are added, The Cottage Conversation, and A Visit to the Infirmary. 
By the Rev. LEGH RICHMOND A.M., late Rector of Turvey, Bed- 
fordshire. With an Introductory Sketch of the Author ; by the Rev. 
JOHN AYRE, A.M. A new edition, in a neat foolscap volume, illus- 
trated with a Portrait of the Author, and other Engravings by Edward 
Finden. 12mo. 7s. bds. — The same Book, illustrated with ten Wood 
Cuts. 18mo. 3s. 6d. bds. 

A NEW YEAR'S EVE, and other Poems. By BER- 
NARD BARTON. In 1 vol. 8vo. Illustrated with a Frontispiece, 
drawn and Engraved by John Martin. 9s. bds. 

AUTHENTIC DETAILS of the VALDENSES, in 

Piedmont and other countries ; with abridged Translations of " L'Histoire 
des Vaudois," par Bresse, and La Rentree Glorieuse, D'Henri Arnaud, 
with the ancient Valdensian Catechism. To which is subjoined Origi- 
nal Letters, written during a residence among the Vaudois of Piemont 
and Wirtemberg, in 1825. Illustrated with twelve Etchings. 8vo. 
12s. bds. 

THE PLAIN ENGLISHMAN; comprehending original 
Compositions, and Selections from the best Authors. 3 vols. 8vo. 11. 16s. 
bds. This work is particularly adapted for the more intelligent class of 
Mechanics and Servants, and will be found a valuable addition to 
a Village or Kitchen Library. 

The SACRED PRECEPTOR; or, a Series of Ques- 
tions and Answers, elucidating the Doctrines, Practice, and Natural 
History of Scripture. For the Use of Schools and Young Persons. 
Second Edit. 3s. neatly half-bound. 

CLAVERSTON, or the Infidel's Visit. 18mo. 2s. 6d. 
boards. 



Works Published by John Hatchard and Son. 



AN ESTIMATE of the HUMAN MIND: being a Philo- 
sophical Inquiry into the legitimate Application and Extent of its leading 
Faculties, as connected with the Principles and Obligations of the Chris- 
tian Religion. By the Rev. J. DAVIES, of Queen's College, Cambridge. 
2 vols. 8vo. 18s. bds. 



LETTERS on the CLIMATE, INHABITANTS, PRO- 
DUCTIONS, &c. of the Neilgherries, or Blue Mountains of Coimbatoor, 
South India. By J. HOUGH, of Madras, 8vo. 6s. bds. 



OCCASIONAL THOUGHTS on Select Texts of Scrip- 
ture. By the late JOHN MASON GOOD,M.D. With a Portrait of 
the Author. Foolscap, 3s. Qd. bds. 



MEMOIRS of JOHN MARTYN, F.R.S. and of THOMAS 
MARTYN, B.D., F.R.S., F.L.S., Professors of Botany in the University 
of Cambridge, for a period of ninety-three years. By the Rev. G. C. 
GORHAM, B.D. 8vo. 10s. Qd. bds. 



The PORTRAITURE of a CHRISTIAN GENTLEMAN. 
By W. ROBERTS, Esq. Lincoln's Inn. 12mo. 6s. bds. 



ESSAYS ON SUPERSTITION, (Originally Published 

in the " Christian Observer," during the year 1829,) with Corrections 
and Additions. By W. NEWNHAM, Esq. Author of" The Principles of 
Education," &c. 8vo. 10s. Qd. bds. 

SOCIAL DUTIES ON CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES. 

One vol. foolscap, 12mo. 3s. Qd. bds. 

THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION AND EXALTED FE- 
LICITY OF GLORIFIED SAINTS. By ROBERT MEEK. 12mo. 
3s. bds. 



TYPICAL INSTRUCTION considered and illustrated, 
and shown to be suited to all, but particularly the early Ages of the 
Church. By JOHN PEERS, A.M. Sunday Evening Lecturer of St. 
Antholins, Watling Street, and late of St. Mary Magdalen College, 
Cambridge. 8vo. 14s. bds. 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724) 779-2111 



